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Abstract
School Effectiveness and School Improvement have achieved a hegemonic position as 
paradigms of educational evaluation and development, both as research paradigms and as 
discursive practices shaping policy and practice. This is true internationally but with 
particular strength in the governance of English schools, thus the texts which constitute this 
doctoral submission - namely a book and several journal articles, and an extended 
commentary upon them -  are grounded specifically in that context. The concept of paradigm 
is deployed in order to question systematically their (often tacit) methodological and political 
assumptions and to establish some foundations and justification for alternative models of 
school quality and educational change. A particular emphasis is placed upon the neglect, 
within these dominant paradigms, of educational and social aims, curriculum and pedagogy, 
and their inadequate framing of the relationship between schools and social context. These 
texts also focus strongly upon the situation of schools serving inner city and other high- 
poverty neighbourhoods, as a kind of border situation which exposes the limitations of these 
paradigms.
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School Effectiveness and School Improvement: questioning the paradigms 
The Commentary
Questioning paradigms: writing from a ‘border country’
In his autobiographical novel Border Country (1960), Raymond Williams’ reveals the grounded 
nature of his writings on literature, culture and society. He portrays the Welsh border village of 
his childhood, his family, working lives, a world away from Cambridge University where he 
taught. It explores the significance of class as a fine-textured lived experience. It conveys the 
‘structure of feeling’ and the change brought about by time. The need to reflect on the roots of 
my own published writing and its relationship with other strands of my life connects me again to 
Williams’ project. The idea of a border positionality may help situate the ongoing scrutiny of 
paradigms in which I have engaged.
School Effectiveness (SE) and the currently hegemonic version of School Improvement (SI) 
have many critics, operating from a variety of subject positions -  different biographical and 
career paths, values, and locations in academic or other fields. How, in my case have critical 
reflection on schooling, and my particular challenge to the Effectiveness and Improvement 
paradigms, come about? What are the biographical and intellectual roots of my own position? 
What is the relationship between my academic writing and a wider political engagement?
The foundations are partly experiential, and go back to my own schooling. The secondary school 
I attended underwent a deep transformation, driven by the energy and vision of a new 
headteacher. I was already a high achiever, but school now meant a rich musical culture, and a 
spirit of intellectual openness and debate. It was a Catholic grammar school, in the days of 
selective education, but serving largely the descendants of Irish immigration; those of us still 
living in the poorer parts of town were able to flourish socially and academically and fulfil our 
parents’ thwarted ambitions without the sense of marginalisation we might have felt elsewhere. 
As a young teacher, I was shocked to find that other schools were not like this: I saw the worst 
of formal grammar schools and decaying secondary moderns, as well as an innovative 
comprehensive school engaged directly in the major curriculum reforms of the 1970s. I have 
never been happy with the complacency of those who deny the possibility of change. From the 
start (see Wrigley 2000:4) I have rejected a kind of sociological determinism which denies the 
possibility of school success for working-class and migrant learners as much as the blinkered
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pragmatism of those who, in effect, step over the ‘background factors’ and expect schools to get 
on with the job o f ‘improvement’.
Cambridge University was a culture shock. I cannot claim to have ‘enjoyed’ student life there, 
but the intellectual stimulus was enormous, including Raymond Williams’ sustained challenge to 
the traditional norms of English studies. He was an early role model: for the way in which he 
combined political and social breadth with a fine-grained analysis of texts, and for the 
connectedness between his academic specialism and a wider social engagement. The 
international student revolts of the late 1960s involved not only a political awakening, but a 
questioning of academic paradigms in many fields (e.g. Blackburn 1972). This has remained part 
of my intellectual heritage, including an earlier research degree (MPhil) in which I was able to 
examine the fundamental transformation of the subject English in secondary schools that I 
experienced as a teacher.
Many years later, I worked as a school inspector (1993-99) - another border position. After 
working in a local education authority, I found it difficult to re-enter teaching as I had intended, 
but was very uncomfortable with the Ofsted inspection regime in England. This coincided with 
the rising influence of School Effectiveness and School Improvement, and their incorporation 
within the governance and discourse of schooling. I was becoming increasingly aware of the 
inadequacy of a nexus of regulations and practices intended to secure the ‘effectiveness’ of 
schools, including league tables, an emphasis on direct teaching, the naming and shaming of 
‘failing schools’, an insistence that they could be ‘turned round’ rapidly through expert 
leadership and tough action, and the pervasive emphasis on monitoring through testing as the 
prime mechanism of quality control. In the course of over a hundred inspections, I was able to 
experience first hand, albeit within limits, the strain between a particular model of evaluation 
and the real life in the school. I came across headteachers who had ticked every box but still not 
‘turned the school round’. My awareness grew that factors were at work in school success and 
improvement which fell outside an increasingly hegemonic SE/SI model, and particularly in the 
case of schools in poor or inner-city neighbourhoods. The encounters provided the foundations 
for my first writings on school improvement, which were already, to a degree, critical of the new 
orthodoxy.
I am also aware that this critique has been developed from outside as much as within. Much of 
my work has consisted in paying close attention to the internal regularities of the paradigms, but 
the critique also arises from my wider political beliefs and habits of mind, as a socialist in a
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troubled neo-liberal world. This is never far from the surface in my writings. Another 
contributory factor is my knowledge and reading ability in a number of different languages, 
giving me access to texts about quality and change outwith the SE/SI paradigms. Finally, I have 
always read widely: some would call this eclecticism, but it has provided tools for alternative 
constructions of reality. All of these factors have supported this current paradigm critique.
Finally, it is important to reiterate that I have never denied that some schools are more successful 
than others, or that schools can and must get better. My disagreement is with the particular 
understanding o f ‘quality’ known as School Effectiveness, and its associated model of School 
Improvement. Flence, the focus on paradigms. It is my contention that the structures of thinking 
and core assumptions of SE, and of a dominant SI paradigm which depends closely upon it, 
whilst strongly institutionalised in some education systems, do not help the education of young 
people growing up in a troubled world. Close scrutiny of the paradigms might help clarify the 
thinking of other critical educators, including those who position themselves confidently within 
the school improvement and others who prefer alternative decriptions such as ‘educational 
change’. At the same time, I am convinced more than ever that much ‘improvement’ has been 
little more than an intensification of existing practices and that we need to rethink education, not 
simply ‘improve’ it. Without wishing to lose the positive lessons about change processes derived 
from School Improvement studies, it has been my intention to work towards new understandings 
of educational change based upon a commitment to social justice and global citizenship. This 
cannot be separated from a wider struggle against neo-liberal assumptions and policies, 
involving both political action and theoretical debate.
Aims, background and structure
This paper constitutes a commentary on a book and a number of articles which form part of an 
ongoing critique of School Effectiveness (SE) and School Improvement (SI), and which 
collectively, along with this commentary, constitute my doctoral submission. These twin 
paradigms, methodologically distinct but otherwise in close partnership, have had enormous 
influence upon education policy internationally, though nowhere more so than in England. The 
critique is, therefore, more than simply an academic debate, as it necessarily raises questions 
about the future development of schooling and the curriculum. Moreover, it extends into an 
attempt to lay foundations for alternative models of educational change.
3
To call SE and SI ‘twin paradigms’ is appropriate; they have very different methodologies but 
are alike in other important respects, as the subsequent discussion will show. They did not come 
naturally from the same womb, however; they are twins more in the sense of ‘town twinning’ 
rather than as siblings. Until the 1990s there was little connection (see Fullan 1991:5 seq; Fullan 
1992:2lseq; Reynolds et al. 2000:207-8), and School Improvement’s origins are to be found 
mainly in attempts to overcome implementation difficulties of externally-imposed curriculum 
innovations. The twinning process, indeed, was deliberately engineered, and involved the 
founding of the International Congress for School Effectiveness and Improvement (ICSEI) in 
London in 1988, and the journal School Effectiveness and School Improvement in 1990.'
A key document is Reynolds, Hopkins and Stoll (1993) Linking School Effectiveness Knowledge 
and School Improvement Practice: Towards a Synergy. The authors speak explicitly of 
paradigms and paradigmatic change, but view these primarily as methodological issues, to the 
neglect of ontological, epistemological and ethical dimensions. They are silent about the political 
context they are working in, and their marriage proposal begs many of the questions that my 
own work has had to grapple with.
These key researchers do however explicitly distinguish different paradigms of School 
Improvement, and it is important to acknowledge that the term Improvement can be applied to 
diverse models and theories, including national variants, in addition to the SE-influenced SI 
paradigm which has become dominant. I have focused particularly on the English situation, and 
often refer to ‘official’ or ‘mainstream’ or ‘hegemonic’ School Improvement; these qualifiers 
should be assumed even where I speak of School Improvement tout simple. I also use the 
abbreviation SE/SI to refer to the conjuncture of paradigms. It is not my intention to include in 
this paradigm critique everyone who seeks to make schools better, studies the processes of 
educational change, or uses the term improvement in their writings. Indeed, a large part of my 
second book (text A) is devoted to making available to an English readership the ideas of key 
writers who either sit on the critical boundaries of the SE/SI tradition or do not identify explicitly 
as ‘School Improvement’.
The present commentary sets out to locate my selected texts within this ongoing meta-theoretical 
challenge to the mainstream School Effectiveness and Improvement literatures, including some 
brief references to some of my other publications and those of other critics. Within the limited 
space available, it also seeks to extend some of the theoretical arguments beyond the selected
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texts. The process of writing this commentary has provided the welcome opportunity of stepping 
back to re-read and refine some of the arguments.
The requirements of the degree also involve the immodest task of establishing a significant 
personal contribution. This is, inevitably, a task of dubious objectivity, but writing the 
commentary has helped me re-evaluate, with the help o f colleagues, the nature of my own 
contribution within a wide and often international debate.
This commentary therefore has a number of interrelated purposes:
• to demonstrate and further develop a clear theoretical position in relation to mainstream 
SE and SI and the alternatives
• to reconsider my critical engagement with SE/SI, reflecting on aims, methods and 
arguments
® to consider the appropriateness of the term paradigm as applied to SE and SI
• to examine more closely the methodologies of SE and SI, and some key terms such as 
culture in comparison with wider usages
• to further relate SE and SI to policy formations, partly with the benefit of hindsight, 
given subsequent developments
• to extend the argument relating SE and SI to wider debates about neo-liberalism and 
globalisation
• to relate these selected texts to my other writings, and compare my own work with that 
of other critical academics, including demonstrating a significant personal contribution
• to focus on two issues in particular, schooling in contexts of serious socio-economic 
deprivation, and democratic citizenship as a key aim of education, in which the 
adequacy of the SE/SI paradigms appears particularly problematic
• to summarise my attempts within these texts to articulate some alternative theoretical 
foundations for rethinking professional practice and educational change.
The space available inevitably places limits on the above, requiring a selective focus. It is 
certainly not possible to pursue any of the above list with the rigour each demands. It would be 
possible, for example, to write several full-length books simply to identify and evaluate the 
network of thinkers active within mainstream SE/SI in the UK alone. It would not be too
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difficult to write a monograph focusing solely on the lost potential in the limited application of 
culture as a key term in the School Improvement literature. My work is not intended to serve as 
a history of these paradigms, nor of their attempted merger in the English context during the 
1990s. Nevertheless, it is hoped that this commentary will give a sense of coherence to the texts 
selected for presentation for the degree, and help to demonstrate their value as a contribution to 
an important practical and theoretical debate within education.
Effectiveness and Improvement are deeply ideological terms, firstly in the sense that they sound 
self-evidently a ‘good thing’ - rather like looking after your health or being kind to animals. Part 
of their persuasive power derives from this approriation; it would appear either destructive or 
silly to argue that schools should be ineffective or should get worse. More precisely, the 
academic research under these headings has made contributions which are of lasting value and 
cannot simply be written off. Yet, for all this, SE and SI are not neutral technologies of 
measurement or change management; they have come to signify a particular nexus of practices, 
concepts and (often tacit) beliefs and values, which are deeply imbricated with educational and 
social policy at a critical time of political and cultural change. They significantly affect the daily 
practices of school management and classroom teaching, and have helped to establish a 
discourse of schooling and education which is often taken for granted and seemingly invisible. 
Given the all-pervasiveness of this way of thinking, this discourse, the way it has become 
embodied in everyday thinking and action, it is tempting to imagine Foucault returning from the 
dead to write one last book. He would, however, be forced to recognise that power can be 
simultaneously highly centralised and dispersed, and that coercion and hegemony can coexist 
and complement each other.
This is especially so in the case of England, on which this study concentrates. Here, under New 
Labour, School Improvement theory flourished once grafted onto School Effectiveness.2 In part, 
the merger was necessary because School Effectiveness, under the Conservative government, 
had in effect made schools ‘accountable’ without explaining how change might be brought 
about. The incoming Labour Government could not espouse a simple market-based argument 
that weaker schools should be allowed to collapse and be replaced. School Improvement offered 
more than top-down demands for the application of a list o f ‘key characteristics’. One way of 
summarising the adoption of School Improvement in mid 1990s England is that soft 
management was placed at the service o f  hard policy. This adoption involved the transformation 
of SI into the paradigm discussed in my writings.
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The incoming government’s Third Way ideology required the sense that something practical and 
apparently sensitive was being done to overcome poverty-related underachievement but without 
challenging the premises of neo-liberal economic relations or the modes of school governance 
established by the previous government - a quasi-market of school choice leading to gradual 
erosion of a comprehensive system, combined with a highly centralised curriculum and strong 
mechanisms of quality control. Here School Improvement helped to create a dominant discourse 
and discursive practice; it was thoroughly imbricated into these modes of governance -  and was 
itself substantially reoriented during the process. The slogan ‘pressure and support’, for example, 
served to hide the contradiction between School Improvement’s emphasis on willing 
participation in the change process and the continuing top-down control of schools.
It is however an essential part of my argument that there are alternatives. Firstly, despite the 
extent of policy borrowing - and even compulsory lending through the World Bank and other 
agencies -  SE and SI are not as universally adopted and embedded as their promoters like to 
believe. My contacts with colleagues in many different countries, and an ability to read the 
literature of educational change in various languages other than English, have shown enormous 
diversity as policies and ways of thinking are applied to different traditions, refracted and 
resisted. We should not underestimate its spread to other parts of the world, but neither should 
we exaggerate it or fail to recognise the hybridisation that occurs in the processes of globalised 
policy transfer (Ball 1998a; Dale 1999; Ozga and Lingard 2007). Closer to home, alongside the 
tacit assumptions and normative practices which pervade the English system, alternative 
practices do emerge, partly as overt resistance to official policies and partly as contradictory 
strands of official policy.
The situation here in Scotland itself deserves specific analysis and evaluation: it is a situation of 
intense contradiction and instability - on the one hand, for example, versions of literacy teaching 
imposed by some local authorities which make England’s National Literacy Strategy seem 
enlightened, and on the other the progressive ambitions of A Curriculum fo r  Excellence, albeit 
still largely rhetorical. Although Scotland has few academics who would locate themselves 
within SE or SI, there are nevertheless extensive signs of impact on education authorities and 
schools.
One reading of the present situation is that SE / SI is in deep crisis, even in the English system.
Its leading proponents are deeply compromised within a policy regime which, in effect, ignores 
some of the more democratic or balanced conclusions of the Improvement literature - for
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example, that there are no ‘quick fixes’, and that sustainable change depends on shared 
understanding and deep conviction. As I argue later in this commentary and in D, this way of 
thinking is too limited to help raise achievement and improve the quality of education in the 
poorest or more troubled neighbourhoods. A focus on improving specific measurable outcomes 
has, arguably, led to superficial learning for the test and to slippage in other equally important 
areas, for example foreign languages, or the high proportion of 17 and 18-year-olds in the UK 
without even part-time education or training. The neglect of wider aspects of education and 
young people’s welfare was highlighted in a Unicef (2007) report. Meanwhile, the wider world 
presents increasingly critical issues (global warming, poverty, war in the Middle East) which cry 
out for a very different kind of educational change.
It is for this reason that I have attempted, in these texts and elsewhere, to devote as much 
attention to curricular issues and pedagogical practices as to developing a critique of hegemonic 
models of change management. This has involved recovering practices from the past and from 
schools in other education systems, revisiting some earlier debates and critically resituating them 
in their relationship to educational change, and beginning to frame an agenda for future research 
and school development.
The text which follows begins with an examination of the concept paradigm in various fields 
(pages 9-24), before applying it to School Effectiveness and to School Improvement (pages 24- 
28). This involves a distinction between the two but also an understanding of their 
interdependence (pages 28-35). The discussion focuses on their neglect o f power as a concept 
and the inadequate conceptualisation within the Improvement literature of the term culture (from 
page 31). As I will argue, examining SE and SI as paradigms facilitates a process of opening up 
to critique ways of studying education which have become hegemonic in policy and practice, 
particularly in England, to the extent that they are widely regarded as self-evidently correct. To 
identity them as paradigms is precisely to de-normalise these ‘normal sciences’, to destabilise 
them and to create out of their silences a critical intellectual space from which new paradigms 
can emerge.
The subsequent section (pages 36-39) reviews alternative conceptualisations of educational 
change, highlighting the closure of the SE and SI mainstream to these alternatives. This section 
ends by highlighting how SE / S i’s much repeated challenge to ‘raise expectations’ requires a 
well theorised rethinking of common sense notions of intelligence and ability. The subsequent 
section of this commentary (pages 40-47) highlights the exploration of pedagogy and curriculum
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in my chosen texts -  surprisingly given only marginal attention in the mainstream Improvement 
literature -  including (from page 43) a discussion of education for democratic citizenship. The 
commentary then focuses (pages 48-57) on SE/SI’s neglect, or inability to respond to, issues of 
social justice, attempting, albeit briefly, to situate these twin paradigms within the political 
context of neo-liberal globalisation. Finally, it summarises some of the possibilities and 
resources for a reconceptualisation of educational change beyond SE / SI.
For the purposes of this degree, I have chosen to present:
• my second book Schools o f  hope: a new agenda fo r  school improvement [Stoke-on- 
Trent: Trentham Books, 2003; referenced here as A, chapters as A l, A2, etc.]
and three papers, the first of which is substituted for A l :
• School Effectiveness -  the problem o f reductionism [British Journal of Educational 
Research, 2004, 30(2); referenced as B.]
• In search o f  inclusive pedagogies: the role o f  experience and symbolic representation in 
cognition [International Journal of Pedagogies and Learning, 2006, 2(1); referenced as 
C]
• Schools and poverty: questioning the Effectiveness and Improvement paradigms 
[Improving Schools, 2006, 9(3); referenced as D]
Sources provided in A are not repeated in the reference list at the end of this commentary. 
Paradigms: towards a definition
Though I had used the term paradigm on various occasions on the assumption of a shared 
understanding, I began to define it more precisely in D. This section of the Commentary thus 
provides an opportunity to expand that discussion of paradigms and paradigm change in a 
variety of fields, and to evaluate its potential relevance to an account of School Effectiveness 
and Improvement. I have preferred the term paradigm to related terms such as discourse or genre 
for its span across ontological, epistemological, methodological and ethical dimensions. (See 
Appendix for further discussion.)
The concept of paradigm has transformed our thinking about competing or successive schools of 
thought and modes of action in numerous academic fields. Little used before 1960, the term was
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popularised as a result of Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure o f  Scientific Revolutions (1962). Almost 
simultaneously however we find parallel examples in various fields of a deep and holistic 
questioning of established ways of thinking (e.g. Laing 1960, Foucault 1961/1967, Williams 
1958). On a broader scale, of course, we might also see positivism, liberalism, marxism and 
postmodernism as meta-paradigms shaping much of 20th Century thinking.
Despite Kuhn’s initial suggestion (1962:15) that paradigms may not exist in the social sciences, 
social science researchers were soon referring to the paradigm wars, and currently there are over 
a hundred UK-published social and political science books with paradigm  in the title.
Particularly at the height of postmodernism, the concept o f ‘paradigm’ was often deployed to 
relativise truth-claims, such that arguments could only be established within a specific frame of 
reference and by appeal to a specific interpretive community. This eventually attracted criticism:
Thus talk of ‘paradigms’ can readily stand in for Wittgensteinian talk o f ‘language 
games’, cultural ‘forms of life’, etc.; for Rorty’s idea of ‘final vocabularies’ as the 
furthest we can get in justifying scientific or other sorts of truth claim; and again, for the 
all-purpose notion of a ‘discourse’ as it figures in those various archaeologies (or 
genealogies) of knowledge pursued under the joint aegis of Nietzsche and Foucault. In 
each case the analogy with Kuhn enters by way of claiming scientific / philosophical 
warrant for the view that all facts, theories, observation sentences, etc., relate to some 
language, discourse or cultural paradigm whose criteria determine what shall count as a 
valid statement at any given time, and whose limits remain necessarily invisible to those 
who think within them. (Norris 1997:82)
But thinking about paradigms can also be liberating, in that it historicises and denaturalises
hegemonic ideologies. As I argue in D (273), the concept of paradigms:
... gives us a tool to grasp the inner logic of a dominant way of thinking and acting; of 
seeing links between knowledge and power; and opening up a space of possibility within 
an apparently closed system.
Such ideas enable us to relativise (in a different sense than Norris’s) the ideas and structures of
our own age. Turning Bourdieu’s claim on its head, they allow the fish to see the water and not
just swim in it (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 127).
This is particularly relevant where a set of ideas and practices pervades an entire field of activity, 
such as the governance of schooling in England. If Foucault were alive today, there could be no 
better topic for his attention than School Effectiveness and School Improvement, not simply as 
academic sub-disciplines, but as regulatory practices at every level of action in educational 
policy and practice. As Foucault repeatedly asserted of discourses, they are not simply 
descriptive but help to constitute that of which they speak (e.g. Foucault 1972).
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The application of the concept paradigm to School Effectiveness and School Improvement, in 
Kuhn’s terms, seems particularly important at the present time as a means of penetrating and 
subverting the normality of these discourses and practices, their ‘taken-for-grantedness’. Kuhn’s 
contribution included demonstrating that social processes are at work even in the 
epistemologically ‘innocent’ field of the natural sciences. I have sought to argue that orthodox 
SE and SI experts, whilst using a neutral technical discourse of effectiveness and improvement 
and even believing themselves to be working scientifically, can be as blinkered as Kuhn’s 
‘normal science’ researchers. However, since education is a field of social science and social 
practice, there are also enormous ethical and political issues involved in the closures and silences 
of SE and SI.
This is not an attack on key academics working within this tradition. Indeed, I sought as far as 
possible in A to avoid focusing on individuals. Examining a paradigm means focusing on a 
structure of thinking which has a normative power beyond the intentions of individual 
contributors, and which can make it difficult to develop a coherent argument along alternative 
lines. Many of the leading English writers in SE-related School Improvement have, in fact, 
either moved away from this field, or sought to resolve their unease by dividing themselves 
between School Improvement and a field in which they feel more able to express their unease 
about the education system (e.g. Kathryn Riley’s work with Rustique-Forrester on school 
exclusions, 2002). This has not reduced the power of the SE/SI paradigms; rather, they are so 
strongly institutionalised that we might view administrators, headteachers, School Development 
Officers, School Improvement Partners, inspectors, NPQH trainers and so on as the equivalent of 
Kuhn’s ‘normal scientists’ beavering away on their laboratory research. The paradigm would 
exist even if all its originators had disappeared or changed their minds. A recent illustration is 
the imposition on schools o f ‘School Improvement Partners’ who are supposed simultaneously 
to respect the autonomy and individuality of the school and to report them to the education 
authority if they do not do as they are told (DfES 2006a; see MacBeath 2006 for more detailed 
commentary on these tensions). This accords with my focus in A3 on the unacknowledged 
contradiction between seemingly collegial school-level processes and the political surveillance 
of schools.
One should also not forget the centrifugal force of agency against the centripetal force of 
paradigmatic structure, which might in time lead to a new paradigm. (See for example A:42-3.) 
The outcome is, needless to say, uncertain, as indeed is the question of whether this will be
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known as School Improvement or by some other name. Those who might bring it about include 
some who identify as part of a School Improvement club and others who do not. My own 
position is itself ambivalent - sitting on the border fence, perhaps. As editor of a journal entitled 
Improving Schools, I am publicly identified with School Improvement but have used this role to 
move debate beyond the dominant paradigm. Some key figures within ICSEI have made 
strenuous efforts to welcome critical thinkers from outwith the SE/SI paradigm into its annual 
meetings, though some of ICSEI’s founders clearly regard this with dismay. The difficulty of 
categorising is well illustrated by the case of Andy Hargreaves, a welcome contributor to ICSEI 
but who describes his field as ‘educational change’. Some of his work fits within the SE/SI 
paradigms, as does most of Lorna Earl’s, but their collaboration with Jim Ryan produced 
Schooling fo r  change: reinventing education for early adolescents (Hargreaves et al. 1996), 
which in its breadth and critical stance lies well outside that tradition. Mitchell and Sackney 
(2000) entitle their book Profound Improvement; its focus is solidly on the process of change, 
with relatively little space devoted to curricular or social issues, but it presents a more subtle and 
developed model of capacity building which pushes the boundaries of SI, as well as supporting 
progressive pedagogical and social positions. This highlights the error of viewing SI as a single 
and uniform entity, but does not diminish the importance of understanding the paradigmatic pull 
ofSE-related School Improvement.
My own writing represents a modest effort to challenge the truth-claims and spurious 
universality of these twin paradigms, in terms of their inner logic or epistemology and their 
practical effects. They also demonstrate some ways of opening up alternative and more hopeful 
perceptions of educational change. Many of the lessons about change processes deriving from 
School Improvement remain valid, but have been distorted by their relationship to damaging 
educational policies; my hope has been to work towards new understandings of educational 
change based upon a commitment to global citizenship and social justice.
Paradigms in natural sciences
Kuhn’s (1962) introduction of the term paradigm to refer to a distinctive way of viewing and 
studying phenomena was groundbreaking. By extending its meaning from ‘exemplary 
achievement’ to ‘all the shared commitments of a scientific group’, he enables us to focus on the 
(often tacit) frames of reference which unite an academic community.
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In various attempts to define paradigm, he includes ‘instrumental, theoretical, and metaphysical 
commitments’ and various ‘objects of group commitment’ such as ‘symbolic generalizations, 
models and exemplars’ (1970:297). His use of the term stretches wide but is quite slippery.
Paradigms in the sense of exemplary solutions are more effective than abstract rules, but this 
does not exclude theoretical elements. He argues that exemplary achievements or classic texts 
include a wide range of theoretical and methodological elements and functions:
• entities, forces and laws - key concepts, relationships and causes
• models -  whether seen as heuristic or ontological
• legitimate problems and acceptable solutions
• methods and instruments.
In addition, Kuhn uses paradigm to refer to a period of relatively stable consensus in a field; he 
distinguishes paradigms from preparadigmatic periods. Later however he concedes that even in 
less stable times when no school of thought has dominance, each competing school necessarily 
has its own paradigm(s).
Kuhn presents a historical dynamic which breaks with accepted norms of science as gradual 
progress. Using the term revolutions, he shows the new as a serious break with the old, involving 
not only different practices but a fundamentally different world-view, though it is the 
contradictions in the old world which give rise to the new. The outgoing world-view cannot, 
ultimately, survive contrary evidence, but the breakthrough is resisted as a result of the outgoing 
paradigm - people explain away problems as anomalies. A growing number, however, can see 
that established structures are inadequate, and that there can be no progress on specifics without 
a broader sweeping aside of the old world order. Kuhn argues that social / subjective as well as 
epistemological factors are at play in both revolutionary periods and ‘normal’ periods of 
scientific development.
As in political revolutions, Kuhn argues the fundamental incompatibility of different scientific 
paradigms:
When paradigms enter, as they must, into a debate about paradigm choice, their role is 
necessarily circular. Each group uses its own paradigm to argue in that paradigm’s 
defence. (1970: 94)
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It is this fundamental incommensurability (Kuhn’s word) which has generated intense 
epistemological debate, and the term makes it easy to question the rationality of the process.
This results from the deployment of Kuhn’s work by some postmodernists in support of their 
own relativism, but some of the confusion must be ascribed to Kuhn’s Humean empiricism. 
(Norris (1997:82-96) calls this ‘ontological relativism’.) An alternative account would involve a 
realist epistemology/ontology (Bhaskar 1975): epistemological ‘truths’ may change, as the best 
currently accepted approximation to ontological reality, without endangering the constancy of 
the material world.
Despite some confusing expressions (‘the scientist afterwards works in a different world’ 
1970:121), Kuhn crucially shows how scientists’ new world-view enables them to ‘see new and 
different things when looking with familiar instruments in places they have looked before’
(ibid: 111).
For a balanced evaluation, we need to understand that, alongside Kuhn’s emphasis on social and 
subjective elements of decision making, terms such as ‘persuasion’ and ‘conversion’, and the 
demonstration that new theories may be presented or even adopted in advance o f  sufficient 
verification, he does not in finality abandon a fundamental commitment to scientific 
(experimental / observational / rational) procedures (ibid:42).
Within this basic commitment to evidence-based rationality, Kuhn’s essential contribution lies in 
understanding that science is not a process of pure autonomous reasoning; scientists inevitably 
work within the framework of a shared world-view or paradigm. In ‘normal’ periods, the 
scientist works within a (perceived) world organised according to paradigmatic entities, laws, 
perspectives, parameters and expectations. Even in times of change, scientists first see counter­
evidence as an anomaly, an accidental exception within an existing paradigm. Most shocking of 
all to some, at the point when scientists become persuaded of a different paradigm, Kuhn argues 
that this is not always on the basis of adequate evidential proof: the dots are only gradually 
joined up in the ‘normal science’ period which follows.
Against Norris (1997), I would argue that regarding observations as seriously affected by 
preconceptions and as ‘theory-laden’ does not necessarily lead to anti-Realism. Norris is right to 
argue that Kuhn opens a gate for postmodernist relativism, but paradigm-denial is not the best 
answer. Norris’s single-minded campaign against postmodernist relativism (1992, 1996, 1997) 
leads him to neglect the more important radical features of Kuhn’s paradigm concept, namely
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the acknowledgement of the influence of human, social and political factors in knowledge 
production even of a scientific kind.
Despite the above problems, Kuhn’s essential contribution lies in demonstrating how, even in 
science, a change of paradigm can bring about a radically different perspective or framework 
through which we seek to understand the world. This reaches beyond laws and relationships into 
the very entities we regard as the building-blocks; it establishes parameters for what can be 
observed, studied and spoken about, the questions which can be asked and the nature of possible 
solutions. He shows how the intense productivity of periods of ‘normal science’ within an 
established paradigm may be at the cost of a narrowing of vision and loss of critical faculties.
Paradigms in social sciences
It is difficult to sustain Kuhn’s proposal that paradigmatic change may not be relevant to the 
social sciences. The contest between positivism (Comte 1830, 1844, 1851; Mill 1843 and 
interpretivism / hermeneutics (Droysen 1868; Dilthey 1883, 1900; Simmel 1892, 1918) dates 
back to the origins of the social sciences. This latter group insist on a mode of understanding 
(Verstehen) which goes beyond scientific explanation (Erklären) in that it requires empathy 
(Einfühlung) and a sense of intentionality in human action. Kuhn’s argument that social sciences 
are ‘pre-paradigmatic’ appears correct only in the limited sense that there is no clear historical 
succession of different schools of thought; there clearly are distinct paradigms but they often 
exist simultaneously. Differences remain unresolved and may not be capable of resolution. 
Paradigmatic pluralism in the social sciences may be endemic because it reflects not only 
methodological disparity but fundamental disagreements about social perspectives, ethical 
frameworks and political values.3
From the 1980s, it became commonplace to refer to ‘paradigm wars’ in the social sciences, 
albeit sometimes understood simplistically as an opposition between quantitative and qualitative 
methods. A paradigm is always more than just a methodology. Initially Lincoln and Guba (1985) 
argued that an historic shift was occurring between positivist and ‘post-positivist’ paradigms, 
though acknowledging (page 46, note) some confusion as the latter term was also adopted by 
neopositivists.
Subsequently, reporting a conference which brought together key social science researchers, 
Guba clarifies the argument by speaking of three distinct paradigmatic challenges to positivism:
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postpositivism, critical theory, and constructivism (Guba 1990). These are contrasted in terms of 
ontology and epistemology as well as methodology. This raises issues for SE / SI as paradigms -  
though Education as a field involving policy and practice has additional complexities.
Methodology
Paradigms involve more than simply methodology: we need to relate methods to epistemology 
and to questions of scope and legitimacy in a paradigm.
Methodology and epistemology are linked. Ways of knowing are guided by assumptions 
concerning what we are about when we inquire and by assumptions concerning the 
nature of the phenomenon into which we inquire. ... To study a methodology is to 
explore a logic of justification or a meta-framework for understanding the exercise of 
method, that is, for examining the principles and procedures by which we formulate 
inquiry problems, develop answers to those problems, and evaluate the correctness and 
profundity of those answers. (Schwandt 1990:262)
At the same time, we cannot regard methods as unimportant:
It does not follow that distinctions like quantitative-qualitative or scientific- 
constructivist-critical science are meaningless. Each of these is a different practice 
shaped by different aims, standards, values, and social and political realities, and... 
situated within a complex web of background knowledge. In other words, these paths to 
inquiry are rooted not simply in matters o f epistemology but in relations of power, 
influence, and control in communities of inquirers (Eisner 1988)... To view inquiry as a 
kind of technical project characterized only by types of logics or methods in use is to 
empty inquiry of its significance as a kind of practically and historically situated 
undertaking. (ibid:276)
It is worth reflecting, in the educational context, that SI and SE are methodologically distinct but 
ideologically and contextually related.
Moral, ethical and political judgements in social science
Various contributors criticise the positivist insistence on excluding ethical considerations from 
the social sciences, and argue for their legitimacy, indeed necessity. Schwandt questions the way 
that positivists and neopositivists shelter behind their ‘scientific’ methodologies:
A salient feature ... is their insistence on separating normative and empirical theory... 
Scientific methodologies deal with social facts; the stuff of normative theory -  social 
and political goals, aims, morals, and values -  is not their concern. (ibid:264)
Indeed Popkewitz (1990: 58) argues that the insistence on neutrality and ‘disinterest’ in the
social sciences in the USA has been a political construct and strategy, arising from historic
pressures exerted by businessmen on universities. A previous, more engaged, grounding of
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social scientific thought in either Christian or socialist ethics was displaced by ostensibly value- 
neutral versions of social sciences as normative academic disciplines.
This norm of value-neutral ‘objectivity’ has, of course, been contested from many directions, 
including varieties of postmodernism and Marxism, as well as humanistic and religious 
approaches. Nor is this a new debate (see Flyvbjerg 2001, drawing on Aristotle’s phronesis).
It is worth noting here that the proponents of School Effectiveness locate themselves as 
‘positivists’ or ‘post-positivists’, arguing that their scientific method ensures objectivity and 
impartiality (see B:238-241). School Improvement is more ambiguous (see for example Hopkins 
2001: 19-25), though its marginalisation of socio-political debate suggests that change processes 
can be ideologically and ethically neutral. By this I mean the assumption that SI provides a 
generic technology of change management which can be applied, promiscuously, in any school 
environment -  whereas in reality there is a deep imbrication of SI and neo-liberal educational 
reform. At a methodological level, the ‘normality’ of a particular view of educational change has 
been reinforced by Si’s reluctance to engage with wider pedagogical or sociological theory, at 
the same time as deriving much of its data from consultancy relationships, which in their turn 
depend upon a particular type of demand on a school to ‘improve’ (explored in A2 and A3). This 
has created a circularity and closure of which the mainstream proponents of SI seem unaware.
The possibility o f  a realist ontology
Guba (1990) argues that both postpositivism and critical theory share a ‘realist’ position, as 
opposed to the ‘relativism’ of the ‘constructivists’. In his argument however, confusion then 
arises due to the entanglement between ontology and epistemology. Guba (for the Constructivist 
camp) argues that the theory-ladenness and value-ladenness of facts, the underdetermination of 
theory, and the interactive nature of the inquirer/inquired-into dyad leads necessarily to a 
position of ontological relativism. As we can see in Bhaskar’s (1979) work on the social 
sciences, all these problems can be accounted for coherently within a sophisticated realist 
ontology (see Collier 1994:137-204).
To clarify, there is a distinction to be made between our sensations and understandings of the 
world and whatever reality lies behind that (between epistemology and ontology). Secondly, in 
the social sciences, whilst recognising other people’s perceptions of the world as subjective or 
culture-bound, the researcher must attempt to step back from them, establishing some critical 
distance. (See Bourdieu’s jibe: the ‘antiscientific caveats of the advocates of mystic union’;
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Bourdieu et al. 1999:607.) Thirdly, despite the values factor, factual investigation and theory 
have a key role in challenging hegemonic values (Collier 1994:170-200). Thus, my critique of 
School Improvement is not merely ‘another point of view’ based solely on different values and 
beliefs; I argue in (D) that the orthodox SI paradigm is ontologically unsound, epistemologically 
inadequate and practically unhelpful in its engagement with schools in the most difficult 
circumstances. The problem is not resolved simply by adding a moral gloss to the dominant 
paradigm.
Eisner, merging a postmodernist subjectivism with a classical empiricism, inadvertently 
illustrates the consequence of a failure to make such distinctions between subjectivities and 
reality:
‘Truth’ is ultimately a kind of mirage that in principle cannot be achieved because the 
worlds we know are those crafted by us and because we cannot uncouple mind and 
matter to know the world as it ‘really’ is. (Eisner 1990: 87-88)
This statement is a classic candidate for deconstruction: in what sense have we ‘crafted’ the
world? did anything of the world exist before our engagement with it? who is the we who know
and craft the world? do we all believe in the same ‘truth’ or can some of us challenge the version
of reality that others o f  us hold? might there also be a they who wish to impose their particular
views of the world on us, and have the power and means to do so?
Can the truth claims o f  different paradigms be compared?
Phillips (1990) argues against Kuhn that mutual comprehension is possible between paradigms. 
He acknowledges firstly that there is no pure observation:
Hanson’s theories may be stated in one sentence: ‘The theory, hypothesis, or 
background knowledge held by an observer can influence in a major way what is 
observed.’ Or, as he put it in a nice aphorism, ‘There is more to seeing than meets the 
eyeball’ (Hanson 1958, p7). In other words, observation is theory laden -  it is not a 
theory-neutral foundation. (Phillips 1990:34)
However, he then asks us to imagine two astronomers with different cosmologies: would they
see the same thing at dawn? Following Hanson, he argues that they would both see the sun
increasing its relative distance above the Earth’s eastern horizon -  though they would explain it
differently.
People with different frameworks nevertheless can have some views -  or can hold some 
d a ta - in  common, and these things can serve as the basis for further discussion and 
clarification of their respective positions. (Phillips 1990:35)
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Phillips extends this to the social sciences:
Freudians do understand -  but, of course, disagree with -  Skinnerians, and neo-Marxist 
social scientists understand colleagues of more conservative bent, and vice versa. The 
point is that paradigms ... serve as lenses, not as blinders, (ibid:41)
It is from a Critical Theory position that Popkewitz questions the constructivists’ methodology /
epistemology based on getting as close as possible to their field:
Much current research accepts the logic and reasoning found in schooling, arguing that 
researchers and policymakers need to respect teachers’ talk. Yet, the style of argument 
in teaching cannot be taken for granted. It presupposes the particular cultural 
competence found in schooling, with its interpretive stances and cognitive frames. 
(Popkewitz 1990:64)
Critical realism requires that we see social phenomena and beliefs as rooted within historical 
processes, but with the possibility of false consciousness and ideology. On the one hand, we are 
studying a reality ‘out there’, but if a particular mode of understanding becomes dominant, our 
paradigms themselves will change the reality and not simply the way we view it.
These arguments become particularly relevant when we are dealing not simply with an academic 
paradigm per se, but with a set of hegemonic practices which is both underpinned by the 
academic paradigm and reinforced, within an economic / social formation, by political 
directives. Challenging the academic paradigm becomes, almost inevitably, a part of a wider 
political challenge, as is evident from Schools o f  Hope (A) and elsewhere. It is, I believe, 
possible to engage critically with orthodox SI, but the process depends on including an ethical 
and political perspective, rather than simply arguing methodologies.
Paradigms in everyday life
Several contributors shed light on the impact of research paradigms on real-life activity, 
including educational examples. Eisner argues that positivistic evaluation affects teaching and 
learning:
Policy is a set of ideas reflecting certain values and beliefs that are created to guide 
decision making. The policies... constrain and stimulate practice... Policy that publishes 
in local newspapers the achievement test scores of students on standardized tests on a 
school-by-grade basis reveals a set of values about what really counts in that school 
district and inevitably influences what teachers are likely to attend to in their classrooms. 
(Eisner 1990:95-6)
He relates this to evaluation which overemphasizes quantitative methods:
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What we count counts. What we measure matters. What we test, we teach. After all, 
adaptation is a primary form of survival, and our appetite for assessment requires forms 
of adaptation in teaching that make survival possible. (ibid:94)
He regard the dominant paradigm in school administration as tacitly based upon a linear
rationality (ibid:96).
Interestingly, LeCompte criticises psychology’s paradigmatic hold on educational studies:
The focus of psychology is the isolated individual, decontextualized, and laboratory 
bound. It provides neither a complete nor an ideal model for studying social, cultural, 
and historical men and women. (LeCompte 1990:249)
These various examples illustrate how a paradigm, as a mode or school of research, can
substantially affect the daily practices of teachers and school administrators. What is at stake
here is not only particular methodologies, but the basic entities which are deployed and
privileged, the relationships between actions, the sense of what is legitimate and worthwhile, the
appropriateness of specific ways of investigating and evaluating practice.
All these endemic problems of the social sciences can be found in education, but more. Indeed, 
in education, once the paradigm has become established, it is sustained by the routine activities 
of headteachers, inspectors, administrators, and so on, insofar as they fail to reflect critically on 
their situation and actions. Education draws upon social scientific theory and practice, but does 
not fit neatly. It is both a field of practice and a field of research, with inevitable tensions 
between normative practices and analytical research. Educational researchers are concerned with
a) a set of everyday practice in schools (disciplinary as well as pedagogical), involving agency 
but within systems, institutions and traditions
b) which is underpinned, governed and redirected by policy and regulation
c) and investigated by methods deriving from the social sciences.
This is already too simple, but may serve to emphasise the possibilities for circularity when a 
particular paradigm (c), concerned with the whole (rather than a part, such as a subject or age- 
related methodology, or the needs of a particular category of pupil), achieves hegemonic status 
as a result of policy and politics (b), in such a way as to radically affect daily classroom practices
(a). It then becomes essential to transcend the paradigm theoretically, as a step towards liberation 
at the levels of policy and practice.
In the light of the above discussion of paradigms in the social sciences, we will need to consider 
with regard to SE and SI:
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0 their characteristics in epistemological and ontological terms, not simply methodological
• explicit and tacit assumptions that they are objective or value-neutral, including 
exposing their hidden values
• a requirement (at the same time) that we challenge them in terms of truth claims, and not 
only as a result of ethical disagreements
• the possibility (albeit limited) of engaging in debate with their proponents, rather than 
simply assuming ‘incommensurability’
• the necessity of challenging their assumed normativity as part o f a practical challenge to 
the dominance of a set of discursive practices.
Before doing that, however, the concept of paradigms will be examined further by looking at 
two other cases.
Paradigm changes in other fields: literature and psychiatry
Finally, this section uses examples in the fields of English literature and psychiatry to highlight 
further features of the paradigm concept. Both are contemporaneous with Kuhn’s Structure.
Though neither Raymond Williams nor Terry Eagleton used the term ‘paradigm’, their project 
turned out to be equally radical. Williams, in Culture and Society (1958), reinserts canonical 
literary figures within a socio-political history, and within a wider set of social critics such as 
Burke, Cobbett and Carlyle, rather than reducing the latter to mere ‘background’ to the literature, 
thus fundamentally changing the parameters and perspectives of the field.
For example, Williams rejects the notion that
... the Poet, the Artist, is by nature indifferent to the crude worldliness and materialism 
of politics and social affairs; he is devoted, rather to the more substantial spheres of 
natural beauty and personal feeling. (1958:48)
He reminds us of the direct political involvement of Wordsworth, Coleridge, Shelley, Southey
and Byron.
These activities were neither marginal nor incidental, but were essentially related to a 
large part of the experience from which the poetry itself was made, (ibid: 48-9)
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Williams’ reframing of Literature addresses the ontology o f ‘English’: it affects the key entities 
(writers and texts) and the force-field connecting these with social affairs. As will be clear later, 
there are parallels with SE/SI’s downplaying of social and political context.
Eagleton extends the paradigmatic shift by probing entities and relationships: what has counted 
as Literature at different times, the relationship between ‘Literature’ and readers, the ‘uses’ to 
which it is put, and so on. He questions fundamental categories, relationships, parameters, 
understandings of the field of study, ideological assumptions and so on:
In eighteenth-century England, the concept of literature... meant the whole body of 
valued writing in society: philosophy, history, essays and letters as well as poems. 
(Eagleton 1983:17)
He questions the dominant belief that Literature is ‘non-pragmatic’; firstly historicising it (as 
above), but then showing the ideological impact of this definition:
[It] would probably have come as a surprise to Qeorge Orwell to hear that his essays 
were to be read as though the topics he discussed were less important than the way he 
discussed them, (ibid: 8)
Like Williams, Eagleton zooms out again to make broader cultural statements:
Liberal humanism is a suburban moral ideology, limited in practice to largely 
interpersonal matters. It is stronger on adultery than on armaments, and its valuable 
concern with freedom, democracy and individual rights are simply not concrete 
enough.(Eagleton 1983: 207-8)
Both writers succeed in demonstrating that the tacit assumptions of a field of study (its assumed
entities, boundaries etc.) are deeply ideological, and that absences and silences in a text can
reveal as much about a paradigm as what is actually voiced. Their challenge, though involving
methodological shifts, goes well beyond this: they raise ontological, epistemological, political
and ethical questions about the entity of Literature, the parameters of the field, the relationship
between texts and readers, the purpose of study, the perspectives from which writers view their
world against the perspectives of readers and critics, and so on. This soon gave birth, in
conjunction with Richard Hoggart, Stuart Hall and others, to the new field of Cultural Studies.
R.D.Laing’s attempt to reform psychiatry has an even more obvious relevance to SE/SI, as it 
involved a set of institutional practices as well as an academic discipline. Though his challenge 
was marginalised and soon eclipsed - see Ingleby (2005) for a retrospective evaluation of the 
reasons -  it clearly illustrates the interconnection between ontological, epistemological, 
methodological and ethical dimensions. Slightly anticipating Foucault, Laing is clearly also
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speaking about power/knowledge or a ‘regime of truth’. Starting from an instinctive revulsion at 
the treatment of patients in mental institutions, Laing clearly understood the mutual necessity of 
transforming practice and developing a new theoretical paradigm: identifying key problems with 
the medical model, he proposed social phenomenology as an epistemology which could provide 
a more adequate understanding of ‘schizophrenia’.
Drawing on Goffman’s (1961) study of total institutions, Laing questioned the basic entities of 
psychiatry, including the role of patient and the categorisation of their problems as mental 
illness. This redefinition of entities shifts the basic perspectives:
A large part of his study [i.e. Goffman’s Asylums, 1961] is devoted to a detailed 
documentation of how it comes about that a person, in being put in the role of patient, 
tends to become defined as a non-agent, as a non-responosible object, to be treated 
accordingly, and even comes to regard himself in this light. (Laing 1967: 92)
The traditional clinical stance pathologises the patient through decontextualising his/her actions,
whilst normalising the behaviour of the psychiatrist. By contrast, Laing’s project (e.g. 1960)
entails deriving meaning from the words and actions of the ‘patient’, but also studying social
situations rather than just individuals. He thus reveals a ‘wider network of extremely disturbed
and disturbing patterns of communication’ (1967:94):
If their patients were disturbed, their families were often very disturbing. 
Psychotherapists, however, remained committed by their technique not to study the 
families directly. (ibid:93)
Laing, in effect, shows how the invalidation of a person’s experience through a clinical approach
(i.e. by declaring the person an invalid) and the wider machinery of psychiatric institutions,
reinforces an invalidation of their experiences within the family. He shows that ‘defences’ are
‘not only intrapersonal, they are transpersonal’ (ibid: 31).
Laing seeks to replace a positivist methodology and epistemology which frames and objectivises 
an individual as a patient with a disease. He rejects the objectification and reductionism of the 
positivist / scientific model:
Just as Kierkegaard remarked that one will never find consciousness by looking down a 
microscope at brain cells or anything else, so one will never find persons by studying 
persons as though they were only objects. A person is the me or you, he or she, whereby 
an object is experienced. Are these centres of experience, and origins of actions, living 
in entirely unrelated worlds of their own composition? (ibid:20)
To replace the clinical paradigm, Laing draws upon a paradigm of social phenomenology.
23
The other person’s behaviour is an experience of mine. My behaviour is an experience 
of the other. The task of social phenomenology is to relate my experience of the other’s 
behaviour to the other’s experience of my behaviour. Its study is the relation between 
experience and experience: its true field is inter-experience, (ibid: 15)
This enables a fundamental change in perspective. He reinscribes the illness as a person’s
strategy (meaningful albeit often flawed and self-destructive) for dealing with an irresolvable
situation. He questions assumed normativity:
One plane may be out of formation. But the whole formation may be off course... The 
plane that is out of formation may be also more or less off course than the formation 
itself is. The ‘out of formation’ criterion is the clinical positivist criterion. The ‘off 
course’ criterion is the ontological... It is of fundamental importance not to confuse the 
person who may be ‘out of formation’ by telling him he is ‘off course’ if he is not... 
(ibid:98-9)
Laing’s hopes for a paradigmatic reform were not realized. Ingleby locates this disappointment 
partly in Laing’s failure to find a strategy, but also in terms of wider political and ideological 
circumstances: economic crisis, an increasing demand for mental health services, Thatcher’s 
budget cuts and the era of ‘managed care’, producing a ‘new alliance of positivism and 
managerialism’. (Ingleby 2005)
Laing’s challenge to psychiatry shows how far down a critique of established practices must go, 
requiring both philosophical debate and social action. As I will argue, opposing the SE/SI 
paradigms requires both a practical and a theoretical challenge.
The relevance to School Effectiveness and School Improvement
In all of the above examples, the difference between paradigms stretches between ontology, 
epistemology and methodology. As summarised earlier, a paradigm involves:
8 entities and the forces / relationships that connect them
* models and theories
• legitimate problems and acceptable solutions
8 methods and instruments.
However, within the humanities and social sciences, as also within fields of social practice such 
as education, two further dimensions are entailed:
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* the political
• and the ethical.
By ‘political’, I mean primarily that a paradigm might privilege some perspectives and interests 
more than others, or it might overlook important differences of power. By ethical, I am referring 
both to the practitioner’s and the researcher’s responsibility for moral evaluation of practice -  it 
is not enough simply to ensure that it ‘works’.
Perhaps it is the political and ethical dimensions which make it almost impossible to resolve 
paradigm debates in the social sciences. It is not so much that they are /?re-paradigmatic as that 
resolution requires agreement about political and moral values. This may be because a particular 
model explicitly privileges certain perspectives. It may also result from versions of truth in 
which, in positivist fashion, the values remain unstated or obscured and their proponents insist 
they are adhering to objective and neutral technologies of truth. This claim in itself is 
ideological; for example, in a divided society, to insist on blindness to these divisions and power 
differentials involves a tacit claim that they are unimportant. Moreover, we might argue that the 
invisibility of the political dimension can actually exacerbate the problem:
Power is at its most effective when least observable. (Lukes 2005:1)
[Power] is tolerable only on condition that it mask a substantial part of itself. Its success 
is proportional to its ability to hide its own mechanisms. (Foucault 1980:86)
Gronn (2000:60) makes the interesting point that leadership has become a favoured concept in
education whilst being disconnected from a family of similar terms designating ‘modes of
human conduct and engagement’ such as ‘power, authority, influence, manipulation, force and
persuasion’. This is a pertinent illustration of how discourses operate as much through their
silences and closures as by what they speak.
It is not possible simply to separate the political and ethical dimensions from the other features 
of a paradigm; they may closely affect / be affected by the focus on particular entities or 
relationships, the legimacy of problems and solutions, and the boundaries of a field. The political 
understanding and positioning of the researcher may be interconnected in complex ways with 
these other features of a paradigm; although there is no automatic link, it is also no accident that 
Williams and Eagleton, for example, seek to re-read English from a particular class perspective 
which connects with their own origins and loyalties. Laing’s position is rather more complex, 
but involves more than detached rationality: a driving force was his emotional revulsion to
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normative practices and relationships which he had been expected to learn as professional 
habitus. Similarly, I would argue, the power relationships of a particular time and place, and the 
way in which a researcher locates him / herself in them, can radically affect the selection of 
entities, the parameters of a field of study, and so on. It might also affect which paradigms 
receive political support and achieve hegemony.
The paradigmatic features of School Effectiveness
The process of articulating a clear critique was slow but grounded. Particular support came with 
the publication of two books critiquing the SE/SI approach, Slee and Weiner, with Tomlinson 
(1998), and Morley and Rassool (1999). Both books provide a wealth of arguments against the 
dominant policy direction and its practical manifestations, though neither is particularly 
systematic or makes a clear enough distinction between SE and SI.
I sought to overcome these limitations in ‘School effectiveness the problem o f  reductionism 
(B), originally presented to BERJ (British Educational Research Journal) in April 2002; one 
version appeared in Schools o f  hope (A l) before the revised version was published in BERJ in 
2004.1 remain grateful to the anonymous referee who helped to clarify my thinking on 
epistemological aspects by directing my attention to Bhaskar’s critical realism (see B:230-l).
Bhaskar explores the relationship between ontology and epistemology, and provides a more 
complex account of the relationship between (real) causes or forces and the phenomena we 
experience: actions are brought about by real forces, but not all forces are actualised, since in 
reality multiple and often conflicting forces are at work. Conversely a correlation between events 
does not necessarily indicate causality; therefore, researchers should not be satisfied with 
demonstrating statistical correlation but must search for real causal mechanisms. He argues that 
this is particularly necessary in open systems where multiple forces are at work, and where a 
single factor cannot be isolated as in the laboratory. The examples he uses (1975:119-123) are 
the fields of history and meteorology, but clearly this would also apply to most fields of social 
practice including education.
It was an important realisation that the problem did not lie in the use of statistical methods per 
se; these have indeed been used with very different intentions and results by, for example, David 
Gillbom and colleagues in his work on social inequality and achievement (e.g. Gillborn and
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Mirza 2000). I was able to develop a much more specific critique of the use of quantitative 
methods in SE (see for example B:232-6).5
While developing this argument, I spent time uncovering one of the foundations of SE in the 
(largely US-based) Teaching Effectiveness research summarised in Rosenshine’s metastudy 
(1971). Another helpful influence was a close reading of some of the texts which SE regards as 
exemplary e.g. Rutter et al. (1979); Mortimore et al. (1988). These are in fact far richer 
investigations than often assumed. The latter is a mixed methods study in which qualitative 
observation and careful educational discussion lead to considered conclusions. For example, the 
authors conclude that some transfer of information as pupils proceed from one year to the next is 
an aid to effective teaching and learning, whether this takes the form of report sheets including 
grades or of a portfolio of work; there is certainly no basis in their work for the later obsession 
with summative assessment, which SE’s ‘key characteristics’ supposedly justify (B:233).
I directly followed up numerous references in Teddlie and Reynolds’ (2000) International 
handbook o f  school effectiveness research, in the course of critical reading which revealed many 
of SE’s shortcomings. This was supported by the polemic between these authors, in their 
capacity as editors of the journal School Effectiveness and School Improvement (12/1, 2001), and 
Martin Thrupp. I was helped to distinguish between SE and SI as methodologies by leading 
Improvement advocate David Hopkins’s contribution to the International handbook o f  
educational change (Hargreaves A. et al. 1998).
Thanks to my eclectic reading habits - important when confronted with the closures of an 
hegemonic paradigm - 1 found in H and S Rose (1976) an argument about reductionism in 
natural and social sciences which I was able to adapt to underpin my critique of SE. Reading 
Rose et al. (1984) provided insights from which I generated my four categories:
• methodological reductionism (mechanistic causality, e.g. a belief in one-to-one 
correspondences)
• contextual reductionism (a failure to examine environmental influences when tracing 
causal relationships internal to a system)
• historical reductionism (a lack of self-awareness about how ideas develop and become 
popular at a particular time)
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• moral / political / teleological reductionism (a blindness to the theory’s social aims or 
impact).
Methodologically, the paper articulates in detail a scepticism about the procedures of SE 
research even in its own terms, as sound quantitative analysis; B:231-233 raises important 
questions of scientific rigour. Perhaps the most important of these, however, was the realisation 
that the mathematical exactness was at odds with the conceptual vagueness:
Many ‘key characteristics’ identified in the literature (for example, ‘a clear and 
continuing focus on teaching and learning’) are semantically incapable of being assigned 
unambiguously to some schools and denied to others, as would be required for valid 
statistical modelling. How can researchers decide that one school has this characteristic 
and another does not? (B:232, point f)
This provides one explanation for the complaint that the findings of SE research are not
‘actionable’; the ‘key characteristics’ are too ambiguous to be useful. ‘Strong leadership’ may be
anything from inspirational to dictatorial; an emphasis on assessment can mean anything from
authentic assessment or Assessment for Learning to the SATs; ensuring a close focus on
teaching and learning might either involve teachers working collaboratively to design
cognitively challenging learning based on social constructivist principles or following tightly
scripted and centrally prescribed lesson plans.
The relationship between Effectiveness and Improvement
Initially, I had made no clear distinction between SE and SI, quite a common error both in 
popular usage and in academic texts. Indeed, Teddlie and Reynolds (2001:48-49) resort 
defensively to SI examples when SE is accused of narrowness, arguing that SI is a sub-set of SE. 
It is not entirely clear in Reynolds et al. (1993) what kind of partnership or merger is envisaged; 
and Hopkins (2001:57), though clearly seeing School Improvement as superior, speaks of the 
emergence of a new group of ‘pragmatists’ who are combining elements of SE and SI into a new 
paradigm and will ‘pull levers’ from both traditions. A better understanding of the SE/SI 
relationship was essential for writing A2 and A3.
Hopkins (2001:56) distinguishes SI from SE, in terms of methodology (qualitative as opposed to 
quantitative) but also, partially, in terms of political differences. I say partially because this is 
confined, in effect, to an emphasis on the internal dynamics of school change. School 
Improvement has a democratic emphasis to the extent that it focuses on the involvement of
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teachers (and sometimes other staff, occasionally parents and pupils) in the process of change. 
A2 hinges around two serious difficulties, however:
a) the failure o f most English SI texts to examine the contradiction between this insistence on 
democratic participation internal to the school and strongly hierarchical ‘top-down’ 
direction from without
b) the failure of the literature to debate the purposes of educational change.
This latter point ties SI closely to SE; indeed, the measurable outcomes which SE requires 
methodologically, and which the system of governance and accountability need politically, are 
taken as read by SI, as educational aims per se. Although School Improvement is, in general, 
undertheorised, other than in terms of its own tradition (including frequent mutual citation, itself 
the marker of a paradigm), it is significant that Hopkins (2001) refers to Habermas as his 
theoretical justification. Actually we can critique Hopkins precisely in Habermasian terms: 
Hopkins appears to regard the ‘ideal speech community’ either as something which already 
exists in schools, or something which can be created internally by building ‘capacity’, regardless 
of the impact of the macro-political environment (national educational policy and global socio­
economic change, both related to neo-liberalism).6
The greatest support, in dealing with (a), came from a growing body of English educational 
sociologists and philosophers who sought to examine the impact of the educational policy 
regime on school ethos, the teacher role, and teacher-pupil relationships. A 2 and A3 bring 
together quotations and analysis from diverse fields, including Helen Gunter’s (2001) critical 
perspectives of leadership; Gerald Grace’s (1995) Catholic perspective on change; curriculum 
expert Fred Inglis’s (1989; 2000) analysis of managerialism; Mahony and Hextall’s (2000) study 
of the transformation of teacher professionalism; Paul Clarke (2001), one o f the more critical SI 
consultants; and Michael Fielding’s (1999; 2001c) philosophical discussions of the policy
•  7discourse and its impact.
In dealing with (b), the biggest single impetus was undoubtedly, and perhaps surprisingly, the 
political aftermath of 9/11. Struggling to write an editorial for Improving Schools in November 
2001 (largely reprinted in the introductory chapter of A, page 7), after overcoming an initial 
sense of the triviality of School Improvement in this wider context, I came, at a fairly 
rudimentary level, to a number of seminal realisations:
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that SI tended to focus on the change process alone, neglecting to discuss educational 
and social aims -  and this despite its frequent use o f the term vision
• that improvement was being confused with intensification -  a speeding up of the 
conveyor belt
• that the Improvement project needed to be re-focused on important social / political 
aims.
In this process, I began to understand that, although SI was methodologically distinct from SE, 
in other respects it remained closely related and even dependent -  hence my reference to them as 
twin paradigms. Despite the apparent openness and neutrality of Hopkins’ language (e.g. 
enhancing ‘student outcomes’ as its key aim; in Hargreaves et al. 1998:1036), the context shows 
a failure to question the vision of a policy regime based on high-stakes accountability or the 
centrality of those educational outcomes which can most easily be measured.
Methodologically we can contrast School Improvement as a qualitative mode of enquiry with 
School Effectiveness as quantitative / statistical research, but there are deeper similarities, and 
even a dependency of SI on SE. For example:
• they both ascribe an exaggerated autonomy to the school as a fundamental entity8, as 
well as overemphasising the agency of the headteacher
• they tacitly regard the aims of schooling and the curriculum prescribed by central 
government and its agencies as sacrosanct.
O f course, referring back to my earlier analysis of paradigms, these are matters not only of the 
basic entities and forces, and the parameters of the field, but having fundamental ethical and 
political implications. There is, ironically, an underlying awareness that schools are not quite so 
autonomous, indeed that the actions of school leaders are heavily constrained by a politically 
imposed accountability regime (A3). The texts tend to marginalise these considerations 
structurally, often by disposing of them in an introductory chapter, then operating as if this were 
not the case -  business as usual. (Thrupp and Willmott (2003) call this ‘subtle apologism’.) This 
inevitably leads to a perspective which overlooks contradictions, and emphasises voluntary 
incorporation within a hegemonic disciplinary regime.9
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Capacity and culture in the Improvement literature
Whereas School Effectiveness regards as the driving forces a list of quasi-autonomous 
behaviours (the key characteristics), School Improvement prefers a more holistic perspective, 
speaking in terms of capacity and culture (though involving a nexus of more specific processes 
such as leadership, planning and staff development). In a sense, SI operates at a kind of meta 
level with regard to SE’s key characteristics. It provides a kind of response to the problems of an 
open system (see the discussion in B:231). But whilst capacity is holistic (within the parameters 
of the school as a bounded entity), it is also deracinated.10 This leads, I would argue, to a 
different kind of reductionism than that of SE but reductionism all the same, because it does not 
pay enough attention to the complexity of the many levels in a stratified open system, (cf Collier 
1994:117)
Much is to be said for such an holistic view. Indeed, in their classic Fifteen thousand hours, 
Rutter et al. (1979: 177-9) concluded that the combined and cumulative effect of various social 
factors was more important than any individual effectiveness characteristics. However the 
negative side of this holism is its vagueness and disconnectness -  the ability of words such as 
culture, ethos or capacity to change shape or dematerialise, as well as their sheer promiscuity,
i.e. their apparent applicability to any change process whatsoever. Capacity in mainstream SI 
texts becomes an abstract force which appears to exist independently of teachers’ work within, 
and reaction to, a pervasive disciplinary system (in an everyday as well as Foucauldian sense) of 
surveillance and control. It is thought to increase through a process of ‘leadership’ which binds 
teachers together through practices o f collegiality whatever their political, social and ethical 
values. (The reality often comes closer to the contrived collegiality described by Hargreaves, 
1994.) To an extent, compared with the mechanistic positivism of SE, we might regard SI as 
philosophically idealist; although capacity is something which is developed through particular 
processes, it becomes reified in its generality and as a consequence of its rootless disconnection 
from other levels of socio-political practice and belief. (See also A: 176 for a brief introduction to 
other semantic shifts in SI.)11
The deployment of the term culture in some well known and influential SI texts is even more 
problematic, and often means little more than capacity in the literature. It is a keyword in the 
Improvement literature, and for good reasons: it invites a less mechanistic understanding than 
the SE lists. The culture concept is enormously powerful, but also slippery: Raymond Williams
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(1976:87) claims that it is ‘one of the two or three most complicated words in the English 
language’.
It has been deployed in diverse and rich ways in educational research, e.g. Willis’s (1977) 
analysis of working-class male adolescent cultures in English schools; McLaren’s (1987) study 
of rituals and norms; Bourdieu and Passeron’s (1970/1977) analysis of cultural difference and 
unequal exchange (cultural capital); the ‘multiculturalism’ debate. In School Culture (Prosser 
1999), a wide range of usage is shown, including Power and Whitty (the impact of market 
reforms on school culture), Nias (the ‘culture of care’ in primary teaching), Mac an Ghaill 
(masculinities), Munn (bullying), Moss and Attar (gender and literacy), Weber and Mitchell 
(teacher representations in the media) and Prosser and Warburton (visual sociology, with 
important lessons for SI researchers).
Perhaps the narrowest use in Prosser’s volume is to be found in Louise Stoll’s and David 
Hargreaves’ chapters, both focusing on school culture as a managerial concept. The Hargreaves 
(1999: 51) quadrant of hothouse, welfarist, formal and survivalist is a valuable analytical model 
which helps us to understand degrees of social control and cohesion, a tool for analysing and 
acting upon a school, but it is disconnected from the felt experience of learners, from pedagogy, 
from the history of schooling, and from tensions in the wider society.
Stoll’s chapter provides an exemplary12 summary of culture as deployed in orthodox SI texts -  
but which unconsciously exposes its own inadequacies. Despite acknowledging briefly (page 33 
and 35) an anthropological sense of culture as significant ‘customs, rituals, symbols, stories and 
language... the artefacts of culture’, she then follows Schein (1985) in stripping away the 
materiality in favour of a ‘deeper level of basic assumptions and beliefs that are shared by 
members of an organisation’. The words are revealing: in which sense are different people 
‘members’, and how exactly are these assumptions and beliefs ‘shared’? Who, for that matter, 
decides what is ‘basic’? Her chapter title provides another major clue: school culture as either 
‘fertile garden’ or ‘black hole’ for school improvement. By ‘black hole’ she means that attempts 
at innovation can simply be swallowed up, disappear and have no impact on some schools. To 
deconstruct her metaphor, this is to suggest that such schools have no visible patterns, no inner 
meanings -  that these schools represent a destructive and incomprehensible chaos. The table 
(page 37, originally from Stoll and Fink 1996) shows the cultural ‘norms of improving schools’ 
as a list of positive feelings among staff:
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1. Shared goals -  ‘we know where we’re going’
2. Responsibility for success -  ‘we must succeed’
3. Collegiality -  ‘we’re working on this together’, etc.
Again there is some value in this summary, but as the Weltanschauung of school improvement, 
this is somewhat bland and one-dimensional, taking little account o f the many contradictions, of 
teachers’ and pupils’ lives outside, and of external pressures both political and socioeconomic. 
There is no concession that some innovations might be ill-conceived, that professionals have a 
right and duty to evaluate them, or that some changes should be resisted. There is a warm glow 
about this notion of culture, emphasising a rather uncritical cohesion, which can conceal some of 
the turmoil outside.
I have argued (A2: 34-37 and D:283~284 in particular) that School Improvement operates with a 
restricted sense of culture. Seymour Sarason (1971) is often cited, but his questioning of the 
taken-for-granted norms of school culture are overlooked. From here, culture quickly becomes 
synonymous with capacity (D283) -  the readiness of an organisation to undergo change -  and 
culture becomes a managerial tool -  the central role of leaderhip being to ‘manage culture’ (Deal 
and Peterson 1999). Culture equates with cohesion or even manageability. Whilst this usage has 
seeped in from industrial / commercial management, more critical texts from that field are 
overlooked (e.g. Alvesson 2002).
1 sought (in A2:34-37) to outline a broader agenda of enquiry into culture which might match up 
to the real issues of quality and equality, as well as a rethinking of educational aims. This was 
wide ranging, including daily rituals, the experience of school learning, the norms of discourse, 
cultural difference and inequality, assumptions about ability, teachers’ understandings of pupils’ 
families and neighbourhood cultures, and so on. This is inevitably full of tensions which are 
skated over by culture-as-managed-cohesion. It requires a different sense of basic entities and 
field, as I have argued in D:287, for example:
• looking at schools within wider communities, and the transition of young people who 
move daily between these different cultures
• developing a stronger understanding of the implications of economic, social and cultural 
change for schooling
as well as new theories and methods:
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• drawing on sociological thinking which casts light on this experience, for example 
Bourdieu’s theories of exchange and in/validation (cultural and social capital)
• engaging in more sophisticated and critical forms of qualitative enquiry, drawing for 
example on traditions of ethnography and social phenomenology.
One of the benefits of the concept culture, I would argue, lies in a unity of material reality and 
ideas: it concerns objects (artefacts, classroom displays, the school environment) and behaviours 
(rituals, responses, regulations) as signifying and significant. This aspect is lost when culture is 
treated solely in terms of disembodied ‘values1 as Stoll and others have tended to do. Culture 
cannot be separated from structures -  from either economic and social inequalities or the 
structural inequalities of traditional schooling (see A2:35). Both of these are, of course, run 
through with power, and they may reinforce each other. Nor can school culture be fruitfully 
studied without reference to a youth culture which is deeply penetrated by commercial culture 
(Kenway and Bullen 2001), or without recognition of the profound cultural transformation 
which Bauman (2000) calls ‘liquid modernity1. (See also Lingard and Gale 2007 for a discussion 
of some of the implications of these profound cultural changes for education.) If we forget 
these, culture is hollowed out as a concept.
The insistence of the SI mainstream that we should ‘change school culture rather than structure1 
(Harris 2002)13 has led to a neglect of organisational features of the school and, in effect, given a 
false sense of universality to certain forms of school organisation. Chapter A:9 seeks to unsettle 
this by looking at available alternatives within and beyond Britain. Firstly I introduced 
alternative forms of secondary school organisation which provided a closer relationship between 
a team of teachers and a population of pupils, as in Norway or the Essential Schools of the USA. 
Secondly I reminded readers of the strong British tradition of community schools. Without 
wishing to appear too deterministic, one might see structure as the material basis, or perhaps 
frame, for culture -  not in any mechanistic sense, but as providing the conditions within which 
particular choices become possible and which make it more likely that cultural changes can be 
brought about. I was able to follow up one aspect of this subsequently through a comparative 
pilot study of a Scottish and a Norwegian secondary school. Other aspects relate to the 
relationship of schools to communities, and various versions of ‘community school1.
I argued (Wrigley 2000, and in A) that ethos and the wider community, as well as pedagogy and 
curriculum, are as important as leadership and the school development processes in any genuine
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improvement of education. Unfortunately, the structural and political conditions which might 
promote better ethos and parental involvement have been overlooked; ethos has been viewed 
instrumentally, as a means towards higher attainment, and parents seen almost as a vehicle to 
get their offspring to school punctually, homework in hand, without real lives of their own.
There is a reciprocal relationship - a vicious circle - between the lack of critical edge and the 
methodological norms of many established School Improvement writers, which I am tempted to 
call (pace Ryle and Geertz) ‘thin description’. It is evident that visits are often either very short, 
with the main focus being a headteacher interview, or the research methodology is flattened out 
or collapsed by being grounded in a consultancy relationship. This works towards reinforcing 
hegemonic assumptions about the key forces leading towards effectiveness and improvement, 
and the neglect of other more complex or contradictory voices. It does not typically lead towards 
the richly interpretative descriptions achieved by more self-aware ethnographers.
My first book The power to learn (2000, partially summarised in D:281-283) is too much a 
beginner’s work to serve as a model, but there are features of its methodology which set it apart 
from mainstream SI.
1) Though three days per school is too short for genuine ethnographies, this was in a number of 
cases additional to a prior knowledge of the school. The time was largely spent on classroom 
observation, and a wide range of individuals were interviewed, not only senior managers.
2) A dynamic of empowerment soon became apparent, running counter to the dominant 
assumptions of top-down control or managed cohesion. Subsequent observations served to 
illustrate and elaborate that vague notion of empowerment, giving it meaning through a process 
of ‘saturation’ (Glaser and Strauss 1967). Aspects included a prevalence o f social constructivist 
pedagogies, curriculum relevance, an ethos based on mutual respect, and an empathetic 
relationship with parents and the local community.
3) Thirdly, the strong emphasis on pedagogy and curriculum distinguished it from the 
managerialist tendency of many orthodox SI texts, i.e.. managerial processes were not isolated 
from and privileged over substantial educational activity. (Some of the lesson observations 




As indicated above, my first book (2000) broke new ground in terms of methods and 
perspectives. It is time to place this, and the subsequent work included here, in a wider context.
To some extent my book followed the precedent set by Success against the odds: effective 
schools in disadvantaged areas (National Commission on Education 1996). The supporting 
framework of the latter book, however, was an SE list of ‘key characteristics’, albeit used by 
some contributors more than others. Greatest use was made by Barber, who then felt able to give 
them a minimalist interpretation, for example regarding the existence of school prefects as a sign 
of substantial pupil involvement and participation in a school. (This helped me to realise that 
many of these SE characteristics were floating signifiers, as discussed earlier.) Some of the 
contributions focused on ethos and community (e.g. Jean Rudduck’s case study of a community 
college). The only contribution emphasising curriculum and pedagogy was MacBeath’s study of 
a special school.
A clear contrast can be found in Blair and Bourne (1998), which investigated ten successful 
multi-ethnic schools serving mainly African Caribbean communities. Despite superficially 
adopting the SE genre of lists of ‘characteristics’, the identified factors were different from SE 
norms. Based on qualitative research, they focused on social justice , such as challenging overt 
and structural racism, including low expectations. Though well known by writers on multiethnic 
schools, little notice has been taken of this volume within the SI mainstream, which, I would 
argue, illustrates a mechanism by which paradigms sustain themselves by deliberate or unwitting 
closure to oppositional research.
This occlusion of inconvenient texts has been a feature of School Improvement, and certainly 
my own work has largely been ignored by the English mainstream, though resulting in 
international invitations to give lectures and presentations (e.g. the keynote to its main 
international conference, ICSEI, Rotterdam 2004).
Similarly, now that a group of writers (Harris et al. 2006; Ainscow and West 2006) have at last 
turned their attention back to inner-city schools, they appear to have overlooked the few existing 
UK-published volumes of recent years, all of which could have provided them with significant 
insights. (In addition to the above, I am thinking of Pat Thomson’s Schooling the rustbelt kids 
(2002); Richard Riddell’s Schools for our cities (2003); Tony Cotton et al. (2003) Improving 
primary schools, improving communities.) The exception to this pattern has been the work of
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Paul Clarke; though closely associated with Harris, Ainscow and West and director of the 
prestigious IQEA consultancy established by Hopkins, his editorship of Improving schools in 
difficulty (2005) successfully brought some of these different voices together.
Moreover, a large body of American literature on urban education was overlooked (e.g. Nieto 
1999; Noguera 2003), despite substantial trans-Atlantic connections, and an extended Literature 
Review (Muijs et al. 2004) by key researchers in the field (Alma Harris but also Louise Stoll, 
one of the most experienced SI writers and a member of the School Matters team). Not only was 
significant US research literature, distributed by such well-known publishers as SUNY or 
Teachers’ College Press, overlooked, but entire networks of schools devoted to educational 
reform such as the Coalition o f  Essential Schools and the Accelerated Schools Project (e.g. 
Finnan et al. 1996). I was able to draw attention to these networks, and substantial bodies of 
research, in A (see its index for page references).
It is difficult to pin down the reasons why these networks were overlooked, but some of the 
reasons may be that they place a stronger, and more questioning, emphasis on pedagogy than the 
SI mainstream is comfortable with. This is a paradigm effect. Ironically, Hopkins, arguably the 
founding father of SI in England, has made stronger use of USA-based reforms and placed a 
greater emphasis on teaching and learning, but his pedagogical preferences have been towards 
the heavily-scripted Slavin approach (Slavin and Madden 2001), as well as the rather self- 
contained and static ‘models’ developed by Bruce Joyce (Hopkins 2001; Joyce, Calhoun and 
Hopkins 1997).
In some ways, I have had an advantage over some influential SI authors in having a wider 
professional focus, including a substantial teaching background, a research degree in curriculum 
studies, a strong interest in aspects of education and social justice, a broad political involvement, 
and a keen interest in pedagogy. It has been a blessing, as well as an inconvenience, not to be 
primarily focused on sustaining a career which is principally based on leadership, effectiveness 
or improvement. The pedagogical and curricular interest, for example, led me towards 
Queensland’s New Basics (A6). I read a number of European languages, which gave me access 
to such collections as Altrichter et al. (1998) and Murillo and Munoz-Repiso (2002) which show 
greater breadth of approach than most SE-linked SI. The former combines a substantial body of 
German-language research and practice on the dynamics of school development - relatively 
unaffected by top-down government directives -  with chapters on gender- and environment- 
focused reform, etc. The Spanish volume connect Anglophone Improvement theory with rather
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different school reform experts such as Dalin; its case studies focus on curriculum reforms 
driven at school level. This international awareness has been a source of confidence in 
challenging mainstream SE/SI. For example, Xaver Btieler (1998) elaborates a clear alternative 
which draws strongly on ecological systems (see B:234; A:26).
Even skimming the chapter headings of Schools o f  hope (A) will demonstrate that the book is 
wide-ranging in its scope; there are chapters on theories of intelligence, pedagogy, curriculum, 
community education, and social justice. However, it is not a loose agglomeration of diverse 
themes. These chapters (A5-10) serve not only to take the book beyond critique into the new 
territory of laying foundations for a different model of educational change, whilst repeatedly 
connecting critically with and reframing key issues in mainstream SI.
For example, ‘raising expectations’ has become a by-word in both SE and SI literature. Aligning 
with earlier comments in this paper, as a category in quantitative SE research, the vagueness 
does raise methodological questions (how does the researcher decide whether or not to tick this 
box?); in SI, it is treated more discursively but in a decontextualised and vaguely moralistic way, 
in a manner which rarely connects with the complex cultural issues, pupil and parent 
subjectivities, the problems of cultural capital, and so on.
I have argued (e.g. D:280 and D:286) that ‘raising expectations’ in urban schools is often far 
more political than is reflected in most of the literature, requiring a more subtle hermeneutic 
approach to research. In A5,1 raised the underlying but unspoken question of how teachers 
understand ability. Simply willing pupils to achieve more, as a sheer moral effort, is undermined 
if we hold that intelligence is either innate or too tightly bound to socio-economic environment. 
The common sense view of ‘ability levels’ stretches from teachers to policy makers. For 
example, the White Paper Higher standards, better schools for all (DfES 2005) is grounded in a 
hierarchy o f ‘gifted and talented’, pupils who are ‘struggling’, and the ‘just ordinary’.) A5 
reviews 20th Century conceptualisations o f ‘intelligence’, drawing together critiques which have 
fallen from view.
However, the chapter goes beyond this process of academic recovery by connecting the debate, 
culturally and pedagogically, with implications for School Improvement. I summarised these 
issues as:
• questions about the social and experiential development of intelligence
• the relationship between practical activity and theoretical learning
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• the forms of language which are valued in schools
• the accumulation of facts and concepts through teaching which is insufficiently 
experiential
• the way in which working-class children experience figures of authority
• the ways in which children accept their positioning as passive and often silent learners
• the relationship between school learning and community needs as experienced by 
working-class children and adolescents. (A:83)
Again, this represents a possible agenda for an entire lifetime’s research.
In the later parts of the chapter, I also extended the discussion by looking at the implications for 
school improvement of Gardner’s (1993) theory of multiple intelligences; Bourdieu’s concept of 
cultural capital (e.g. Bourdieu and Passeron 1970/1977); and the exciting notion of distributed 
intelligence developed by Perkins (1995) and his Project Zero colleagues (Salomon 1993, also 
A86-9 for other references). (This continues the development of activity theory and situated 
cognition by Rogoff, Cole, Engestrom, Lave, Wenger, Moll and others. See for example Rogoff 
and Lave 1984; Wenger 1998; Engestrom et al. 1999; Cole et al. 1997; Moll 1990.) All these 
ideas have deep relevance for any genuine project of improving the quality of education, 
particularly for disadvantaged young people, and if taken seriously would help to move thinking 
about educational change beyond the vague moralism and political pressure of calls to ‘raise 
expectations’.
As I have argued in various places, part of the closure of the School Improvement paradigm, and 
one reason for its impasse when dealing with schools in particularly challenging circumstances, 
is its exclusive focus on managing change, and its neglect of books to be found on all the other 
shelves of the education library (sociology, psychology, pedagogy, inclusion and so on). The 
other chapters of A seek to remedy this. The remaining sections of this commentary, therefore, 
highlight how the selected texts focus and develop new understandings of pedagogy, curriculum, 
education for citizenship, and social justice.
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Pedagogy and curriculum
It scarcely seems possible to discuss the school quality or educational change without a central 
focus on the curriculum and pedagogy. A neglect, or flawed discussion, of such questions raises 
issues which go to the heart of the SE and SI paradigms, involving entities and forces, models 
and theories, legitimate problems and acceptable solutions, and research methods. The treatment 
of curriculum and pedagogy also has deep political and ethical implications.
School Effectiveness is clearly incapable of the kind of fine-tuned attention that would provide 
an illuminating pedagogical analysis. Some of its difficulties are methodological: it seeks to 
correlate specific observable behaviours to outcomes, but is unable to cope with the different 
significance of such behaviours within the lesson or sequence as a whole, or with the 
interpretation and response of different students. Moreover, as is evident from Rosenshine’s 
(1971) metastudy of teacher effectiveness research in the USA, it relies for its output measures 
on tests which often reflect limited learning outcomes. There is the clear danger o f a circularity 
between limited, and often behaviourist, teaching and superficial learning.
Using visible behaviours to evaluate teaching, in a seemingly neutral technological manner, 
evades the need to articulate an underlying theory of learning. A key example is the word ‘pace’, 
one of a number of sub-headings laid down for OfSTED inspectors as a criterion on which to 
judge lessons (A113-4). This has had an ongoing impact on teaching and learning in England, 
within a culture of performativity, and makes it very difficult to abandon such markers even 
when a rather different pedagogy is envisaged. For example, some of the lesson plans in the Key 
Stage 3 Strategy which seek to promote collaborative investigation in groups restrict the 
opportunity by too tight a pre-definition of outcomes and an impossibly tight time allocation (see 
Wrigley 2006:26).
Some more holistic attempts to look at teaching effectiveness have been problematic. Bennett 
(1976) ascribed the descriptors informal, mixed and formal to teaching styles in such a way that 
only the most disorganised or anarchistic teacher would fit the first category. Not surprisingly, 
‘informal’ teaching proved ‘ineffective’. Mortimore et al. (1988) is better, a mixed methods 
study depending on substantial open-ended observation. Muijs and Reynolds (2001), in their 
book Effective teaching: evidence and practice, lean heavily towards behaviourist theories, hold 
a limited view of teaching as the transmission of testable knowledge and skills, and prove 
limited in their understanding of many of the issues they tackle. (See Wrigley et al. 2002 for an
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extended critique.) Moreover, there is a telling admission (page 175) that most of their evidence 
in fact derives from primary numeracy lessons.16 Often, School Effectiveness is limited to vague 
statements about the amount o f ‘focus’ on teaching and learning.
The neglect o f pedagogy in much of the Anglophone School Improvement literature is a problem 
acknowledged by Hopkins (personal conversation), who in many respects was its founding 
father and greatest influence in the British context. I have to qualify this statement by reference 
to Hopkins’ own collaboration with Joyce (Joyce et al. 1997), but also to a recent stirring of 
interest centred at the Institute of Education in London (e.g. Camell and Lodge 2002; 
MacGilchrist et al. 1997). This latter move has produced valuable research, but it focuses on 
pupil attitudes and approaches to improving their work, and falls short of a rounded 
understanding of pedagogy, whether we are using that word as a synonym of methodologies, or 
in a more extended Germanic sense including ethical, psychological and sociological 
considerations. Another growth area has been the attempt to relate this type o f work to school 
development processes, through the linking concept of ‘learning school’ (see for example Stoll 
et al. 2003; Mitchell and Sackney 2000). This represents, perhaps, one of the centripetal forces 
which could help to establish a new paradigm -  agency against paradigmatic structure.
Adey and Shayer’s (1994) book Really raising standards provides a telling contrast with the 
SE/SI mainstream. Indeed, its provocative is itself a challenge to managerialist ‘improvers’. The 
book is substantially researched, well grounded in psychological theory, refined through 
empirical research, and implemented practically through the extended development project 
Cognitive Acceleration in Science Education (CASE), with parallel projects in other curriculum 
areas (e.g. Shayer and Adey 2002).
From a different direction, the case studies in Wrigley (2000) provided an empirical basis for my 
rethinking of the SE/SI paradigms. I entered with a predisposition towards social constructivist 
pedagogies, but was surprised how much they predominated in my fieldwork schools despite the 
official emphasis on whole-class ‘direct teaching’. Three related strands emerged:
(i) cognitive challenge through problem-solving, with a strong emphasis on group work
(ii) the use o f varied sensory channels for knowledge acquisition (‘multiple intelligences’)
(iii) the exploration of social and ethical questions, especially relating to identity and cultural 
heritage, and involving various artistic forms.
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The analysis is sharpened in Pedagogies for Improving Schools (Wrigley 2000a), in which I 
described (iii) as cultural reflection and repositioning. This use of creative art forms (drama, 
creative writing, visual art, etc.) provided a safe space for young people from minority ethnic 
families to re-live and reflect on their cultural heritage, but also to play with alternatives in a 
contemporary context. This helped provide a basis for A6-8 and C. This identity and culture 
work is related to that described in Weis and Fine (2000) and Thomson (2006); its relevance to 
school culture and working on the cultural gap beween school and home / peers / neighbourhood 
needs further development.
The main purpose of A7 was to attempt to breach the Chinese wall between SI and many other 
shelves of the education library through a series of short critiques and positive illustrations:
1) Pages 113-115 contrast the positivistic assumptions of official advice in England with Stigler 
and Hiebert’s (1999) more interpretive observational research, equally focused on raising 
standards of achievement. Stigler and Hiebert were able to compare mathematics teaching in the 
USA, almost entirely based on the demonstration and practice of algorithms, with the more 
effective problem-posing methods in Japan.18
2) A contrast is drawn between the ‘direct whole-class teaching’ privileged by English 
government agencies since the early 1990s and Perkins’ (1995) emphasis on learning by 
applying knowledge to new situations or translating it to new problems.
3) I then argue (following Bowring-Carr and West-Burnham, 1997) that transmission teaching 
tends to produce learning as replication -  a form which fits neatly with the requirements of a 
testing regime.
4) Using the Scottish model o f ‘modes of teaching’, I argue (A116-7) that surface-level 
categories provide limited information about teaching quality, since each can be interpreted at 
different qualitative levels. For example, many teachers will describe a lesson as discussion 
which is a teacher-directed question-and-answer session about a vaguely controversial topic.
5) Pages 118-120 recovers research on classroom discourse which was well known in the 1970s 
and early 1980s but since neglected (e.g. Barnes, 1969). I also connect this with Freire on critical 
pedagogy and literacy (1974).
6) A122-3 argues the value of social constructivist pedagogies, through some illustrations 
deriving from the case studies (Wrigley 2000). In reviewing these earlier observations, I was
42
also able to relate them to Gardner’s concept of multiple intelligences. (This argument was 
substantially revised later, in terms of the connection between experience and symbolic 
representation, in C.)
7) The chapter ends (A: 128) with an original pedagogical model seeking to relate methodology, 
curriculum, social context and psychology / learning.
Other chapters of the book extend this discussion in terms of a) education for citizenship, and b) 
a political or ideological model for understanding curriculum.
The former is mainly pursued in A8, including a short analysis of two contrasting approaches, 
one from a popular Scottish Modem Studies textbook, the other from a book of guidance to 
German teachers of Political Education. The former is more limited, as it tends to position the 
teacher as the authoritative source of information, emphasises knowledge as fragmentary facts 
(to be reproduced in examinations), and divorces school learning from community action.
This connects with part of the earlier chapter on Curriculum (A6: 100-101) which, under the 
concept of authorship, questions the limited scope given to learner choice and initiative in 
Britain compared with Denmark. Interestingly the Danish guidance to teachers of social studies 
for 14-16 year olds discourages them from overplanning in case this hinders the negotiation with 
learners about what and how they will study - in contrast with centrally directed systems such as 
England’s, where teachers are expected to plan meticulously the delivery of lessons whose 
content, and increasingly methodology, is nationally prescribed.
The discussion of education for democratic citizenship in chapters 6 and 8 highlights School 
Improvement’s marginalisation of this curricular aim, and its failure to address the issue of 
democracy and agency -  a focus which could make a substantial improvement to learner 
motivation. The SE/SI literature is replete with recommendations that teachers should have ‘high 
expectations’, but has little to say about intrinsic motivation. School Improvement tacitly accepts 
the positioning of learners as inactive and without decision-making powers. For all its emphasis 
on ‘raising standards’, it pays little heed to the possibility that learners’ interests and desires may 
be a force behind such improvement. Once more, we see that the limitations of a paradigm go 
right down to the entities and forces that it privileges or neglects.
The remainder of chapter 6 provides a discussion of curricular aims -  a serious neglect in 
English SI in particular, and one which sits oddly with the origins of School Improvement 
theory internationally. This is largely because of an acceptance, since the 1988 Education
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Reform Act (England and Wales), that the curriculum is determined by organs of state; is all too 
easily becomes should. Indeed Michael Barber is reputed to have described the National 
Curriculum as one of the ‘four pillars’ of accountability - surely a case of the tail wagging the 
dog, since, on that argument, it would matter little whether learning is worthwhile provided that 
it is uniform and well suited to national testing.
The curriculum analysis found early in A6, based on Kemmis et al. (1983), argues that both a 
traditional academic curriculum and a vocational one share a conservative political orientation. 
This has particular relevance in the light of recent legislation in England (DfES 2006), which 
divides fourteen-year-olds into two distinct tracks, academic and vocational. Vocational courses 
are not offered within a broad and balanced curriculum; rather those who choose the vocational 
track are denied access to history, geography, a foreign language, art, music, drama etc. as well 
as more creative and critical elements o f English. (See Wrigley 2006: 47)
Currently training for work is held up as the appropriate curriculum for the children of manual 
workers, especially those less successful in more academic subjects. Writers within the SE/SI 
paradigms have largely been silent on this trend, or endorsed it uncritically, since they tend to 
regard curriculum as basically not their business, or to be judged quantitatively through the 
analysis of test results. The argument in A6, on the other hand, is that greater realism and 
relevance must be sought not only in terms of preparation for work, but in terms of education for 
democratic citizenship.
Paper C extends this discussion from curriculum to pedagogy by examining the relationship 
between abstract and situated knowledge, against a background of class differences in 
educational engagement and achievement. Reiterating some of the earlier arguments about 
‘intelligence’ (A5), it highlights the tacit privileging of abstract knowledge and the 
disconnection of symbolic representations from experience and sensory perception. This 
discussion connects back to successive theories about working-class and minority ethnic 
achievement, and provides an alternative theory to Gardner’s multiple intelligences (1993 and 
elsewhere). Returning to Bernstein’s critics Rosen (1972) and Labov (1969), it is apparent that 
they are validating more grounded forms of cognition and critical thinking.
The paper connects this argument to recent developments of Vygotsky ian psychology known as 
activity theory or situated cognition, including Wenger’s argument (1998:134seq) that human 
learning involves a dialectical unity of participation and reification -  though I have preferred to
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substitute ‘symbolic representation’ for his latter term because it seems to me less confusing. It 
revisits Piaget’s stage theory, Adey and Shayer’s research (e.g. 1994), and Vygotsky’s 
(1986:150) discussion of concepts and abstract thinking, as well as re-presenting some of the 
examples in my earlier fieldwork (Wrigley 2000). Finally, it offers as a model (C:68) a 
‘spectrum of representations’, from the most abstract to those which sit closest to lived 
experience. On this basis, linked with earlier theories (Vygotsky 1976 and 1986; Bruner 1968), I 
argue:
a) that teachers need to be more aware of the difficulties of more abstract forms of 
representation, and to reconnect more abstract modes with lived experience to help pupils 
acquire real concepts rather than the ‘empty shells’ (Vygotsky 1986) of rote learning
b) that, despite this, more abstract representations can prove the most powerful, as they enable 
us to operate at higher levels of generality and criticality
but also:
c) that another more experiential terrain exists in which reflective and critical thinking can take 
place -  the level o f simulation.
Simulations of various kinds, whether children’s play, gaming and role play, virtual realities, 
novels and drama and paintings, help us to re-live or re-create much of the sensory richness of 
real life experiences without the harsh consequences o f reality. The philosopher of science 
Wartofsky (1973:208-9), starting from a discussion of scientific modelling, speaks of tertiary 
artefacts, imagined worlds or a kind of off-line activity which is not so tightly constrained by 
economic necessity and can allow scope for greater creativity. Such artefacts and activities can 
provide a space for critical reflection but also a sense of openness to alternative ways of being 
and doing. Thus we have two ways of transcending everyday reality, one theoretical and the 
other poetic.
Reflecting back to my fieldwork examples (Wrigley 2000), I became aware of a further dynamic 
achieved by stepping out of the simulation, similar to debriefing in role-play. Skilful teachers 
thus enable pupils to use the terrain o f simulations, the ‘imagined world’, model or ‘micro­
world’, to help learners recall or imagine a real situation in an accessible way (regardless of any 
linguistic barriers), but also as a secure foundation for more abstract conceptualisation and 
debate.
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Not only does this address the key issues of accessibility which troubled Bernstein (1971), 
leading him to his problematic formulation o f ‘restricted code’ (A5; C:59seq), but it also 
facilitates a critique of the kind of uncritical ‘realism’ offered by the vocationalist solution -  an 
induction into (one aspect of) real life which lacks criticality and openness to change.19 Whilst in 
many ways a parallel to Gardner’s (1993) shifting theory of multiple intelligences, it has the 
advantage of providing an explanatory model which supports analysis of classroom practices in 
terms of class-related underachievement.
It will be evident from the above that the discussion in the papers referred to, and included in 
this doctoral submission, has moved a long way beyond the examinations of teaching and 
learning in either School Effectiveness or School Improvement. In a later paper (D), I argue that 
the inadequacy of SE/SI’s pedagogical understanding is most exposed when it deals with schools 
serving poorer neighbourhoods or ethnic minorities. It is useful here to return to my earlier 
framework model for analysing paradigms, based on Kuhn:
• entities, forces and laws - key concepts, relationships and causes
• models -  whether seen as heuristic or ontological
• legitimate problems and acceptable solutions (its sense of field)
• methods and instruments
and supplemented, after consideration of the social sciences, by
• the political orientation resulting from the privileging of particular perspectives and 
interests, and the marginalisation of issues of power
• the ethical, in terms of the practitioner’s and the researcher’s responsibility for moral 
evaluation of practice -  rather than simply a search for functional efficiency.
I have referred above to the problems within the SE paradigm, when it deals with teaching 
effectiveness, of attempting to evaluate and account for the quality of teaching in terms of a 
number o f easily visible behaviours. We can explain this error, in Bhaskar’s (1975) terms, as 
actualism: the assumption that the effects we observe equate to the real causes at work. Beyond 
this, there has been a chronic neglect of pedagogical theory by SE and SI. In terms of the above 
model, this silence about teaching and learning impacts right down to the entity being studied: if 
you are not examining pedagogy, you are not looking at a school! Studying schools as if they are 
just another kind of organisation is fatally flawed: you cannot get to grips with the most
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important forces at work -  the pedagogical commitment and practices of the teachers and pupils 
-  by re-imagining them simply as leaders and followers (or even, more equally, ‘participants in a 
change process’).
The neglect o f pedagogy also connects to other problems of paradigmatic SI which were 
discussed earlier. For example:
• Reducing culture to capacity has produced a number of models to assist managers take a 
temperature check on staff attitudes and cohesion (see the various typologies and 
quadrants of A Hargreaves (1994), D Hargreaves (1995), Stoll and Fink (1996)) but not 
models such as A: 128 and C:68 which might actually assist teachers with harder-to- 
reach pupils.
• Whilst purporting to deal with primary forces such as leadership, the field o f study -  its 
legitimate problems and solutions -  is educationally tangential, having little to say to 
teachers and learners except insofar as it is able to reposition them as leaders and 
followers, ‘accountable’ and to be accounted for.
• The research methodology places too great an emphasis on interviews with senior 
management, neglecting for example classroom observation and pupil-focused 
ethnography.
Finally, the above distortions and limitations have serious political and ethical consequences.
The curricular irresponsibility of leaving questions of curriculum to state agencies legitimises the 
neo-conservative ‘academic’ one-size-fits-all of Thatcher’s National Curriculum, and now the 
neo-liberal ‘vocationalism for the hard-to-teach’ of Blair’s Education and Inspection Act (DfES 
2006). It leaves unsupported those teachers who argue that active learning extends beyond the 
vocational field, and whose aims involve an Education for Citizenship that is genuinely critical 
and democratic. An ethical dimension to educational change should not be a mere afterthought, 
to receive minimal attention after you have dealt with ‘effectiveness’ or built ‘capacity’: it is 
central and fundamental to any discussion of change in an area of policy which is responsible for 
shaping the next generation of citizens. This is true now more than ever, given simultaneous and 
global crises of poverty, environment and war. Those who claim expertise in raising educational 
standards, whilst having little to say about the why and how of what children might actually 
learn, are hollowing out the concept of improvement.
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Effectiveness, Improvement and Social Justice
The neglect o f key dimensions of social justice by the SE / SI paradigms is just as clear, and 
perhaps even more surprising, than the meagre treatment of pedagogy and curriculum. I say 
‘more surprising’ because the narrative of origin of SE is based precisely upon the supposed 
fatalism of educational sociology with regard to low achievement in poor and minority ethnic 
neighbourhoods, including theories of reproduction (Bourdieu and Passeron 1970/1977; Bowles 
and Gintis 1976).20 Indeed, many of the early American classics in this field focus precisely on 
how schools might overcome poverty-related underachievement (see for example Weber 1971; 
Edmonds and Frederiksen 1979).
From the start I should clear up a possible misunderstanding by insisting that examination results 
and formal qualifications do matter for working-class and ethnic minority pupils. Indeed, if you 
have the ‘wrong’ postcode or skin colour, you need such qualifications more than anyone, for 
example to overcome the prejudice of potential employers. In a hierarchical society, education is 
a positional good as well as a good in itself and a good for the world. The problem is that it 
becomes counterproductive to overemphasise attainment, for two major reasons:
a) insufficient attention is paid to the recognition (identity, self-esteem) aspect of social justice 
(see Fraser 1997) which underpins personal struggles to succeed in school and in later life
b) an overwhelming emphasis on the exchange value of learning can result in curriculum and 
pedagogy which lack enjoyment and engagement. (See, for example, the very powerful 
argument on literacy and identity in Cummins 2003.)
The case against SE has been well rehearsed (including B:234-6). Indeed, there is scarcely a 
mention of poverty in Teddlie and Reynolds’ (2000) encyclopaedic International handbook o f  
school effectiveness research, nor indeed in Sammons’ (1999) School effectiveness: coming o f  
age in the twenty-first century. The mainstream School Improvement literature, despite having 
recourse to the same justification and narrative of origin, has produced few texts in the past 
decade which focus on social class or poverty. The important exceptions have been Success 
against the odds (National Commission on Education 1996), with its successor volume (Maden 
2001); Stoll and Myers ’ (1998) No quick fixes: perspectives on schools in difficulty, and recently
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three volumes connected to DfES commissions and projects, Clarke (2005), Harris et al (2006) 
and Ainscow and West (2006). To this, we should add Macbeath et al’s (2007) Schools on the 
edge, based on a DfES-commissioned evaluation of one of these projects. Among these, two 
books do not follow the usual patterns: Clarke’s book includes a commissioned chapter from 
myself and also Richard Riddell, whilst Macbeath et al. rigorously challenges the conclusions 
reached by Harris et al. I will focus on Stoll and Myers (1998) in this commentary, partly 
because this book represents almost a pantheon of English SI and SE experts: in addition to its 
editors, there are chapters by Barber, Hopkins, Harris, MacBeath, Learmonth, Lodge, Reynolds 
as well as North Americans Fink (SI) and Stringfield (SE), and various lesser known authors. It 
was also written as these paradigms were actively ‘twinning’, and as the New Labour project 
was becoming a reality.
In this book, there is a stunning silence about the poverty in which so many children grow up; 
rather these children are viewed from the school’s perspective, as ‘challenging circumstances’, a 
discursive sleight of hand. Returning to my paradigm points, the school is the key entity and 
field, with the dominant characteristics and narratives o f children’s lives viewed as mere 
background difficulties. Ethnicity is scarcely mentioned, except on two occasions where 
minorities are regarded as a ‘nuisance factor’, indeed almost blamed for creating difficulties. 
Reynolds (p i66) sums up his position as follows:
In this particular school, the racial balance of the pupils in the school had reached the 
crucial ‘threshold’ of being comprised of 35-40 per cent Asian, Oriental and Afro- 
Caribbean children, the level at which ‘white’ children often become somewhat 
threatened and accordingly indulge in racist attacks, racial abuse and the like. The 
numerous racial incidents in this school became paralleled by considerable racial 
conflicts between ‘Asian’ and ‘white’ governors, which meant that the governors were 
unable to give a unified response when the school needed leadership to deal with the 
‘special measures’ routine o f OFSTED and the associated involvement of local 
education authority inspectors.
Apart from such blatant examples o f ‘blame the victims’, the solutions proposed throughout this
volume are managerial in nature, focusing around issues o f ‘capacity’ and ‘leadership’.
Pedagogy and curriculum are barely mentioned, other than references to the challenges of low
levels of literacy and bilingual pupils (seen as a problem), with meagre understanding shown in
either case. Relationships and ethos within the school are discussed with a disciplinary emphasis,
in either a harder (traditional schooling) or a softer (Foucauldian) sense.
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The neglect of the lives of students, their parents and neighbours shows the extent to which SI 
has mirrored SE at a deep level, despite the methodological differences. It is even more 
remarkable when we recall a comment made just a few years earlier by one of the editors Kate 
Myers (1990), referring critically to the prevalent equiphobia. I am reminded of Angus’ 
(1993:361) comment on SE:
Family background, social class, any notion of context are typically regarded as ‘noise’, 
as ‘outside background factors’ which must be controlled for and then stripped away so 
that the researcher can concentrate on the important domain of school factors.
This deep similarity, in terms of the acontextuality of both SE and SI, illustrates the importance,
when examining paradigms, of seeing beyond the level of methodology. This silencing stands in
stark contrast to books such as Thomson’s Schooling the rustbelt kids (2002), Riddell’s Schools
fo r  our cities (2003), or the work of American educators such as Lois Weis, Michelle Fine and
colleagues (e.g. Weis and Fine 2000 and 2005). To parody Bourdieu (1999), for School
Effectiveness and Improvement the world is almost weightless.
This neglect of social ‘background’ (the word is itself significant) is equally stark in the recent 
books by Harris et al. (2006) and Ainscow and West eds (2006) -  and we must remember that 
these are the very rare books within SI which are dedicated to ‘schools in challenging 
circumstances’. Interestingly, MacBeath et al. (2007) have published a more oppositional 
account, almost a ‘minority report’ on the same research project, which includes a more solid 
and contextualised description of pupils’ lives.
There is no need to repeat in this commentary the extensive discussion in paper D within this 
submission. Suffice it to underline my argument that poverty and often race are proving 
stumbling blocks to SI, throwing up anomalies which expose the weaknesses of the paradigm, 
its theory and advice. The paper (D:287) ends with a proposal to rethink the most basic 
characteristics of the paradigm.
A10 Social justice -  or a discourse o f  deficit? opens with a reminder that questions of social 
justice have in fact permeated the whole book. It recalls this chapter by chapter, for example 
(A: 154):
(4) the discriminatory effects of selective school systems and the quasi-market
(5) the importance of overcoming constructs of ability which lower expectations and 
restrict opportunities
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(6) suggesting alternatives to a centrally controlled curriculum which does little to 
motivate young people and hinders them from understanding poverty and racism.
Chapter 10 sought to bring together advanced thinking from a range of sources about diverse
aspects of education and social justice: social class and poverty; pupils with physical and
learning needs; school exclusions; ‘race’, bilingual pupils and refugees; gender, sexuality and
boys’ achievement. Needless to say, no single chapter could hope to do justice to all these
themes. The unifying issue, however, is how to avoid labelling and creating a deficit discourse
when attending to learners’ needs. Essentially this means avoiding approaches which locate a
‘problem’ within individuals or a particular group, whilst regarding institutions as fundamentally
stable - often termed a ‘medical model’, though this is unfair to the best current thinking in
Medicine.
It would be a redundant exercise to reiterate the various examples here, but the central argument 
is that a genuine improvement of education requires an openness to rethinking those aspects of 
education which create the greatest social and learning difficulties for substantial minorities of 
pupils. This even makes sense in crude ‘effectiveness’ terms: one of the key findings of the 
PISA 2000 study was that most countries show similar attainment at the upper end, but their 
differences lie in the extent of disadvantage at the lower end of the attainment scale, i.e. a wider 
downward spread of attainment. Thus, the main characteristic of high-ranking countries such as 
Finland lies in their lack of a ‘tail’ of underachievement.
The examples and theories derive from wide reading in many different specialisms, which again 
exposes the failure of mainstream School Improvement to visit other shelves in the education 
library. Ironically perhaps it also in part results from connections made through ICSEI, the main 
international conference for SE and SI, which in addition to helping to cement the SE / SI 
relationship, has also opened them to other thinking on quality and change. In some of its annual 
conferences, ICSEI has drawn successfully upon the educational culture of the host country. For 
example, the Copenhagen conference helped make me aware of a radically different approach to 
differentiation, one that operated without stigma and without fixing pupils into a particular 
‘level’ (Krogh-Jespersen et al. 1998). This is based on a relatively open challenge or activity 
which enables pupils, increasingly conscious of their own learning and progress, to plan the 
nature of their response. This wider awareness and reading help to avoid short-term responses to 
issues such as proposals to improve boys’ reading through single-sex classes or responding to
‘male’ interests; as Martino and others (2001; 2003) have demonstrated, this has the danger of 
reinforcing the macho anti-intellectualism which is largely the source of the problem.
The other principle running through this chapter is the need to acknowledge issues of power. 
Schools are extremely dangerous places in this regard: their internal power structures and 
disciplinary cultures can easily collude with and reinforce power inequalities and discrimination 
in the wider society. This point is missed by improvement strategies which focus on attainment 
averages or quotas, and which unduly privilege measurable attainment above wider aspects of 
learning and social development.
This is not to suggest that hegemonic School Improvement is overtly discriminatory, but rather 
that its silences result in a reinforcement of normativity which serves to exclude very many 
pupils from successful participation. It becomes counter-productive, even in its own terms. Thus 
for example it draws on a Leadership literature which largely neglects the social understanding 
and engagement o f many successful school principals serving marginalised communities. School 
Improvement, in its hegemonic version, has focused on making the vehicle run more smoothly 
without questioning whether a new design is needed; it prefers the pragmatic approach of 
applying more or better oil to the same moving parts.
The silence about power, and indeed a failure to give voice to disempowered groups, does not of 
course combat or remove power. As Lukes (2005) has coherently argued, power is often 
strongest where it is invisible and unspoken. The tacit assumptions about school norms, 
reinforced by a complicity with governmental processes of surveillance and control, sustains a 
tone of pragmatism and moderation which objectively colludes with injustice and inequality.
(See also Thrupp and Willmott 2003 on ‘subtle apologism’.)
The neglect o f power issues extends also to a failure to question in whose interests - essentially 
the question why SE and SI have been so readily accepted and promoted politically and 
administratively as the ‘only show in town’. The final pages of Schools o f  Hope (A11) raise a 
number o f broad challenges regarding educational reform in a changing world. They recapitulate 
and reinforce the two recurrent themes in my writing: educational reform for social justice and 
for democratic citizenship. With the benefit of hindsight, they provided a rhetorical foundation 
but did not reach a sufficiently clear political analysis.
Ontologically this depends on a sense of class, in two different senses. Educational sociology 
relies heavily on an occupational distinction between manual workers and white collar /
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professional families, to explain children’s different attainment levels. This has been extended 
by examining the additional difficulties resulting from poverty (and, though often seen as 
disconnected, ‘race’ and gender). It is essential to retain this focus, whilst at the same time 
considering a Marxist distinction between capitalists and workers, increasingly operating as 
forces on a global scale. The latter definition underpins the importance of defending schools as a 
site for citizenship education, in opposition to attempts to gear schools more closely to economic 
functions. In its turn, articulating this depends upon an understanding of neo-liberalism as a class 
ideology and practice (see Harvey 2005, among others). Some recent studies seek to interpret 
educational reform in these terms, including (with reservations) Hargreaves (2003), and (more 
directly) Sears (2003) and Ball (2007). Andy Hargreaves’ book begins to see through the policy 
rhetoric of the ‘knowledge society’; he argues that large sections of the population work at low 
paid ‘McJobs’ to support the ‘weightless’ work of the ‘knowledge economy’, and increasingly 
their teachers are being retrained in very limiting ways through what he calls ‘performance sects’ 
rather than deep staff and school development. Alan Sears’ (2003) Retooling the mind factory 
argues that schooling today is being made to fit the needs of ‘fast capitalism’ in a slimmed down 
way, involving a reorientation towards basic skills and vocational training, and a socialisation of 
young people ‘as self-commodifying individuals, prepared to take their place in the market as 
sellers of their own capacity to work (labour power)’ (page 13). Ball (2007) presents a scholarly 
analysis of privatisation as economic transformation and as discourse. He sees England as a 
‘laboratory of political transformation which exports policy solutions across the globe’ (page 5), 
new ways of using the state as a ‘commodifying agent’ (page 5) to promote new opportunities 
for private enterprise under the shield of ‘partnership’.
Both Sears (page 4) and Ball (page 4) demonstrate how a manufactured ‘crisis’ of the public 
sector serves to create a ‘necessarian logic’ to privatisation (Watson and Hay 2003, cited Ball 
2007:33). The culture of performativity is ‘insatiable’; it
changes meaning; it delivers re-design and ensures ‘alignment’ It objectifies and 
commodifies public sector work; the knowledge work of educational institutions is 
rendered into ‘outputs’, ‘levels of performance’ and ‘forms of quality’, that is this 
process of objectification contributes more generally to the possibility of thinking about 
social services like education as forms of production, as ‘just like’ services of other 
kinds and other kinds of production’... They are standardised, calculated, qualified and 
compared. More generally performativity works to edge public sector organisations into 
a convergence with the private sector’. (Ball 2007:27-8)
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In chapter 6, Selling improvement /  selling policy /  selling localities, he demonstrates how 
demands for ‘continuous improvement’ enable companies, in prospectuses which are 
‘breathlessly enthusiastic’ (page 137) to offer
‘solutions’, ‘holistic change’, ‘vision’, ‘customised change’, ‘values-led approaches’, 
‘creative challenges’ and repeatedly ‘transformation’ to schools and education 
authorities, (page 138)
It is no longer tenable to discuss school improvement in the English context without recognising 
its entanglement with a neoliberal project of privatisation.
The relationship between contemporary school reforms and neo-liberalism is complex and does 
not submit to any reductionist one-to-one matching. It requires a well-developed critical 
sociology of policy, and internationally the analysis is still embryonic. Nevertheless some 
features have a direct relevance to understanding the SE / SI paradigms and their possible future 
development:
• the argument that test scores will attract investment, in a situation where national 
governments are felt to have little leverage
• the use of ‘league tables’ to generate a quasi-market, and subsequently their deployment
within a more radical privatisation process
• the accountability discourse as a means of creating a new utilitarianism
• the avoidance of any debate about educational values and purpose
• the increasing reduction of primary education to ‘basic skills’ and of secondary to
vocational preparation. (See also Wrigley 2006:18-19.)
Many of these points are already outlined in A. However, my most recent book (2006) builds on 
these, and seeks to interpret current changes in England, including a government drive to 
privatise the management of schools as ‘academies’ or ‘trust schools’. Another school is possible 
(2006:8) boldly summarises the historic tensions surrounding educational development:
Capitalism needs workers who are clever enough to be profitable, but not wise enough 
to know what’s really going on.
In a context o f global crises -  environmental (global warming), economic (debt, development,
poverty) and military (war in the Middle East, the arms trade) -  there is a drive not only to
vocationalise secondary schooling, but also to minimise opportunities to develop in-depth
critical understanding. This leads, in the English context, to a critique of current policy,
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including the Five Year Strategy for Children and Learners (DfES 2004), the White Paper (DfES 
2005) and the Education and Inspection Act (DfES 2006).
This new book, whilst drawing on A, represents a new departure in that it was written in 
collaboration with teacher union activists for a very wide audience, and published at a price 
which is selling far more rapidly than most academic books. I am led to reflect on the relative 
value of an academic challenge to School Improvement, in comparison with a more political 
engagement with a wider constituency of teachers and parents. It is also time to raise the 
question, in the context of this commentary, of how much longer the popularity and hegemony 
of SE and SI will last. Of course there is a powerful political interest which will serve to sustain 
this dominance, through English educational institutions such as OfSTED, the DfES and NCSL. 
However, the value of SE research and the mechanisms to which it is related are significantly 
undermined when the data are perceived to be unreliable (see Wrigley 2006: 13-18 for a 
summary). Mainstream SI, trapped within similar assumptions and perspectives, seems destined 
to keep repeating the same messages about capacity and leadership (whether singular or 
distributed), and, as argued above, is proving incapable of dealing with the challenge of poverty 
and low achievement. At the same time, structural and curricular reforms (privatisation, new 
forms of selection and vocationalism) are increasingly critical for all involved in school 
development, but are resolutely evaded by the mainstream Improvement experts. Finally, we 
might even be reaching a point when a general feeling emerges that the School Improvement 
orthodoxy has little more to say.
It is difficult to speculate on the future of School Improvement in the English context, now that 
policy is going down new avenues with the determination to transfer many schools to privatised 
management (academies and trust schools). Ball’s analysis (2007:135-146) points strongly 
towards improvement (or perhaps ‘innovation’, ‘transformation’) as a marketable commodity to 
be sold to schools from outside. Of course this new policy direction, or rather next step in neo­
liberal reform, is not inevitable, and there is considerable resistance.
Much depends on whether teachers are able to see beyond present modes of schooling and can 
organise to transcend them. Under these conditions, it would be possible to utilise some of the 
earlier gains of SI in terms of understanding collegial change processes, whilst re-connecting to 
other educational knowledge.21 Whether or not this will be known as ‘School Improvement’, we 
would in effect have a different paradigm, more closely resembling earlier, less compromised
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versions. In any case, new hybrid theories will inevitably arise, in Britain and elsewhere, as 
theories of educational change.
Just as it is a mistake to assume that policy transfer can occur, due to global agencies, without 
negotiation with vernacular traditions (see Ball 1998a; Dale 1999), it is also naïve to imagine 
that progressive educators can simply adopt innovative practices from other parts of the world. 
Nevertheless, in a situation where particular practices and discourses have become hegemonic, it 
becomes important to spread awareness of innovation elsewhere. This was one of the purposes 
of A6-8, and even more so Wrigley (2006). These include consideration of curriculum and 
school reforms including the American networks. It is also important to note some change of 
mood -  a desire for a more satisfying curriculum -  expressed in small-scale experiments in 
England (e.g. NESTA Future Lab), the new discourse o f ‘creativity’, and Scotland’s Curriculum 
fo r  Excellence.
It is hoped that this exploration of SE and SI as twin paradigms will contribute by subjecting 
current orthodoxies to critical scrutiny, in a systematic and theoretical way, in order to 
demonstrate that they are a kind of Kuhnian ‘normal science’ rather than truth per se.
In conclusion, albeit tentatively, I return to my framework for understanding paradigms, in order 
to suggest what a more powerful mode of research into educational change might look like. Such 
research would work with the following assumptions:
• As entities, schools are not simply organisations-to-be-managed; they are sites dedicated to 
learning and socio-cultural development, communities within wider communities. The 
primary forces which lead to stability or change go beyond and deeper than management, 
leadership and ‘capacity’; they must include the pedagogical desires and satisfaction of 
teachers and students, and the dynamics of transition and cultural contradiction among 
young people who move daily between the different worlds of neighbourhood and school.
• Educational change needs to draw upon and develop sociological models and theories which 
cast light on this experience, for example Bourdieu’s theories of exchange and in/validation, 
utilising and reworking concepts such as cultural and social capital. It needs to draw upon 
new pedagogical theories of learning, such as situated cognition, and engage seriously with 
new models of intelligence which challenge dominant assumptions about ‘ability’.
• The fie ld  of legitimate enquiry is no less than a rethinking of education. Simply improving 
schools within their current norms and historic traditions is insufficient, in the face of
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dramatic technological and social change in the wider world. Rather than oiling the wheels 
of a poorly designed machine, we need to consider what kind of education will best help a 
new generation of young people to face up to the challenges presented by a world in crisis.
• The study of educational change needs to be more wide-ranging and even eclectic in its 
adoption of methodologies, for example engaging in more sophisticated and critical forms of 
qualitative enquiry from the traditions of ethnography and social phenomenology; finding 
new ways o f listening to young people’s experience of schooling and society; and more 
critical forms of statistical research. It needs to develop a greater awareness of the diversity 
of pedagogical practices and theory within and beyond the English-speaking world.
• The process of rethinking education still requires close attention to process, but must 
connect the local in-school dynamics with a critical understanding of the implications of 
wider economic, social and cultural change. We need to be increasingly aware o f the 
relationship between national school reforms and the wider forces of neo-liberal 
globalisation.
• It must re-centre on the critical issues of social justice, particularly poverty and class, and on 
the central importance of citizenship: educating future citizens who are capable of dealing 
with the simultaneous global crises of poverty, environmental disaster and war. It must 
evaluate the ethical and political implications of different forms of school organisation and 
conflicting models of change, and engage in debate about curricular aims. It must be rooted 
in a commitment to democracy and social justice.
This is a substantial challenge, particularly as it runs against the grain of current power structures 
and policies, but developing a critical awareness of the limitations of the dominant School 
Effectiveness and Improvement paradigms might help to regroup and reorientate those who are 
concerned about this task. My work in attempting to destabilise the twin paradigms is hopefully 
contributing to the emergence of such an agenda, and taking us nearer to alternative paradigms.
57
Endnotes
1 It should be noted that the journal has tended towards the SE pole, and the relationship between 
SE and SI has often been a troubled one in the International Congress, especially when other 
versions of School Improvement have been heard.
2 Although the focus in this study is on paradigms as structures of thinking, it is possible to 
locate the material existence and cohesion of SI as a ‘school’. I recently used the device of 
asking three different leading academics within this field for a list of whom they considered to 
be its major contributors, setting this alongside the board of the journal I edit, Improving 
Schools. The following names appeared on three or all four of these lists: David Hopkins, Mel 
West, Louise Stoll, Tim Brighouse, Alma Harris, Paul Clarke, John Gray, John MacBeath (UK); 
Andy Hargreaves (USA, formerly UK and Canada) and Michael Fullan (Canada). In addition, 
the following appeared twice: Mel Ainscow, Kate Myers, Kathryn Riley, Felicity Wikely, Clive 
Dimmock and Michael Fielding (UK), along with Tony Townsend (Australia / USA) and Lorna 
Earl (Canada) appeared twice. The list is not unproblematic: Fielding has moved from being 
‘critical friend’ to a distant and sharp critic; Gray is more closely associated with SE than SI; 
MacBeath has determinedly sought to open up Anglophone SI to the influences of European 
traditions of school reform; Kathryn Riley has increasingly pursued an interest in school ethos 
and inclusion. For the most part, however, they constitute a close network or school.
My informants then helped me trace multiple connections: almost all had worked with other 
members o f the group at a handful of universities (Cambridge, Nottingham, Manchester,
Institute of Education (London), and OISE (Toronto)), with the opinion leaders moving between 
two or more o f these; there were multiple connections of co-authorship and joint research; 
almost all had been prominent in ICSEI (International Congress for School Effectiveness and 
Improvement, the annual world conference for the field), most having delivered keynotes. One 
of my informants pointed to critical stages in the development of school improvement in 
England, in terms of its relationship with New Labour ideologies and policies, and Michael 
Barber’s crucial role in cementing this ideological and pragmatic relationship. (Barber was, for a 
short time, a Dean at the London Institute, before being given charge of school improvement 
strategies at the Department for Education shortly after Blair’s election success.) Although aA 
more detailed mapping of these interrelationships would be revealing., it goes beyond the 
purposes of this Commentary, except to the extent of demonstrating the material existence of a 
school of leading proponents of the SI paradigm.
The coherence of SE is easier still to establish, with David Reynolds (UK) and Charles Teddlie 
(USA) acting virtually as its gatekeepers through their co-editorship of its leading journal School 
Effectiveness and School Improvement, and the International Handbook o f  School Effectiveness 
Research (Teddlie and Reynolds 2000). A major though less prominent role has been played by 
Pam Sammons and Daniel Muijs.
3 This does of course raise the question why, and under what circumstances and influence, SE 
and SI have achieved such an unusual degree of dominance in the field o f educational policy.
5 See also Nikolas Rose (1999).
6 Further than this, if we take a Foucauldian position, an extra-disciplinary ‘ideal speech 
community’ may not even be possible as power is pervasive and inescapable.
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7 At the time of writing, I had not read Mitchell and Sackney (2000), which take a position 
strongly opposed to regimes o f top-down control and surveillance. Their analysis links this to the 
disciplinary structures regulating the lives of students, as well as to pedagogical and assessment 
norms, seeing all these as part of a ‘systemsworld’ thinking (Sergiovanni 2000:4). The ‘profound 
school improvement’ they espouse aligns with social constructivist pedagogies; creating a 
‘learning community’ involves a transformation of learning for teachers and students alike.
8 Ironically, this is despite frequent findings in the SE literature that within-school differences, 
and particularly between teachers, are far greater than between-school differences.
9 Hopkins’ role was particularly crucial here, partly because of his habit of sliding between an 
apparently critical or progressive discourse and acceptance of almost any policy mandated by 
central government. He speaks o f ‘finding a balance’ between centralised policy initiatives and 
local improvement efforts (1994:75); sees ‘bottom-up’ responses as providing ‘energy’ and 
‘school-based implementation’ for top-down policy aims, strategy and operational plans (p79); 
and describes the National Curriculum, ‘the prescriptions of the effective schools research’, and 
the requirement for school development plans as ‘doors’ to school improvement (p86). It appears 
to matter little to what ends, and in which policy environment, a curriculum or school 
development plan is produced.
10 Elmore (2003) reworks the concept ‘capacity’ in examining the complex and contradictory 
responses of schools to high-stakes testing. He recognizes the problems of compliance and 
superficial learning, but appears to make too many concessions to the imposed accountability 
regime.
11 To the extent that School Improvement recognises the complex interaction of different forces, 
it tends to melt down complexity into chaos -  Fullan’s preferred term. Rather than analyse the 
nature and interlinking / interference of these multiple causal forces (cf Bhaskar’s stratification) 
‘leadership’ is summoned up, its primary role being to ‘manage culture’ and ‘build capacity’.
121 use the term deliberately, in the sense that Kuhn refers to certain experiments, models and 
texts as exemplary for a paradigm.
13 Earlier however Hopkins et al. (1994:87), following Andy Hargreaves, emphasised the 
complementarity and mutual impact of cultural and structural change.
16 This has been echoed more recently when literacy tests based on decoding or recognising 
individual words out of context are used to justify a strongly phonics-based approach to 
teaching; tests which emphasise understanding produce very different results. See critique in 
Berliner 2005.
18 It is ironic that they did so on the very terrain of mathematics which SE researchers Muijs and 
Reynolds had found most favourable to their case, see above.
19 Indeed, some features of a vocationalist curriculum, such as ‘enterprise’ projects, have an 
extremely tenuous hold on reality: no employee is exploited, paid meagre wages or laid off, and 
no entrepreneur fights aggressive take-over battles or is declared bankrupt.
20 The oft-repeated claim that Coleman asserted that ‘schools make no difference’ is refuted by 
Hayes et al (2006: 176-8).
21 Hayes et al. (2006) provide an interesting model for such a reworking of concepts of learning 
community, leadership and professional development.
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Appendix
Paradigms, epistemology and relativism -  a philosophical note
The concept of paradigm connects up ontological, epistemological and methodological concerns 
more directly than alternatives such a discourse or genre. In one summary:
‘paradigm’ encompasses everything: a generally accepted theory including exemplary 
problem solutions, governing research, with implications for what there is in the world, 
how it behaves, what questions we may ask about it, what methods may be used in 
pursuit of these questions, and what answers we may expect. (Hoyningen-Huene 
1993:142)
Indeed, according to the same source (pages 142-3), Kuhn himself made attempts to narrow 
down the concept he had developed, but by this time it had popularised so much that it was too 
late.
At the same time, Kuhn’s work in highlighting systematically different explanations, along with 
an allowance that subjective elements may be involved in paradigm change, immediately opens 
the door to relativism, in terms of a possible argument that the alternatives may be equally valid. 
Kuhn’s use of the term incommensurability has caused most controversy; indeed, Hoyningen- 
Huene (1993:207) provides over a hundred references in a single footnote.
Norris (1997:82-96) argues that Kuhn does indeed fall into ‘ontological relativism’, and that, in 
his attempt to respond to this criticism, he simply articulates a Humean empiricism or scepticism 
with regard to any reality which may lie behind our sensations. Norris insists that Kuhn, at the 
time of writing, did have alternative epistemological and ontological positions available to him, 
and in a grand flourish, Norris associates:
Quinean ontologies, Kuhnian paradigms, Wittgensteinian language games, Foucauldian 
‘discourses’, Rortian ‘final vocabularies’ or whatever, (ibid:61)
The term incommensurable appears to have come from Feyerabend, a committed relativist who
scandalously defended the Inquisition as appropriate within its own times and cultural
framework (Feyerabend 1987:247-264). Kuhn did, however, also insist upon the importance of
evidence and scientific rigour:
Finally, at a still higher level, there is another set of commitments without which no man 
is a scientist. The scientist must, for example, be concerned to understand the world and 
to extend the precision and scope with which it has been ordered. That commitment 
must, in turn, lead him to scrutinize, either for himself or through colleagues, some 
aspect of nature in great empirical detail. And if that scrutiny displays pockets of 
apparent disorder, then these must challenge him to a new refinement of his
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observational techniques or to a further articulation of his theories. Undoubtedly there 
are still other rules like these, ones which have held for scientists at all times. (Kuhn 
1970:42)
Arguably the ontological question is even more difficult in the social sciences, since ways of 
seeing the world (concepts, values, discourses) can be the object of enquiry as well as a factor in 
its interpretation. Further, if an academic paradigm acquires hegemonic status in the wider 
society, the resulting circularity can be difficult to break. We should note, however, that this is 
also possible with the natural sciences, for example recent arguments that Baconian, masculine 
or Eurocentric perspectives sanctioning dominance over nature have given an ecologically 
damaging direction to technological development.
The conference referred to in the main text (Guba ed. 1990) explicitly sought to discuss 
alternatives to positivism in terms of ontology, epistemology and methodology. Some of the 
discussion, unfortunately, confuses these levels, including the editor:
Ontologically, if there are always many interpretations that can be made in any inquiry, 
and if there is no foundational process by which the ultimate truth or falsity of these 
several constructions can be determined, there is no alternative but to take a position of 
relativism. (ibid:26)
There appears to be a logical error here in his use of the word ontologically to preface an 
argument which is clearly epistemological\ the difficulty of establishing truth says nothing about 
the ultimate existence or otherwise of the material reality under investigation. Similarly, 
Popkewitz, who argues for a ‘modified realism’:
First, I would accept a modified realist view that there are real objects in the world. We 
do pass through doors and can hurt our knees if we fall off a bicycle and hit the 
pavement. Things occupy physical space and time. Yet, once that is said, I still have to 
take a modified view of realism and, therefore, of objectivity. To say that there are trees 
is also to recognize that tree is an arbitrary name that assumes particular and possibly 
different meanings as it is placed within symbolic fields. ... Our categories and 
distinctions assume significance because of the ways in which they are positioned within 
language and as that language is made part of the rules and standards of social practice 
itself. (Popkewitz 1990:56)
This is not entirely convincing. Firstly, we need to make a philosophical distinction between our
sensations and understandings of the world and whatever reality lies behind them, i.e. between
epistemology and ontology. Secondly, in the process of enquiry, there is a necessary distinction
between other people’s perceptions of the world which are inevitably subjective and culturally
influenced, and the researcher’s own (subjectively and culturally influenced) position. This is
especially important when the researcher and the respondents share the same culture or
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worldview. This is crucially what distinguishes a Critical Theory paradigm and the kind of 
relativism or subjectivism which Lincoln, Guba and others espouse as part of their interpretivist 
approach. Without this critical distancing, we end up - as Norris (1996; 1997) asserts of 
postmodernism - with no belief or argument being any more true than another.
The danger of relativism is clearly increased by the values factor. However, here Bhaskar’s 
philosophy provides the basis for a more adequate discussion of the relationship between facts 
and values, including the key role of factual investigation and theory in challenging established 
values. (See Collier 1994: 170-200 for a summary, based substantially on Bhaskar 1986.) It 
might be argued that my critique of School Improvement simply represents ‘another point of 
view’ based solely on different values and beliefs; however, in Schools and Poverty (D), I have 
sought to argue that the orthodox SI paradigm is also ontologically unsound, epistemologically 
inadequate and practically incompetent in its engagement with schools in the most difficult 
circumstances.
As stated earlier, inadequate paradigms for analysing reality can ultimate distort the reality they 
are seeking to analyse. Indeed, Elliot Eisner, in his contribution to the conference, points out 
how that was already operating in the USA in terms of a linear rationality which holds sway in 
the paradigms for school evaluation and pedagogy. This ultimately affects structures and creates 
a new habitus and identity for teachers.
In conventional paradigms, action is idealized as a premeditated, goal-directed, 
cybernetically driven system. To act rationally, you have to have specific goals; the 
goals, in turn, determine the means you are to employ; the means you employ are then to 
be evaluated by their effects to determine the congruence between prespecified goals 
and the behaviour of students. (Eisner 1990:96)
In effect, what is at stake is a whole way of both understanding and acting on the world. The
uncritical researcher easily becomes caught up in this.
It is this overarching and pervasive world-view that Raymond Williams seeks to understand, and 
for which he invents the concept of a structure o f  feeling  (Williams 1958). Thus in addition to 
creating a new paradigm for English studies at university, Williams is also engaged in locating 
systematic patterns of feeling in society at large. This may run across a culture at a particular 
point in time, or transmit down the generations. The notion o f ‘structure o f feeling’, I would 
argue, gives a materiality to social psychology, as against the individualist and idealist way in 
which feelings and emotions are often discussed. Williams locates, in the literature, broad
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patterns of thought, feeling, action and relationship which reflect what is hegemonic in the wider 
society.
These novels, when read together, seem to illustrate clearly enough not only the 
common criticism of industrialism, which the tradition was establishing, but also the 
general structure of feeling which was equally determining. Recognition of evil was 
balanced by fear of becoming involved. Sympathy was transformed, not into action, but 
into withdrawal. We can all observe the extent to which this structure of feeling has 
persisted, into both the literature and the social thinking of our own time. (Williams 
1958:119)
Such systematic ways of viewing the worlds -  cultural paradigms -  characterise an entire 
cultural situation (though Williams is careful to disallow a determinism which prevents 
resistance and change). Thus he examines why novelists such as Elizabeth Gaskell and Charlotte 
Bronte, as well as Dickens, cannot move beyond sympathy for the suffering of ‘the poor’ into 
engagement with workers’ political demands and movements (ibid: 99-119). He exposes Jane 
Austen’s limiting historical and geographical perspectives:
It is a truth universally acknowledged, that Jane Austen chose to ignore the decisive 
historical events ofhertim e.’ (1973:113).
In The country and the city (1973) Williams explores an enduring pattern o f nostalgia about the
countryside in English culture, tracing back the lost golden age, ever receding, until he
eventually reaches Piers Plowman. This last example unites a critique of an academic paradigm,
the Leavisite model of literary studies, with a wider cultural exploration.
It is when examining R. D. Laing’s work that we see how paradigms work in a field of 
institutionalised social practice such as psychiatry -  or education. There are strong connections 
between academic paradigms, discourses as public frames of reference, and institutional 
structures. In a classic (we might say in Kuhn’s original sense of exemplary, a paradigmatic) 
example, Laing shows, by italicising the psychiatrist’s actions, just how questionable this is:
Here are a man and a young girl. If we see the situation purely in terms of Kraepelin’s 
point of view, it all immediately falls into place. He is sane, she is insane: he is rational, 
she is irrational. This entails looking at the patient’s actions out of the context of the 
situation as she experienced it. But if we take Kraepelin’s actions (in italics) -  he tries to 
stop her movements, stands in front of her with arms outspread, tries to force a piece of 
bread out o f her hand, sticks a needle in her forehead, and so on -  out of the context of 
the situation as experienced and defined by him, how extraordinary they are! (1967:89)
Here incommensurable takes on a new meaning, in that the agent (in this case the psychiatrist) is
so caught up in his professional habitus that he loses the ability to reflect on his own mode of
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action. The extent o f blockage and denial shows how strongly such ways of knowing the world 
are entangled with power -  power/knowledge, as Foucault (1980a) expressed it.
If Jack succeeds in forgetting something, this is of little use if Jill continues to remind 
him of it. He must induce her not to do so... He may make her feel guilty for keeping on 
“bringing it up”. He may invalidate her experience. This can be done more or less 
radically. He can indicate merely that it is unimportant or trivial, whereas it is important 
and significant to her. Going further, he can shift the modality of her experience from 
memory to imagination: “It’s all in your imagination.” Further still, he can invalidate the 
content. “It never happened that way.” Finally, he can invalidate not only the 
significance, modality, and content, but her very capacity to remember at all, and make 
her feel guilty for doing so into the bargain... “How can you think such a thing?” “You 
must be paranoid.” (Laing 1967:31)
In such situations, perhaps unconsciously, one individual goes to great lengths to enforce a
particular way of looking at the world.
The knowledge / power connections also, o f course, operate at a macro-political level. A recent 
lecture on Laing’s legacy illustrates how the acceptance or rejection of a new paradigm depends 
strongly upon the wider economic and political situation:
Social approaches to mental health began to stagnate after the 1970s. Sociological 
approaches were everywhere in retreat, and the more extreme claims of critical 
psychiatry were discredited. In Britain, at least, the movement seemed to have been 
swept away as if it had never happened. Within mental health services a gradual shift of 
power back to psychiatry began to occur. These changes took place against a 
background of recurrent financial crises. Demand for mental health services increased, 
but the oil crisis plunged Western economies into recession. Mrs Thatcher introduced 
“Reaganomics” into Britain and the budget for health and social services was cut 
drastically. This ushered in the era of Managed Care -  a new bogey for professionals 
and patients alike. This new alliance of positivism and managerialism created strange 
bedfellows. Managed Care represents an attack on professional autonomy, whether the 
professional happens to be a phenomenologist or a brain surgeon. During the same 
period, organic psychiatry made a spectacular come-back: once vilified, it now became 
prestigious -  the 1990s were “the decade of the brain”. Psychiatry entered into an 
alliance with the pharmaceutical industry and discovered an enormous market. (Ingleby 
2005)
Many of the above examples illustrate the limited understanding which arises when the object 
and activity of scientific study are assumed to be entirely separate from thought and feeling and 
human interaction. Kuhn’s recognition of the subjective and cultural dimensions of scientific 
discovery challenges this dualism, as does Laing’s objection to those established modes of 
clinical diagnosis which objectify the other. The opposite error is shown by relativist positions 
which submerge the researcher into what is being researched or assume that all conclusions are 
equally valid.
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There is a danger of this in Flyvbjerg’s (2001) recourse to Aristotle’s concept of phronesis as 
ethical enquiry, which he distinguishes from episteme and techne. Phronesis necessarily involves 
human values and feelings, and it is important to counter those who seek to remove values from 
social sciences. Flowever, Flyvbjerg suggests too rigid a separation between phronesis and 
episteme, as if factual verification did not matter in the social sciences. Let us consider what 
would occur if techne (craft skills or technology) were divorced from episteme (as scientific 
knowledge). Boats would sink and chairs would fall apart.
I return to Stephen and Hilary Rose (1976) for a way of resolving this. Whilst arguing against 
reductionism, they fully recognise the value of simplifying situations in order to concentrate on 
particular features. Indeed, they see the whole experimental tradition as involving reductions 
(isolating variables, producing mathematical representations). At the same time they argue that 
scientists should rebuild what they have taken apart, and reconnect those features which they 
have isolated for experimental purposes to the complexity of the wider world from which they 
were tom. This is an important way of reconciling the split between quantitative and qualitative 
methods in the social sciences generally; and of distinguishing between those quantitative 
studies in education which serve the cause of human development and social justice and those 
which simply reduce educational evaluation and change to government by numbers.
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Abstract
This paper examines the relationship between social class and low academ ic 
achievem ent in the light of recent developments in pedagogical theory. It revisits 
historically influential theories (innate intelligence and language deficit) using the 
lens of situated cognition and activity theory as conceptualisations of knowledge and 
learning which embed thinking within action, experience and context. Drawing on 
W enger (1998) and others, it argues for a more skilful grounding of theoretical 
learning in experience, so that good opportunities are given to exercise voice and 
agency. The paper includes positive examples from  lesson observations in urban 
schools. The methodology is that o f a critical and historical review of key theories, 
followed by a theoretical discussion of recent pedagogical developm ents and specific 
examples drawn from  the w riter’s fieldwork studies of successful schools in areas of 
disadvantage.
In troduction
An im portant normative feature of school learning is the privileging of abstract 
reasoning over thinking which is experientially grounded. Although practical activity 
has had a place in schools, it has often been positioned as of low status and seen in 
terms of trained actions rather than as situated learning (a key exception to this being 
the developm ent of Design and Technology to replace craft subjects). A t the same 
time, form s of learning in more cognitive or ‘academ ic’ subjects often involve 
abstract verbal explanations with very little experiential involvement or use of other 
sensory channels.
I would like to argue that this basic culture of learning is likely to have a particularly 
damaging effect on students from  m arginalised communities. Firstly, if the school is 
perceived as failing to attach value to manual work, the cultural assets of the 
neighbourhood are not converted into cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1983). A significant 
gulf emerges between the learning culture of the school and forms of manual activity 
in poorer comm unities -  and indeed patterns of everyday informal learning which are 
often more ‘situated’ than traditional school learning. Secondly, access to learning is 
made more difficult for pupils who lack the out-of-school experience to interpret their 
teachers’ explanations or who are less accustomed to abstract linguistic registers.
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The privileging of abstract reasoning has been a recurrent feature informing 
hegemonic theories of ability and intelligence in the 20th century. In particular, the 
notion o f intelligence as generic and innate, and subsequent language deficit theories, 
have been deployed, albeit for different motives, to explain the relatively lower 
attainm ent of pupils from  manual worker families. We are now able to review such 
constructs and discourses with the benefit of hindsight, because of the different way in 
which activity theory and situated cognition fram e the relationship of symbolic 
representation to experiential involvement. Beyond this pedagogical analysis, the 
subsections of the following section also attempt to provide some historical 
explanation o f the popularity and explanatory power of these theories.
Conceptualising Reasoning, Language and Experience
Cyril Burt and the concept o f  innate intelligence
From roughly the 1920s to the 1950s, Cyril Burt, London’s first educational 
psychologist, was able to shape professional and popular understanding around a 
concept of innate intelligence, supposedly measurable by IQ tests. ‘Intelligence’ was 
constructed in terms of highly abstract forms of reasoning, with logical puzzles such 
as “Rectangle is to square as ellipse is to . . .” . It is hardly surprising that children from 
professional fam ilies tended to be more successful than those from  manual w orkers’ 
fam ilies who were more accustomed to dealing with less abstract but equally complex 
real life problems. (Illogically Burt, in an early study, jum ped to the conclusion that 
differences in measured IQ between the children of Oxford university teachers and 
those of manual workers in the town m ust be due to heredity rather than environment. 
Rose, Kamin and Lewontin [1984, p. 87 | argue that this is the result of the hegemony 
of Social Darwinism  as an ideology but also of B urt’s class prejudice. W hile still an 
undergraduate student at Oxford, Burt had noted: “the problem of the very poor -  
chronic poverty: little prospect of the solution of the problem without the forcible 
detention of the wreckage of society or otherwise preventing them from  propagating 
their own species” .)
As Neisser (1976) points out, such tests are designed by people with a particular type 
of intelligence to identify others with a sim ilar type of intelligence:
Academ ic people are among the stoutest defenders o f the notion of 
intelligence....[T ]he tests seem so obviously valid to us who are members of 
the academic com m unity....There is no doubt that Academ ic Intelligence is 
really im portant for the kind of work that we do. W e readily slip into believing 
that it is important for every kind o f significant work. (p. 138)
It has been suggested that this model was particularly influential because of its 
ideological convenience. According to Cow bum  (1986), the increased power o f the 
labour m ovem ent in the early years of the 20th century made it impossible for the 
British ruling class to continue arguing overtly, as they had in V ictorian times, that 
manual w orkers’ children must not be educated ‘above their station’. In parallel to this, 
the desperate skills shortage after W orld W ar I meant that some limited upward 
mobility was needed, with ‘intelligence tests’ at age 11 serving as a gatekeeper to 
allow some working class children access to a secondary education, whilst leaving 
intact the basic social divisions in the school system.
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Basil Bernstein and the concept o f  language deficit
Once the concept of innate intelligence lost favour -  and after Burt’s research was 
exposed as largely fraudulent (Rose, Kamin & Lewontin, 1984, p. 98) -  theories of 
verbal deficit emerged as the preferred explanation for differential levels of school 
achievem ent of pupils from different backgrounds. (More extended critiques of 
language deficit theories can be found, among other sources, in Rosen [1972], Labov 
[1969], Gordon [1981], Tizard and Hughes [1984], Edwards and W estgate [1994] and 
Edwards [1976].) A t this time, across Britain, established structures of tw o- or three­
tiered secondary schooling were being abandoned and comprehensive schools 
established, though it was already being realised that that would not automatically 
bring about equality of outcome. (It is beyond the scope o f this paper to analyse the 
reasons behind the parallel growth of deficit theories in the United States of America.)
In their m ost primitive forms, language deficit theories were based on a crude 
prejudice which saw certain dialects and accents as inferior. The colloquial speech of 
working class pupils was described in quasi-moral terms, as bad grammar, slovenly 
speech, sloppy pronunciation and foul language. Such judgm ents often showed high 
levels of linguistic m isunderstanding and social prejudice.
Bereiter et al. (1966, p l21 ) frown on pupils who reply to the question ‘W here 
is the squirrel?’ by saying ‘In the tree’ rather than ‘The squirrel is in the tree .’ 
Riessm ann (1962, p75) writes: ‘The communication of the deprived is famous 
for its use of imaginative nicknames and shortenings -  the British “never- 
never” for instalm ent buying, “telly” for TV, “pub” for bar or public place [sj'c]. 
(Gordon, 1981, p. 50)
Particular dialect form s such as double negatives were assumed to be illogical; they 
had to be eliminated in young children in order to make them fit for schooling. In the 
United States of America, the Black English Vernacular of African Am ericans became 
a particular target', with features such as the double negative (“ I a in ’t going nowhere” ) 
or missing copula (“She no good!” ) regarded as a barrier to cognitive development. 
An old kind of prejudice was emerging as a new quasi-scientific. explanation.
In Britain, however, a more sophisticated language deficit theory came from  Basil 
Bernstein (e.g., 1965, 1971, 1973). (Bernstein himself denied that it amounted to a 
deficit theory. The point is skilfully argued by Gordon [1981, pp. 66-89], who 
provides a penetrating commentary on Bernstein’s inconsistencies.) His argument, in 
a nutshell, was that working class children’s speech is largely determined by a 
“restricted code” , whereas middle class children frequently use language which it 
regulated according to an “elaborated code” . “Restricted code” utterances make sense 
within the shared experience of a fam iliar or immediate context; “elaborated code” 
denotes utterances which are more explicit. “Elaborated code” is appropriate when 
speaking about a situation which is not immediately present to the speaker and 
listeners, or at least fam iliar to them both. Bernstein listed a num ber of grammatical 
markers o f each code; for example, “ restricted code” tends to involve more pronouns, 
whereas “elaborated code” involves more nouns.
The problem centres on the relationship of language and other symbolic form s with 
experience, or more precisely on the complementary contributions of symbolic forms 
and lived experience in producing meaning. This is the dom inant question of this
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paper, connecting language deficit theories and Burt’s decontextualised ‘intelligence’, 
and underpinning the pedagogical problems of decontextualised abstract instruction 
which will be discussed later.
Bernstein experienced particular problems in constructing his explanation for low 
attainm ent; his argum ents depend on unclear causal links am ong class, fam ily type, 
linguistic code, speech and educational attainment. (The term “code” is itself obscure. 
Bernstein uses it to refer directly not to patterns of speech but to an underlying 
organising principle which leads to the production of certain types o f speech. The 
essential point, in the end, is that a distinction is being made between two different 
types o f language.) (See Edwards [1976] for an extended discussion of these posited 
causal links.) However, even the basic empirical evidence was flawed. The m ost 
fam ous demonstration was through an experiment in which ‘working class’ and 
‘m iddle class’ children were asked to describe a drawing of boys playing football and 
accidentally kicking the ball through a neighbour’s window. (Like many sociologists, 
Bernstein uses the terms “working class” and “middle class” to make a broad 
distinction between manual and white collar employment. These broad definitions are 
a source of further problems, since there is no differentiation, for example, between 
different levels of skill in manual occupations or between routine clerical work and 
the higher professions. There is often a degree of social stereotyping in his notion of a 
working class home or community.)
The middle class version of the description of the drawing is more explicit:
Three boys are playing football and one boy kicks the ball and it goes 
through the window the ball breaks the window and the boys are looking at 
it and a man comes out and shouts at them because they ’ve broken the 
window so they run away and then that lady looks out o f her window and 
she tells the boys off.
The working class version uses pronouns, assuming that the listener will understand: 
T hey’re playing football and he kicks it and it goes through there it breaks 
the window and they’re looking at it and he comes out and shouts at them 
because they’ve broken it so they run away and then she looks out and she 
tells them off. (Bernstein, 1972, p. 167)
(Like other ‘evidence’ in support of Bernstein’s arguments, we do not have access to 
real quotations but only to the research assistant’s reconstruction of typical versions. 
The research assistant, Hawkins [1969], calls them “slightly exaggerated” versions.)
Ironically, the researchers missed the point -  that the children, and the listener, have 
the drawing in front of them all the time. Pronouns are quite sufficient in this context. 
If anything, it is the first child’s use of language which is inappropriate. Bernstein 
does not argue that working class children are incapable of more explicit syntax or 
that they do not have the grammar but that they simply tend to use language 
differently. An alternative explanation would be that the middle class children in the 
experim ent have a different social understanding of the situation -  namely, that it 
requires a more formal register.
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Bernstein was hurt by accusations that he held a deficit view of working class speech, 
yet it is hard to avoid that conclusion. In retrospect, it would have been perfectly 
possible to use more neutral terms such as “abstracted” and “contextualised” rather 
than “elaborated” and “ restricted” codes, or even to reverse the polarity with 
“disem bodied” and “situated”.
B ernstein’s theories were received enthusiastically and became, in crude popular 
versions, a kind of professional folklore. British teachers in the 1970s would 
frequently claim that working class parents “don’t talk to their children, they ju st hit 
them ” or that the children arrive at school “without any language” (Tizard & Hughes, 
1984, p. 159).
Alternative explanations
The deficit view, in its North American version, was vigorously attacked by Labov 
(1969), who provided evidence of black youth debating theology and politics on the 
streets of the Harlem  ghetto:
There is no reason to believe that any non-standard vernacular is in itself an 
obstacle to learning. The chief problem is ignorance of language on the part of 
all concerned....Teachers are now being told to ignore the language of Negro 
children as...useless for learning. They are being taught to hear every natural 
utterance of the child as evidence of his [s/c] mental inferiority. As linguists 
we are unanim ous in condemning this view as bad observation, bad theory and 
bad practice, (p. 34)
In England, Rosen (1972) made similar points about the rich verbal culture of militant 
working class areas in Britain such as the London Docklands and the coalmining 
regions:
No attention is paid to that vast area of critical working-class experience, the 
encounter with exploitation at the place of work and the response to 
it....C ollective bargaining, demonstrations, strikes and so on ...can  occur only 
if language is available which is adequate to the task. W hat kind of people 
imagine that the 1972 m iners’ strike, for example, was made possible merely 
by the incantation of a few rabble-rousing slogans?
It would be valuable to revisit Labov’s(1969) and R osen’s (1972) argum ent through a 
closer examination of the discourse of high level debate in such environments. My 
hypothesis would be that it would depend much more than m ost classroom-based 
argum ent on the interweaving of narrative with abstract language. Such discourse 
would probably also make greater acknowledgem ent of different voices (real or 
hypothetical), rather than the voice (or rather voicelessness) of “decontextualised 
rationality” (Wertsch, 1990) -  a register which silences and conceals conflicting 
perspectives and interests beneath the pseudo-objectivity of Enlightenm ent discourse.
Here Bourdieu’s (1983) concept of cultural capital is relevant: it is not so much the 
characteristics o f a particular class culture as whether it is validated by the school. As 
other opponents of the language deficit view have pointed out, we should also take 
account of the limitations of the school as a discursive environment:
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a) Spoken language in the classroom  is largely dom inated by closed questions, 
giving the pupils little opportunity to speak for more than two or three words. 
Some researchers have pointed out that the language practice of working class 
homes is actually richer than that of the school, in terms of the negotiation and 
developm ent of meaning, and that in reality schools do little to compensate for the 
supposed deficit (see Edwards & W estgate, 1994; Tizard & Hughes, 1984; W ells 
& W ells, 1984).
b) School language operates at a high level of abstraction, m aking it difficult for 
many pupils to connect concepts with experience. School learning does require 
some explicit comm unications about situations that are not physically present. 
However, it happens too frequently that teachers use abstract language without 
providing photographs or real objects, as if the teacher and pupils shared a 
common experience.
As Edwards and W estgate (1994) noted:
The characteristic identified most often as the main source of difficulty is the 
high level of abstraction which pervades so much classroom  talk (and, of 
course, classroom writing). It is argued that most of the expositional language 
of teachers, and of textbooks, is ‘language at the apex of a pyramid of 
experience’ -  that is, language which offers summ aries of, or generalizations 
about, objects and actions and events (Rosen 1967). That would not be a 
problem if more of the pyramid had earlier been in view, because we are all 
accustomed to first ‘telling a story’ and then ‘giving the g ist’ of it. Problems 
arise where there has been no ‘story’ -  where the abstractions are free-floating, 
unattached to those detailed empirical referents which can alone give them life 
(Barnes et al, 1969; Edwards, A. 1978; Hull, 1985). (p. 35)
Vygotsky (1986) argues that in such situations words are acquired as empty shells 
rather than as real concepts:
Direct teaching o f concepts is impossible and fruitless. A teacher who tries to 
do this usually accomplishes nothing but empty verbalism, a parrotlike 
repetition of words by the child, simulating a knowledge of the corresponding 
concepts but actually covering up a vacuum, (p. 150)
Pupils whose fam ilies have provided the relevant experiences, whether visiting 
museums or watching and discussing television documentaries and nature 
programmes together, will make sense of the teacher’s words; for other children, it is 
not their language where the deficit is located but the visual and other sensory 
elem ents in the teacher’s presentation. For these children, it is im portant to provide 
rich learning experiences as a foundation for developing verbal explanations and to 
scaffold the pupils’ transition towards more abstract and formal kinds of speech.
Transform ing  School Learning
It would be wrong, on the other hand, to regard abstract thinking as inappropriate or 
unnecessary for working class pupils. Even if we accept L abov’s (1969) argum ent that 
the street language of the Harlem ghetto can be a medium for high level political and 
theological debate, as well as the growing body of knowledge about alternative modes 
of reasoning in diverse environments (e.g., the alternative mathematics of non-school 
situations [Lave, M urtaugh & de la Rocha, 1984; Scribner, 1984]), abandoning the
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more theoretical discourses of academ ic learning is not necessarily the best way to 
raise working class achievement. W hilst arguing for learning which is better grounded 
in experience and for more careful transitions from  colloquial to academ ic language, I 
would wish to reject any notion that sensory experience by itself is enough. This 
would be seriously limiting. (This position was adopted by Bantock [Lawton, 1977, p. 
24], a contributor to the extreme right wing Black Papers, who argued for two forms 
of education: a literary, logical, intellectual curriculum  for a small m inority; and a 
sensory and affective curriculum for the majority, including basic literacy skills but 
with minimal cognitive requirements. This position, I believe, is restrictive and elitist.)
The central issue, I would argue, is how best to connect language (and other symbolic 
form s such as maps, algebra or musical notation) with experience in ways which 
restore voice and agency to the learner. A theoretical foundation for this can be found 
in Vygotskian social constructivism, as developed and elaborated in the last two 
decades under rubrics such as activity theory and situated cognition. Vygotsky (1978) 
had shown that learning is primarily social, depending upon the cultural inheritance of 
artefacts and language, as well as direct cooperation with others. The interpenetration 
of thinking and activity, and the extent to which learning and thinking are embedded 
in social and cultural contexts, have been increasingly understood through the work of 
writers such as Rogoff and Lave (1984), W enger (1998), Engestrom, M iettinen and 
Punamaki (1999), Salomon (1993) and others.
Experience and symbolic representation in a community o f  practice  
I find particularly illuminating W enger’s metaphor of the flow er and the computer. 
W enger (1998) poses an old Zen problem: what does a flower know about being a 
flower? The answ er is: in one sense, everything but in another, nothing at all:
Being a flow er is to no one as transparent, immediately obvious, fully 
internalized, and natural as it is to a flower: spreading those leaves, absorbing 
that specific spectrum of light from  the sun, taking the energy in, building 
protein, sucking nutrients from  its roots, growing, budding, blooming, being 
visited by a bee ....B u t ask the flow er to teach a botany class, and it will just 
stand there, knowing nothing about being a flower, not the first thing, (p. 134)
He follows this with the question, “W hat does a computer know about being a 
flo w er? ’. Again his answer is everything and nothing -  but the opposite way round to 
the flower. The com puter can handle all kinds of data about flowers but experientially 
it has no understanding at all about being a flower: “ Type ‘photosynthesis’, ‘petal’, 
‘stem ’, and so on: perfect answers. The knowledge is all there ....B u t if...y o u  buy 
your computer a half-dozen roses, then the computer will sit there, awaiting some 
input. It knows nothing” (p. 135).
W enger (1998) argues that human learning m ust involve both experience and 
symbolic representation. He calls these participation  and reification. Having an 
experience o f  meaning  involves both of these in close interconnection.
It seem s to me that this analysis of a dialectical relationship between experience and 
symbolic representation  (I prefer these terms to W enger’s participation  and reification) 
is the key to understanding successful learning, in and out of school. It has particular 
relevance as a tool for grappling with the issue of underachievem ent in marginalised
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communities. It casts light on the fallacies of judging intelligence through tests of 
abstract reasoning or condemning language as ‘deficient’ on the false assum ption that 
words alone m ust be sufficient to carry a meaning.
If we pursue W enger’s argument, we soon encounter the term community o f  practice, 
which supplies the missing element: the social environm ent in which the interplay of 
language (symbol system) and experience (a sensory involvement with material 
reality) takes place.
Facilitating cognitive development
Piaget’s stage theory distinguishes between contextualised and abstract reasoning 
(concrete operational/formal operational), with a transition around the age of 12. 
Repeating his experiments in inner London schools and then with a representative 
cross sample in England and Wales, Adey and Shayer (1994, pp. 28-33) concluded 
that this does not happen spontaneously at that age, and for many the transition comes 
much later, if at all. (In the population as a whole, few er than 30 per cent of 16 year 
olds were showing the use of even early formal operations. That means that the 
majority of the population was leaving school using only concrete operations [Adey & 
Shayer, 1994, p. 31.)
They developed m ethods to support and accelerate this transition, by embedding the 
learning of key scientific concepts into cooperative problem solving activity. Based on 
a constructivist psychology, their five steps are:
• concrete preparation (involving rich experience and introduction to new 
vocabulary)
• cognitive conflict (the learners find an event or observation puzzling/discordant 
with previous experience or understanding)
® construction zone activity (collaborative mental activity -  “a magic place where
minds meet, where things are not the same to all who see them, where meanings 
are fluid”)
• metacognition (self-reflection and higher level modelling on the part of the learner)
• bridging (the conscious transfer of a theory to new situations and problems), 
(adapted from  Adey & Shayer, 1994, p. 75)
As an illustration, I will use a science lesson which I observed in a school in Leicester 
in the United Kingdom  with high levels of poverty and where m ost pupils were 
bilingual (South Asian) and a significant minority struggle with English (Wrigley, 
2000, pp. 47-60). The study of evolution began with groups of 13 year olds designing 
islands -  drawing them and deciding the climate and vegetation. A fter this concrete 
preparation, the teacher stimulated cognitive conflict by placing the wrong animal on 
each group’s island -  a model penguin on a sandy tropical island, a camel in the 
Antarctic, etc. The groups discussed this vigorously, identifying particular physical 
features of the animal. W orking now on large sheets of paper (big enough to show to 
the rest of the class -  a real audience), each group drew an animal and labelled 
features which were well-adapted to an environment -  an elephant’s thick skin and 
trunk, a penguin’s feet, etc. This, and the discussion that followed, fit Adey and 
Shayer’s (1994) notion of “construction zone activity”. The series of lessons was not 
complete until concepts of adaptation and evolution had been consolidated at a more 
abstract theoretical level and the transferability to many other problems was clear.
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The learning was successful because theoretical learning was skilfully grounded in an 
experience which the students found interesting and challenging. It was a clear 
example of voice and agency: it provided many opportunities for authentic discussion, 
for choices to be. made, for active learning, for sharing with others -  a real audience, a 
product. It also involved students in m aking campaign posters for Friends of the Earth 
and Greenpeace -  a sense of political voice and agency.
W aitofsky (1973, p. 209), discussing various types o f models and representations, 
speaks o f a special category which he calls “ tertiary artefacts” or “imagined worlds” -  
a locus of playful learning where alternatives can be explored. In this lesson, the 
students are actively creating an ‘imagined w orld’ using islands and posters as 
semiotic models within which complex theories can be accessed. A lthough not the 
‘real w orld’ as such, they provide a sensory-rich model of it, a sim ulated environm ent 
in which young people can relate symbols with sensory experience. They are both a 
model or form  of representation in themselves and a field in which other 
representations can become meaningful.
It seem s to me that schools need to seek out two kinds of field to give a greater sense 
of reality to learning. One is to go out into the real world -  fieldwork, placements, 
surveys, etc. -  and the other is various kinds of ‘p lay’ or ‘imagined w orlds’. This 
concept of play can be applied at all stages of education and provides the possibility 
of the open exploration of possibilities, testing out options for change. It is a kind of 
“off-line” activity (Wartofsky, 1973, p. 208) which is not so tightly constrained by 
econom ic necessity and can allow scope for greater creativity. Such simulated realities 
also allow for the possibility of stepping back out of role during a ‘debriefing’ stage to 
discuss what has occurred at a meta-level, using more abstract language.
I came across many productive examples of simulations when investigating successful 
inner city schools with large numbers of bilingual pupils (Wrigley, 2000):
« interviews for the post of parish priest in a medieval village, which revealed the 
power relationships at play in that society
• interviews for the vacancy of Enzyme -  students drew up job  descriptions, wrote 
CVs, planned questions and made a successful ‘appointm ent’
* a fam ily at the time of the English Civil War, debating which side they should 
support.
They provide rich illustrations of social constructivist pedagogy, in contrast to the 
fast-paced transmission teaching which has been granted official favour in England. 
One example involves a class of seven year olds in a Bradford school, where many 
children from  Pakistani and Bangladeshi families speak little English prior to 
enrolling at school. The school believed firmly in rooting literacy skills in an 
integrated and experience-rich curriculum (Wrigley, 2000, pp. 112-116).
One classroom  wall represented their neighbourhood, to which the children had stuck 
photographs and maps and drawings from their many visits out o f school. It was 
labelled in English and Urdu. Another wall was a large map of a remote Scottish 
island -  the children were reading one of the Katie M orag stories. This provided much 
discussion about the geographical contrasts and new vocabulary appeared on the walls
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-  “settlem ents” , “ bay”, “ferry”. On the day of my visit, the teacher had written a 
newspaper in large print about the myth of the Loch Ness Monster. An eyewitness 
report appeared in column 2, and the teacher (in role as reporter) soon discovered that 
the children m isunderstood the source of the information: “ Miss, you found it in the 
library” ; “Internet, m iss!” . Finally one small boy, very excited: “M iss, that man said... 
that man saw i t . . .” .
Here was an opportunity to open up the two-dimensional text into three-dim ensional 
experience, and to make a past tense report more immediate. The teacher brought the 
boy to the front, he quickly invented a persona as eyewitness, other children (holding 
glue-pens as pretend m icrophones) acted as reporters interviewing him -  they were 
ju st as quick to give their newspapers names and develop an identity. A fter this, the 
activity was repeated in pairs, so that each child had lots of practice, and finally the 
class moved on to writing.
In another class, I saw children learning the genre of instructions by writing a recipe. 
First, the teacher demonstrated how to mix the ingredients for a cake, speaking it 
aloud. The children baked a cake together, each child performing one action before 
passing to the next person and speaking each step aloud. Learning how to read and 
write for these children is a big step, since their English is still lim ited; in fact, they 
have to do three things together: develop spoken English; learn how to read and write; 
and acquire curriculum  knowledge in different areas. The developm ent of symbolic 
representations has to be skilfully interwoven with direct experience (in W enger’s 
[1998] words, the combination of “participation” and “reification”). In these two 
examples also, we m ight speak o f the shared construction of imagined worlds in 
which the second level symbolic processes of literacy can be developed. (For 
W artofsky [1973], the category of ‘imagined w orlds’ also includes works of art such 
as paintings and novels.)
M ore Open Architectures for School Learn ing
The recent large-scale reform strategies in England have mainly involved attempts to 
discipline teaching by imposing particular structures on individual lessons, dividing 
each 40-60 m inutes into three or four different activities. Though not explicitly 
acknowledged, there has been a strong emphasis on teaching as the transmission of 
knowledge. Despite the declared intention of raising attainm ent for all, the benefit to 
students from  poorer families has generally been limited. (Governm ent claims that the 
attainm ent gap is shrinking are often based on flawed assessm ent tools [see Wrigley, 
forthcom ing, ch. 1|. Some key officials, including the Chief Inspector, have publicly 
acknowledged that the attainment gap has not decreased.)
Internationally more open pedagogies are available which m ight engage these 
students more and provide a greater excitem ent in learning. Key criteria would be:
• the interrelationship between experience and symbolic representations
• engagem ent in activity in a learning community -  a ‘community of practice’
• a sense o f em powerm ent by restoring voice and agency.
The concept of simulation is a fam iliar one. Simulations are better than discussions or 
debates for various reasons:
• learners participate in a rich imaginary context
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• participants engage in role, thus ensuring that conflicting views are heard
• ideas are connected with real world situations
• there is less possibility for the teacher to dominate.
Some other open architectures for learning involve a shift of focus from  the single 
lesson to larger units of time. We m ight see the following as a fam ily o f such methods 
-  creating spaces for exercising voice and agency, involving decision-m aking and real 
audiences and frequently also leading to real and significant outcomes:




1) Project M ethod, as developed by Kirkpatrick (1918) in collaboration with John 
Dewey and commonly practised in Northern Europe, begins with a them e or issue 
introduced by teacher or pupils. This is discussed freely, so that ideas and questions 
emerge. The next stage is independent research or enquiry, with each group or 
individual choosing to investigate a particular aspect. In the final plenary stage, each 
group presents to the class and stimulates further debate. There m ight also be a fifth 
stage, involving a real world outcome. (One German variant involves the town 
council or a com m unity group presenting a real problem to the school and asking the 
students to present possible solutions.)
2) Problem-Based Learning is a version of Project M ethod developed for medical 
education in North America but subsequently used in Scandinavian and Dutch 
universities in different specialisms (now also with Education students at the 
University of Edinburgh). (For various case studies, see Schwartz [2001].) It begins 
with a situation, description or scenario which is difficult to ‘d iagnose’. The next step 
is for students to begin to articulate the possible problems. It then continues as Project 
M ethod. Applying this to teacher education, a course on social justice in my own 
departm ent asks students to debate a scenario in which teachers are acting according 
to a basic professional ‘common sense’ but which is in effect unjust, damaging and 
discriminatory. Students are required, after a period of reading and enquiry, to present 
two endings or sequels in some kind of narrative form at (story, description, letter from 
a parent, enacting a staff meeting, etc.) along with a more abstract meta-level 
‘theoretical com m entary’ on the situation and their proposed responses.
3) Storyline is a form  of thematic work structured by a narrative. This can be based on 
a novel but more often the bare outline of a story form s the skeleton. Like the other 
m ethods, it gives scope for independence within a community of enquiry. It typically 
begins with a situation (e.g., a location at one point in time). The learners invent 
characters for themselves (e.g., employees in a hotel, families in a town). The teacher 
(perhaps in role as postman, politician or newsreader) moves the story forward by 
announcing an event. Each such event is the stimulus for research, fictional or formal 
writing, improvised drama, art or discussion. Although the method was invented in 
Scotland for young children, it is regularly used with 13 to 16 year olds and older in 
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4) Design Challenges were invented at the University of Syracuse in the United States 
of America, as Education by Design (EBD), and dissem inated in Britain as the 
Critical Skills Project (ww w.criticalskills.co.ukf (See Critical Skills Programme, 
2001; W eatherley with Bonney, Kerr & M orrison, 2003.) This m ethod presents 
problem s to students which involve investigation and lead to creative solutions which 
are presented to an audience. I saw one class, in their first m onth at secondary school, 
in a challenge involving many different learning skills (library and computer-based 
research; spoken and written comm unication and PowerPoint presentations; small 
group cooperation and planning) as well as geographical and scientific knowledge. It 
began with a video message from  the Emperor of the Galaxy about his proposal to 
build a superhighway across space from  the capital to a new holiday resort. 
Unfortunately this would mean destroying the earth. The earthlings’ challenge was to 
prove that Earth was worth saving.
These various ‘open architectures’ provide spaces for learning communities to 
develop, for engaged learning which is critical and creative, for new interrelationships 
of experiential involvement and symbolisation in a range of media and for the 
exercise of voice and agency. They provide possibilities for engaging students from 
marginalised com m unities and overcoming feelings of low status and powerlessness. 
They provide a broader and often richer means than vocational training (the usual 
offer to disengaged young people from working class backgrounds) to engage in 
learning which is active and feels relevant. They help to bridge the gap between 
language embedded in immediate experience (Bernstein’s “restricted code” ) and more 
abstract theoretical registers (his “elaborated code”). They provide, in their different 
ways, for both the “ways of knowing” valued by Bruner (1968): the logico-scientific; 
and the narrative modes.
A Spectrum  of Representations
It is possible to imagine different kinds of representation as lying on a spectrum 
ranging from  the most concrete to the most abstract (see Figure 1).
Figure 1: Spectrum of representations







Let us consider the three pairs shown above, beginning with the m ost abstract:
a) Vygotsky (1986), who argued that words which are not rooted in experience remain 
an empty shell rather than a concept, also recognised the importance of “higher” or 
more abstract concepts: ‘T he new higher concepts [algebra] in turn transform  the 
meaning of the lower [arithmetic]. The adolescent who has m astered algebraic 
concepts has gained a vantage point from  which he [v/c] sees arithmetic concepts in a
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broader perspective” (p. 202).
Arithm etic already generalises quantity, shape, etc. (2 + 3, regardless of whether these 
are oranges or orangutans) but algebra takes this one step further by focusing on the 
relationship (x + y) regardless of the quantity. For any of this to make sense, however, 
connections between symbolic expressions and everyday experiences have to be made. 
This is harder in the case of algebra -  i.e., towards the more abstract end of the 
spectrum  -  but potentially more powerful.
b) Bruner (1968) speaks of “two modes o f thought” , two “ways of knowing” :
• the paradigmatic or logico-scientific mode 
® the narrative mode.
He argues that both are important, though the form er is unduly privileged in 
traditional schooling. Bruner argues that much is lost if teachers insist on excluding 
narrations o f lived experience and that stories have their own way of explaining the 
world. Learners need the facility to move between these two modes, building concepts 
on retellings of experience but also testing out more abstract form ulations through 
remembered and simulated events.
c) Similarly, a simple model of an electrical circuit (battery, bulb, wire, etc.) connects 
more directly to everyday experience but a virtual model in the form  of a circuit 
diagram on the computer can be much more powerful; we are able to play with 
alternatives in the circuit and test out the consequences of adding a second bulb or a 
more powerful battery -  provided that the learner can connect this with reality.
A particular case is that of simulations as a kind of imagined world (Wartofsky, 1973, 
pp. 208-209) which have a special role to play in learning. They help to bridge various 
form s of symbolic representations and lived reality in two senses:
• they are them selves a kind of alternative world or micro-world which parallels the 
real world visually, tangibly and so on;
• they provide a field in which the learner can move comfortably among different 
types of representation, shifting between narrative and academic language, 
between arithmetic and algebra.
This is particularly important for pupils whose fam ily or neighbourhood culture is 
built more on immediate and practical operations than on abstract argum ent -  for 
example, the children of manual workers or of ethnic m inorities with strong rural 
roots. They provide a means of drawing on the ‘funds of knowledge’ from  the home 
and comm unity (see Moll & Greenberg, 1990).
Conclusion
Pedagogies which shift easily between symbols and experience, and along a spectrum 
of concrete and abstract representations, have considerable potential for enhancing the 
educational progress of marginalised young people. In the past, too many assumptions 
have been made about the supposed intellectual inadequacies of disadvantaged pupils, 
without questioning tacit constructs of ‘ability’ (often based implicitly on notions of 
innate intelligence or linguistic competence). In parallel to this, because abstract 
reasoning is privileged within our academic culture, too little has been done to 
transform  pedagogy, including discursive patterns in the classroom. Both these factors
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-  the construction of individual ability and the dom inant pedagogical traditions -  have 
depended upon a Cartesian separation between thought and action.
This has been particularly damaging for pupils whose fam ilies do not share the culture 
of the school and its teachers. W hen teachers provide abstract explanations or require 
learning by m em orisation, without enabling their listeners to participate directly or 
vicariously in relevant experiences, their words may be com prehensible to pupils who 
have previously enjoyed such experiences but others are disadvantaged and com e to 
feel inadequate as learners. They simply do not have the experiences to connect with 
the words and enable the co-construction of meanings.
Recent theoretical developm ents, under the rubrics o f activity theory or situated 
cognition, and based upon V ygotsky’s (1978, 1986) seminal explorations of the 
sociality of learning, provide a new basis on which to develop m ore inclusive 
pedagogies. The argum ent of this paper is not for a return to earlier versions of 
progressive pedagogy, based on ‘learning through experience’ alone, but for a 
carefully planned bridging between symbolic representation and experience.
References
Adey, P., & Shayer M. (1994), Really raising standards: Cognitive intervention and  
academ ic achievement. London: Routledge.
Bernstein, B. (1965). A socio-linguistic approach to social learning. In J. Gould (Ed.), 
Penguin survey o f  social sciences. Harm ondsworth, UK: Penguin.
Bernstein, B. (1971). On the classification and fram ing o f educational knowledge. In 
M. Young (Ed.), Knowledge and control: N ew  directions in the sociology o f  
knowledge. London: Collier-M acm illan.
Bernstein, B. (1972). Social class, language and socialisation. In P. Giglioli (Ed.), 
Language and  social context. Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin.
Bernstein, B. (1973). Class, codes and control (vol. 1: Theoretical studies towards a 
sociology o f  language). St A lbans, UK: Paladin Books.
Bourdieu, P. (1983). Forms of capital. In J. C. Richards (Ed.), H andbook o f  theory and  
research fo r  the sociology o f  education. New York: Greenword Press.
Bruner, J. (1968). Tw o modes o f thought. In Actual minds, possible worlds.
Cam bridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Cowburn, W. (1986). Class, ideology and community education. London: Croom  
Helm.
Critical Skills Programme. (2001). Education by design: L evel 1 coaching kit.
Stafford, UK: Network Educational Press.
Edwards, A. D. (1976). Language in culture and class. London: Heinemann.
Edwards, A. D., & Westgate, D. P. (1994). Investigating classroom talk  (2nd ed.). 
London: Falmer.
Engestrom, Y., M iettinen, R., & Punam aki, R.-L. (Eds.) (1999). Perspectives on 
activity theory. Cambridge, UK: Cam bridge University Press.
Gordon, J. C. B. (1981). Verbal d e f ic i t - a  critique. London: Croom  Helm.
Hawkins, P. R. (1969). Social class, the nominal group and reference. Language and  
Speech, 12(2).
Kirkpatrick, W. H. (1918). The project method. Chicago, IL: Teachers College Record. 
Labov, W. (1969). The logic of non-standard English. G eorgetown M onographs on 
Language and Linguistics, 22, 1-31.
70
International journal
o f  Pedagogies and Learning 2(1), pp. 57-71. June 2006
Lave, J., M urtaugh, M., & de la Rocha, O. (1984). The dialectic o f arithm etic in 
grocery shopping. In B. Rogoff & J. Lave (Eds.), Everyday cognition  -  
developm ent in social context. Cam bridge, MA: Harvard U niversity Press.
Lawton, D. (1977). Education and social justice. London: Sage.
Moll, L., & Greenberg, J. (1990). Creating zones of possibilities: C om bining social 
contexts for instruction. In L. Moll (Ed.), Vygotsky and education. Harvard, 
MA: Cam bridge University Press.
Neisser, U. (1976). General, academ ic and artificial intelligence. In J. B. Resnick 
(Ed.), The nature o f  intelligence. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Rogoff, B., & Lave. J (Eds.) (1984). Everyday cognition: D evelopm ent in social 
context. Cam bridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Rose, S., K am in, L., & Lewontin, R. C. (1984). Not in our genes: Biology, ideology  
and hum an nature. Harm ondsworth, UK: Penguin.
Rosen, H. (1972). Language and class: A critical look a t the theories o f  Basil 
Bernstein. Bristol, UK: Falling Wall Press.
Salomon, G. (Ed.) (1993). D istributed cognitions: Psychological and  educational 
considerations. Cambridge, UK: Cam bridge University Press.
Schwartz, P. (2001). Problem -based learning: Case studies, experience and  practice. 
London: Kogan Page.
Scribner, S. (1984). Studying working intelligence. In B. R ogoff & J. Lave (Eds.), 
Everyday cognition -  developm ent in social context. Cam bridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press.
Tizard, B., & Hughes, M. (1984). Young children learning: Talking and thinking at 
home and school. London: Fontana.
Vygotsky, L. (1978). M ind in society: The developm ent o f  higher psychological 
processes. Cam bridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Vygotsky, L. (1986). Thought and language (edited by A. Kozulin). Cam bridge, MA: 
M assachusetts Institute of Technology Press.
Wartofsky, M. (1973). Models. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: D. Reide.
W eatherley, C. with Bonney, B., Kerr, J., & M orrison, J. (2003). Transforming  
teaching and  learning: D eveloping ‘critical sk ills ’ fo r  living and working in 
the 21st century. Stafford, UK: Network Educational Press.
Wells, G., & Wells, J. (1984). Learning to talk and talking to learn. Theory into 
Practice, 23.
Wengei; E. (1998). Communities o f  practice: Learning, meaning and identity. 
Cam bridge, UK: Cam bridge University Press
W ertsch, J. (1990). The voice of rationality in a sociocultural approach to mind. In L. 
Moll (Ed)., Vygotsky and education. H arvard, MA: Cam bridge University 
Press.
Wrigley, T. (2000). The pow er to learn: Stories o f  success in the education o f  Asian  
and other bilingual pupils. Stoke, UK: Trentham  Books.
Wrigley, T. (forthcoming). Another school is possible. London: Bookmarks.
71
CD T 3  
3  cd 
2 . °
a. 3 -
' C  o
o-a ex
o  §  o
s  ^  i .
CO 3  5 ‘ H
5 '  ° -
£ z
era c l
P  - t ,
FT g
I I
O  c  CL g  c r
■ a  o






p V? CD O COCD O '
O ^  ~  
" ’’ t l  (TO
-a  2  -•
o  n  cd 
CO 2 .
s  *- J  ca 
£ L  *< 
c/T 0/5
°  S  .cr 3“
-  8  S
3 '  5 -
era o
C  3 O  CD
• w  •» = ■  " a
3- X3 
3  CD 
6?
er 3-
p erg 03. 3-lcr cd n §
CD o  P
O  3  3 iw «ex 3
a 3 3CD £+
I  Q .
^ OC5 M
3 3  cr
^  ex




CD O  CD 
2: B 3









3  §J 
—  UO




i  ex o
2 9: oo era w
° S >3 cr
CD (/)
T  3 .  CD
= -  o  -  ^  5 ' «  g  
3- <§. 1  "  *• 5. 8
cd n  S  oo £S ej _ ,
3 -  &  g  £ 3  if
— . K  ^  trq “  mg g. 3 ™ o “ 8
5  „  %  "  £  2, g
i s ^ - 3
o O 3 3"*1B0 □. g- 
E f  o '  < .  £  g3  m  £?
11 ^  p 
as cd e x
■ £  2  era-o <' 3
3
T J




2  o -  CD <
s  «  &  3- g-
-  p E  „  D
K  cd era 3 "  3 -P -  -1  n> CD
00 g 
2 -  “a
CD pj
. 2 . ~  5>
3- q  § J3 2 era
o 3

















































■ f? s § s 3  y  s
3  of 
2  c2 . 
er B  . ° 3CL 3
3 s =f {ÖM e ; °  S
n  g 3
hj CD
5  P■ t  en ~* ri " 
ex c  <: x3g.3 S -S -^c » ï
i  a  X  g- g. «  <s
.  ¿ S  H  »  S -,
, £  S 'er »  S, g- S
-  S; 5 s  tt-S o
”  °  í  §  "  , 9  C
M m i.' C  P  O 1»
I  S- ^  g S
g  p . O 3  O E. o
I s  ° £ « « S
3 3 ° -a g g. S'
S  5  g  5  È  o . o
p  ri. 2.. cl ^  o
“a  cr o> _  e r  3
3* 3  3  o  e r  p  o
*■< CD C . 2  ^  CD
£2. 3  en c . 2  cr 'H
O  CO CD Q  (05 wEL CL s C CL ̂
o  H" cd w  ea
Q 2 , g  «  g , »  g
CD T1  esP1 C7Q ™
_> „j 3* ^
S .  n  r  cd c
g  § ’ ^ 3  cd 
g g 3* 3. CD 
K ? = 3 S " S
CD CD CD « ,  L3
p  era X  3  _  cd r io  3  3  rr O o  — ■
o  era’ 
■ o 1 S
3  «  
3  o  
CD
TD 35 -
»° 3*. 3  r





! °- 1 1 3 
f  s i !
p . ■“
3* 3  o  O* fif 2 -
CD
S  £  g  h
0  O  3 .  3 -1 p  a  2 
ex £  2  -1
3  3  <- 
<  (TO — • <
O  £L *—  P  31 p  —  • CD co 3
3  0Q cd co P
CD TU 
h-, CD
P -  O
. 3 2
o  p  .«*  
3  ? r
HT °3 Í5 ex
cr. -• a  cr
ira r r  CD co ,-T5
r-, a -  *_J _  CD CO
CD CD ¿2 - .  3  o
*  3  CD CD £2. 2
-  " ■  3  -  W
“  K'  JD  
X J  3  
ÊJ g  
p  cr. 






S  o .  
EL §
00 CD 




2- 3 - 3 " CDO 00 
$  32 g.
Q . "3 
ex 2—  ■ co
¡ 3 'S  ■CD S?
3
S E S ? ,v< 3  cr. o
ï * n£D CD < ;  O
£  2  < Î  ^
- n  e £ L
O O P 3 3 3 3
2  ex o
S' g1 E .  
S 95. 3
P  CD XD 
V< O
I  S -  2 .
5 -  3 "  3 -








S er 3 < i* 2
I S- s I  ? I-S g. s^  cT a ex ^  p
H »  o  u H “  
3  3  3  c  ^
S 0 g o  ïï g 
£°ä » ! ! 13
g -
CD O  3  
CD
CD ^  
or O
3 “ G
ço ¡2  J  ( J  <
s -  &  S  ï » '■ cd ¡~L cd <;
sj^Æ  :  ° 
g  o . 3  ° -a
' < :§ I  s; 1o  x i o  ex
c  o  ^  ^  era’
5" o  g  3  3
2 c r  cd co
00 co 3  3 -  co^  3 o — .
co ?  M  Q ,  C
2  3  0 « ,
- er o  5“ e 
«1 cd era P  
o  w S
CD 3 Ï  e. fi
■ ' P O *
P à i
— xi 
m  o  2
o g r  a  e. s
^  - -  —  g -  o  “
P  2  3  cn
«  s  sX j  „„ co







3 o  35 ex te. 
D cd c r  
X CD E  5 ex cd
; a  g 
r  < Ii ,e r  p  
: cd" —
!. 03 £
: g s 
2  3
i w  O
■. e;  t j  
^  9
3  S  
o  L .
*1 r-*




^  2 
6 ìo  Po  q V
^  5 ’ ^  cT




3  3 “
3  2  .
2  33  O
H
b :




O  £  
3  CD 
CD 3  
X J CT
3 -  >
g  3  
? r  *P
ì era’ cd
r  3 S’! co q
o
—  p  CD




3 :  S
3  2  ^3  to' ~
'H .  5  3
s' § o
, 5-! ta ; a
' O
■ g 3 -a o. ”- £?
Q ? !
I  “ 35  p  3
3  2 .  s









2  op  p
& & 
ÖQ CD
. 3 - 3  w
S i  I
• g o l "
9 ^ 5 .
'S X I
g  2 
3 ?’
CD O '
h— P ‘- 1 
?  3 -  3
era 2  3






■°- “ § Cfl 2. re
■ S- §CT. re
Q.
TD
3 3 a. *q
«  CD
. O  3


















2 .  o
o 3
o  P  
—  3
^  a•CD CD 
O  P  «  XD 




&  3 .  O  &  -
= ■  o  
g  °a s  c s
B g




o g- S- I  S
(T) 3  O  CD (JQ
P
«  X3o E
XD g
c l  B*. 
o  era
£  3  
3  ^
3  &o P
cl e=
CD CD
S ' «O  CD
8* gCL 3
co P
P  P  O X)
o  c
3  a  . <  
$  CD
S '  § .
o  2  
e r  3





oo oo q-2 2.3e r  e r  >q o o 3  ^ 
o  o o ta­re- —  <






^  §  CD CD
3 (03
CD CD
X  °* 







3 ,  B )C2. CO 
§  O
o
« ,  m
CO — U
O  ™ n
a  (D 
°  O
^  a  <
S -  <d
D .  CD 3
5 ?  CDCD _•• (0
g g W 
. s  3 S8 
—  9 -. 3  





?  o  B. era 
3  " <  era
-  3










3  2 ,  
3 .  5*




c  'S .
3. g-'o  ~
E -  3  3 o
3  CL 3  n
er er 





3  3 — . (0 UW 2 . O
S g  re <g. g-
.» ^  3 a  g
a .  e r  x d  ~  -
re, 3  e r  j -  -•
B. p 3* g
O 2  K* g  era
O  3  _  §  P
- - S 8"B




D Q Û<Q tt ®
g" 8
°  °  G 5  >2 *< £  o
cd e n  cd ¿ O d  ■ re.
"  D. =r ’ "  o  E - %
S ^  Ër
P  -1 CD .
L<  ̂ CD O  -- fU
SS.«“ S  ,  §
C L  3 .  P  <  CD
r- CD P  U.  %
cra_ ci- ni g
* re S3 CTP O ^- ■ N » 3 ° 2 t r e ~  
2  re C  _  r r  2  3
?5 re Er <2 Si cr S3
^  B  SS re CL _  <a. £ 5 93. S re 2
re § I  3 " 90 13  CTQ CD cr 3
2  CD CO P  re-, «
S  r  g  2  8- n ^
„re' CD p  p  re, CD «-<
?  cr K. g  o 3
W l  s § I'3- e  g1 re re e
e I  S- <§ B 3 -re 93 re- F -a
3  re- ~  "
9° 5i—* Og  re 3. 9° 33 3 CC *r 2S » 2 o Ì »
9 2 . S 3 31 
g e  g :  s a
O co ^  o
Q.
Xd
3  B  o
CD 3
H  EL 00cd er o  
cl p  er 
a  e  o  




rT O 1 P . B-CD
e r

































p r P 0 O p B s: CO
3
CL S Tco X3















O 5 ' >
r  f
D) q  d
l | §  
§ Rig- « Cû
CD “  3  
— ■ CD CD °  ~  
5  (B O
p g. w 
£  g S 
o  â §q ÇD_ °
9: 3 ®
(D P  20 re— œ p
o  3  
-  -*• o
$  C  CD m O 3.











o  3~r u)
3 >
2  y? r3  n  C 
c l  o  c B.c
3  E . o
re-, l»3 .  O  
N  ” •
CD EL
3- CD
I  33i S3
s £^  re C
o  3 .
<  CD
ig*
1 ° - ■ 3 3
p
!
p  o  
r  o  e r
- Cd p  
n  ^  
E  n
' P  P
t  00 x>
- c e  p
! c B.
i’ § • § -i 3  p
• 3  x  
! B ’ v< 
f -ao 3
;• -i 0Q1 to P
^  I
Í 3 <S
: g  SD' I a
B Cd 





a  Q) 
S ’ (Q
%  03
«  5 ’
S -  Co
O  ^ T  
Cl CD
^  O





»  2  Í
n  S3B. g
o  p 
p  B i
o  ^  
3






















n  ï  E cd er o  
5= S re n » 3
g °a . o
3  2
o  =• ee er3 2 af «
3 2- o B- g
00 ë £q CD CD
p 3
&  XJ
— • era oG0 CD G 
>  CL
e r
o  ^  
—  °1 c CD
co co C O <
n e e
er o  3*
co O
n w der , 2 
o  3o CD
Cd era
eicS
CD P P. G
3 3-
S3
§  W  g
S c T O ^ F T - S Sre Ì0 O —-93 E. 2 a.5: 33 P re—
g  cr
a? ^  
" 3-
—  PJ3 3 ro 2
o  lo H  G0




O“ <  O O 3-
S  co o  y »  §re—  — S re-,
«  -  ^  te < ¡ 3





o .  3  2 -  p  3  3  CD 3
9 . «  P
n  9
ce o  o  er 
3  /i n  X •
' !  §'&
— Hn er
P  CD
p p  p
7C O  m r  
CD Q . — ■ CD 
e> C  3  e
% S 3  S
P  Q . 2  <CT
■o 2  o
^ 3 -Q 3
-Q o- c  c  
S . —• o ' w
s? S 2'




're  CD «X 3O  «  CD 
O  00 3
5 £ %o . er ev 
B- CL 9 2- CD co~ & s r  
S »  BB g s
re °' n . c  3  ̂E.CTQ 
3 .  ' - «  s r  
95  S  nS ç S » er c l
3 3









-1 CD CD P
£ Û) 3
Ulv>
3 ^5 3 ' 0OP
C L CÛ 3-.p
CO __ 3 a!
P a cC/) 33
COn o '
3 ! P 0 2 '
















e r v :co



















O - X 3' 2
ce p  co
3 f §3 °  p




W i r tp p crT 3 p
P  P  p
p 0)
3  3  Q .• a -a
o $ 2  o
r  y>
B n
o' B ^  3 ® 53  3  p
5- < co 
CÛ P_ 3
p co q
§ 3  S.
g - 1  J f
m ® ~
< < 3-
<  P  P  « P <
® : »  3 p 2— £2! c-0  3  2




P  3£5 n 
3 =3  CL
“  i  
° -  3-i»
<  CL
2  c/5’ ç. o
3  "O ca =r.
— . 3  3- P 










| ï2 toCD p
3 9*.CD 3
B  era
X  co 
3  co3 o
X I 3  
CD CD 




g  3PCD P
£o ° *  3* 
1 3 "  00 P
• S- b  8' ^  71' r/ô
r r  b  V 
re 3  
°  2ic 
o ’ g
££ì CL 3 OQ 3* XJ
3- &
ru o
o  5 '  o -  re
3 '  3
3  3
I I
DJ P  




P  —  
Q. P  





3 -  *





3 *  CDP r/1
er q .- cr ^
§  S ’  t
g 2 C l  . . O 3- a-
3 9 3
¿  3 .
c  B  -
O  CD
s  5-1 p
g. p
a  s. s «
■ 3  b -
g -  o  =r >
a  s  3
S 3
5 '  E T t
S? gS . OQ
3 re)CD CD —J
S
XJ a 1 q_
r e j P2 to P
3 “ O








3  2P  3
3 s*
CD to
e r  er
 —o  a .
cr o 
o  “  £
3  B*. 3 -  -
3 3
‘ n  5 ' 9*. ei
3. p 9 
p  —  2
^  CD
p 3
p  H  - HCO □  reico e r
c> o  ?r 2-g cd cd ef P
; CD
era







NJ Q)°  ao  O
£  Q .  X
w  3  o  
O r e o
3 - 2  p
CT. *—}
g 9. 0
W Ï .  O
3. 3 p e r  rro top  CO
CD CC 
£  ^
o  QB* °CD rre 
3  p
o  -
^  e r 3  
3 ’ P  3 're3  CL
p  CD
3 ' O
2  CD 9  
8 3  HX - _ o
3  S, EL 
2 . 3  e00 2- 3 3 -  er. EL 
e  e .
o  o  n>c  P  p
¡4* “  c l
O  C L  CD
o* p ‘ 3:
3 XJ 
e r  o  
P  cd - .  
C l  -  co
x :  p
.—. _ ■ u  
¡H  CD X ) 
CD O  2  
X “ “  • o  5  3 XD 
►a OQ D . 
CD «  P  
O  P  CD
^  9  e r
w  3 .  CC L Q  rere
CD 2  - .B p 3CD 3 -  CO
Z> “  §1P  to re*
3  3  2 .  







e r  co
«  §  CD CD P  CD g  
CL XD 2
I 2  P  







s a â M s3  e r  3  







2 p  o -  e r  K  
o  X -
' 3D  £  
°  2  
p  CL n  co
3 ’ ^
rere CD
X I CD p  
—  , C  P
n  X ,  g . ’o
%, 9 to p* to >1 o  
- i  co n>
D> c  c l
S S 5  2 
3  « n  








’ c  3
co X
o ’ CD OQ
0  3 - 3
p  cd era. 
co g  3
-  re CTQ
31 p  «3 3p .  CD
3  CL ero p  
CO 5
CD O
e r  9  
to C) 
re re
> 1  re -o
5- Í2  p  2 . * <
p  X
H -  g
P  co X  CL p  P
to 3  reg
0  o => o  3
X  O  co X  p -  ,




P  r3  n  'ira
9*. o
t  era c l
EL 3
c l  ^
co p
5 ‘ 90 g- 
p  - 5 ‘ ;
p  p  '
1 S- :L CD 1
; i l  




S .  %
3 S
a  s





p  pre“"" 3
P  P  
3  X  
C L  X
P* 3
p  ia? ;
p0 5
1 âp  X
1 s3 3
<  F3 i
3' H  
0 0  e r  i
rere CD I
er  _Q o i 
C l  P  :
O  C L  I
2  p  !
o
B
to p  £ £
to $
s -  «  s  s  g - 1  s  • §  í -
a  g  c r  g .  »  §  g  I  3 -
ÿ  S . 01 S-. c  r  5 '  o  °  a -  oo
I s S  s s a - y , "  B  l a
■ era S, o  ^  „  „
ê. g  H  %
■ n n o- Hi
o  a  n> co
3  n  °  a
. j a ço °  Q  CD
ï 3 » s r2 o e _cd
I -  • s- » S, s  w °  S
- p
X  — > X  9  9  3  x  q .  -
CD «  3  «  C  re X  X -
K O g C D W r O Ï Ï M -
S 3 S g g | §  g’'S
i  < rê I  « i  s - !  saL I  ê a S g-^-a •
X  P -  CD O  _  ^
g ;  S  3  X  s  a
° -  O  ta l* a r  s
g -  X  CO X  ÇD C .  «
<  s  g  a  b  s  «
3 .  £  s .  a .  - a  
^  “g  £  ¡  S -  i - o  
S ê g o ï f sL era *? *2. -°* 5
i g s  S r12. p 
o  o  1
r  È  <•
C  ^  ^CO r-,
re & S-
3  ^  S 3 „  . ____S S 'S o - S g s a »  ero  co cd r-, crq 9  ^  açd x  o x. x cd ni cr o k p3 _ 3 CD CD -, X- °  p n 00
9  p  er> 3 ' 3  M «  9  X  torri L—  CO « ,  O  CD 3  p
r r  O  C  £  3 3  0 Q R• c < 3 § cd re r à.5 a g L Q -re gn „ CD X




o  c < 5 a 3 . x e 3 n i- HQ co 3. S. cd 3. O 2 3 3 
2  c r  CD £5 ~1 2 .  9  B  e -
CD X
3  9« CD° B—, co




S  I P  3 H
9 % g
U. p pr
se P. aCT n co 
«  E T  ™
cd e v
9  B CD p CD
3 .  9  3  —  Xo J S-
c  3 P
X  P  0Q
B  9  9
~  c r  e*
£2 . 3  9
O  OQ p  




™  3  ^  
& | .  3 
X  9  2.
1-1 g  <M re £3 3 CD3  h-. - 3  n
O co CD CD
- °  §  £  I  5  
s  2 -  3 -  S '  §
€ E  g  S . TO
» • o  ? »  o
“  a 1 § 3P  X  Xw  ̂ < e  3"— . 3  <  e r  n.
CD
3  3  




oo ?! re E
to S 
3  O  
—  a
g fs 
E .  CL
0 “ 
TO Eg B.H-- CO 
N  —
g. S
§  ï_ CD
1 ^ 





&  g  5a oo
ë p.3. P
<  e rCD cora 3̂





a i  2 .
E r  o
cd e rP CD 
CL <  ¿y p "  3 .< ra 0q O
¿  a  P  °  9




o o  H
P  9p  o  
c  cæ oo
O rû 5- co- 3 ra 3CD
3  p  
re 5re—S »I• >— O 
VO p
■ 3  S -
- i  3
B
3  9 ;CD 31
S  Ore
< O CD ÜQ CD n X 3
3  B
9  «  




CD 9  •— •
■ I  I  13  3  012.W 3
üQ er
3 -  o  3
3X
o o “3 2CD ~  




-  D  p
: 3  * 9  "S 3;• O  OQ 1 <l: 2 C
co CD •“t-
■ O  B  CD 
-  P- • ‘ 3D O 
ra X  _
g. g § 
i'g-S ?
, XI CO H— «■ rere. r̂e. p




rè—  ¡~l re-, CU retP « 2 Q ra
* B
CD O
° o 3 O CD
$  z




lirre ,—». . . CU3 S  3 --0  c,
t o  3 .  9  §  CD ;
0 3 5 3.
§ “  8- g 3 13 9  ¥ co -•s ? í - g i  ^3  o o ee <O c a "  3.
3 w  L  o c2g- ^  ^ 5
D  3 -  r—,  D
°- re §  2
c r  -h  3>< 3 -i 3







9 P-3  o  p xr
X X X
X



















































































o X D B p
n o $ X <'











§  ° -
s  a
e r  a
3 EL
C l  o  
- .  3
CO C L  X
!“!• D 3
* <  S  O  d  '
ra 9  3  9
?: & ' 9; fO CD >“1
1 re. CO
i co D -  ç r
r X  CL  — •i s  3 ?
D  co _ b  - •  g  D -  on i C O r r ,  3  <  Q  9  2 -
2 OQ to P DX 
C  2  3  to 9 OQ
' \ 2-9
P  Q  D
X -  r jX  cjn  3  3  OQ CC p  , . 
n  3  -  • O  3  OQ to
p  ̂X CD
' w <■ 
C l  <
X - 3  C 
3  — . co
oT 3  O
X  D  
VO X  X  3
!* V ,  9  °
—  C  3 -  3
to 3m  r 3
* r 5re, D. ?






3 °5  « i
o ë o








p c =•— 3 9
-  3  i—i —i r J► 3  o  o  X• X °* 3 O
o o  E -  O
n 3
a  H  
8 ,  = :  ■ § '  
S
! 3  ̂ 2 1 X o $ra 9 Bn  • 3
o P  cr 
g r a n ,  
c  3  L -  co « _  re-,
O  X  C L  OQ
-■ e  s gX O ° C3
9 - 3  5 '
-  X g  oo
X- 0Q
§ Í
X X CD X
■ 5 '  3
£ 9  3 O ço o 
r  o  3
(Q  CD 3
ò. 5 ‘ ©
ï “ I,






S ' ñ  aCD (ü 3
'S
CO o
3  p  3
3  3  CD
*?3
p  3q  en —-
CD X  3
<  o ra
g 3 S.
?  5 - 6T
i 5  3  g
¡ CD CD CD













§ 1  ra i.
co *< 
œ  •' O CT
n- 3 113 o © 3 
3  <  p
© g  g .
p  o  °  
o CT en
p g «  3  _  n 
°  x  Z  
£=. ©  c
Î S  5•< ra. —
X  $  CD 
CD O  <  
> ,  —  © 
£  P- ©
p =• B 3 x  p
o f f ?
S ä S
B o S. 
c  q p 
«  ra x
©' B- x
' ^  -  =J‘
■ * » ?H X  ¿=- CD
i i  S O
i O 9  R
» T O ' ,
B 2- o ra 
>< x '  o  -j- ra p p
© -i ° I^  B  o ~-
C  P  3  O
x  X  p  x c  o  9  q
3  =  S 5
3 o  o’ 3  '




n  ^  
X  X I
§ S
ÉL § g
n  ï »  °  S  2 x  3 co 3 X  , (TO O X
2 S " 3 Ï
g a¡
I s
9  °* 9 x  o ' 3
co < 2  ° 3  o
P  P  O  co *-t
X  ra i—  • (jQ
ra n  O -  o  Po  ra « , 3 
2  ( t  O .
p  o> o  „
9  CL X 5  XC «  _  < G
p  9*•<: °









X  o  
3  X  ra
ra B 9
co P  2
9 °
ra -  I«  x  o>
n  2 . oX -1 CD
P  ra 3
S- E E-
o 2  5' 
g i" -o
™ s; § 
" g go 2
•a « g
CD X  X-  p
01 2  ̂ bB -°1 9- rao m _
S o’ -9 °
E. ’S »  c.g S re re
°- g  S  SP  r—r 
X  P
X
— - o n
3 '  -d_ 
3
3 S - 5
3  3
re §  
° -  <
P  CD .—_  X  ra
3 Q g  ï
»  ^  §• ° -3 x 0 0  CD X  X3 ' 5’ «CD to  B  CO
8 g  g  Ü.
g . P f  B- 
§ s i  I-  E-  ce
c:. c  XJ o2 9 9 93 9 ra K p ^ x  Ü-
x  o Ä ^
o  H -  3  3  
9* o ’ -  g  
9  $  ÜQ 
<  3 ^  X  9  ra
3  3 ‘
CD Q. 
£  p
3  % o  £
• s .  3 a’ O — OQff ï  3
1 ra  CD Q
O  (D P  
3  p  XJ OQ q xi■ ÇD CD — 
M-Ï X  ^  
x  o q ’ °
t J <— —1 x
p  X  CD
“ 0  3 ^x co CO O
ra x  9
x  £ p ~p S. x
<  X  o  p
■ S i  
s  I1 er- 3  
CD CT' • O *5
•—■ C.co Lo co 
x  ^  3  
^  H ft S à
—  P  CDa- a g
O








. x'  g  g
ÜQ X  O
- re-T ^  <S" rere ~*-
f0 CD x-1 n  -
: cd p
p  3 -■1 O CO re», R • CD O" O — re, O
1 3  X  X  3 ‘
“  "  =■ n
: 8 8  *■ §
(• 3 °  g
§ 3 E es
:  8  s  s -  "
r  ^  a  E  «
°  a  re, S
X  p  





■° O "  p o
■ 9  to
CD OQ





f OQB c? xCD O
« r a o0  3 — 0
3  ^  5° ~
ra p  x  r*>P  ra c  2C  CO CT «




CD x  
3  o  
X  X  




S . 3 - S
X





















re— O 0 O XO
P

















p 0 " XO
3
x
ÜQ. 2  
O X eu p
<  3
p  X I  
X  O
x  2 . o  1ÇD 3 ’ CT, I











3  «  p  ra pf ft
P .  ©  O o
3  OQ
CO x  
2 .  CD 
3  CD
- 5 ' a
OQ O
CD P  
O  X J
~  B
5 § S - .
g & en 3
3  n .
ëX
5 ' —<
o q  g
g 8
9  g  
■9 B
B: S 3 B X raX  3  o
X  X J
g  E
g  &
O  CD 3". q_  .. 9  3 o  CT 9 x 3 ci ^  -p 9 3 B
— o  P .
O Cl
X  ffQ 
o  2 .
3  5 ' ÜQ Ñ' X  >  §  03 •—» .CT X CD r, CT 3  E
X  OQ
g "
ÜQ < 3 O
CT OQ
8 ° 
x  Bo  3
B 3 9  3O XJ
5  n
POQ









<5 to9  üQ
Q- 5 CD 3  X  O
O ro X' X  P  B 3
ra , B O X  Q-
X  9  R 9  O x  q
3  9  ra. 3  3CD 33 s
?  o  
□"
9  3
2  3 =  
P <Dra 13




g  3 3 . - -  ~




. 5 ' g '










o  CT. ^  ra
09. S* 'S
S ’ g : S ’
3  0X O
co 3  q
rer CO O
X X - "
g  Q) 





CT © 3 3
“D
I
3 0 “ - c
«  oo x  
i = -  S .  3  e
cn co -u -a 
>  S- H §
3 S Ï "
—  3  •
2 & '
’ ë jS




• £  ft '
i „  £ re
I S , ? 3  
> o« -  ■£
. PO ^  ft- re 3. •<
-  OQ g 
Í  o  “ -
? 3 —-  fl K)
i' 3. 2
n 3 —_  Er ¡
C» 3 ' !
Ni o 
■ § 1  f° 
>  
3







S  c O  «
2 a c Q  
er P. er P+
“ 5  “  ®





XJ § 'ë 3
w — • Q. 3 
era' 3




S3 32.x  < 
° 3' 
g  9 o q
e cT 9 H ero oI- ft g
1 g ’ 8rere R. P




X  CD CD
CD X  3
<  P  ÜQ
CD X  p
O X  9




x  9  
q p 
q  o q
CO P- v 
O  3
B  s
x  g -  c
CD OQ
P 3
1 °  X •-!
CD p  
O  ^  
X J  co
3  3
o  2 . Í  §  
3 . o  s r  2 .
m § I  
2  5  a .
3 8 re
S a s - '
S  2  o "  X 3" P
B '  tra B, 
ci g  b  
re S
2  s - - a
5  3 . .  
—  o  x  
P  OQ 
P  CT ra
Bt HQ x
S  g  g .
o  -
ft B 3 « ra g 1 g. q S- x 9 3
O o ^ 9  X  X
■ s  i - i - S  l a
o
3  o  ra,
n  x3  ra x« P 3
«  OQ HQ O CD 9
rare s re 3 I  s-
2 S S
p  ÜQ _  
n  ra O
OQ x  
ra P &
E E .  a*-*• P  CD
co q
0 x 2  to B
' X
o 1
p x .  
■i 5  o  
«  x  P
re S ä  
3 1 0Xi co
X X  O  O X «,
s  a  o
¡ ' I l
° I !.
CD O  CD 





3 - 2 -p  ■
x .  xco CD




q -  O  B. X
x  q .
CD CD
? 2 








co ra. 3  
§ ' c o
ra. cd
re C CD




5  °X 3S
s  £  *  £X X X X
£  B
Q g * è- ft«  2 . CD q  CDX P  re §  re,
o  ^  CD. o h  P
x  9  R- era
a- P CD O CD
3 '  o q  o  <  9 ,
CL
■Q





a 1X P CD O
3 3











CD £P XJ 
g X X
q . co' oq'x  ra p  
to g- 3 
° - p  o
9 05
CD O
P  CDXcc ° 





O  OQ 
re, CD
I Ift °• X
' % 5
c  • 8  
0  -1 
CD CDq co 
q  xi





3 p*o 9  
re gra* era
p  ©
^  X  
CT ore T3
3  E .






f  • 1 "
r ¡  Q  ¡  P
3' g. ¡ =
S P S S
O  O  G  Op c  c  ct
5  a  c r  ó '
•3 “  “  ci







n x r a x m m o a
= l s  *
00 00









o  o  
g  ë
70 x  ra
tC
-~J u) o  2.
g í  ?
70o_
ft £





a  p  
o  3:
S  fi-
>  D  P




3  »■P. »o
Ó' 3 CT CTS  GO CT
s .  n







1 i aLî CD•25reC/3 0
& G&5
G 'O CT co g







§  2 .  g
U) •>
u> q  
V^OOl  5C/I *
r*
fe 3D 
3  OO f~h
2 (D
<  - i
2  CDÌ  3fe» o  
^  CD 
5  0 )
CT p_ CT
o  CT §—> &o d.
n  Q |X  r3 0,0 
S d CT0 2 3
CT CTi
§ í §  I
1 í  i
i 5 5.
S  —. a
§  a g  ¡CT ^ Zct (T 55 
&  -  ñ f :
o  q  a
ë  §  g*
'• S - a
i .  w  u
M H  >  
o  ¡ r
3  S -  í=
' B M C  
*-■ o  » .  n  I
-  m  i ?  =r oP  M  2
<n O . rs 
er o  “
ë CT « O re­ft 8 5T ? íí
»  E  3  
=  2 - 3
• 2L ë
‘ KJ CB
o  Sí o
o\ oCT T3
• —  Q> ca n  
o  “
5
q  3  B
g  ë  re. :
o ’ I  !
E I § i-  »  §
■ re
, o o  i
^  i
■ oCT 5- :
a  5  5O Q- cr o. “  ct
S  o '  3 -
■ ro a
! c .  9  S 'CT re CT. i  -a 
«  CT oE ft R
O . 3  J
«  < ’ r°  
1 s § 
§•§£ 
8 O 3
°  O .
er § ■ :
&  w . g ■= 
i  eë  a .,
° s: l
-  S .  %  - • S ft <
! CD
I 00 3_ TD. a. re re *ft > q> i  3  io  oo ,
3  §  f t d  
■S- 3  = r ;re 5 °G  3  o  i
’ f f  ; 
I  i ii  3re re , CT 3 i
°  c r  re-
CT c r  c r  3 . CT
%  5 ' 
H 3:
3  3 -
O  oo
EL CT
■ i  §
re* s, 
§ § E
' ë  C.
ÒO o  &
5 -cra  S
IQ 3  3  
=r co Ç?




f  1 1  í? g
<
O




- B - ;
£  °E. 3
3  CT O






¡n ? < y H S H poH 00 ood  re*■ rj CT - r  re re  re re  3  3
i ? r j
S  ̂
í  8 -  's
r r  »  ?
B ? S  C • CT 2 1? re
re" 3fB q
ere T J  




I "  3
ta o










r -  °
re °3  co
P  ̂P.00 re 2





«  vO 
to O
g :





E  3 
3 ' 2




re 2  y? P
■ g 3 O  ^  z  2
S  H  P  g  !
■ S  r  EL p
P  >  Co §
3  G  —  "— 'Z “M -°o  o  P  o
^  £re 3  o  c:
cî' e  cT  r?
o
o
ë  2  
a s .
re re  £L
p R ) ,—s
CT CT (O  ë  O
G  CT O
o  01 ¿5 
S  'n  «w  p. P
S* ftfta CTO
S  'S  re.
Ö  o '
§ i  S
§ ß=>
i° 70
r  2  
s â
O  ■ct r
‘  R° 
‘  O
7  2  ë CT
P  S
>  03
t̂ 3 vO 3  S 
O . \0  03 R
I -  Q  i
c I 
3 .  o




S  n  E .  K.
r~ 3  3O gj oo oq 1
S s ? 0 ? 3
a  ro  Ö  D
re3 re










CT 03■a - 
x  n  
7  ELÇÏ CTtO vO lO CT>
p- re







S  § '  
I  S  
S  F
=  ç











■ a  ^  - ë
X  O’ L- re —O 3 ~ tOre re' Oj tre- to





>  O en re5
O  <  ft- a
X  3 .  Q
o  a  h
2 ^ 0  CT 5 3
p  00
p  3 1 
&  E
CL -- G 3
re ~ .yjB- P R '  




I l 3? 5 3 £3 .  - 5 2 .  3.oo oa_ qo_ 
ci 'T- n a'-< * 
H o H  H
S cP 
S’ 2
3Ri
5 ■
S- ?
3 3
